
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
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MIDDLE EAST IN CRISIS

A HISTORICAL AND DOCUMENTARY REVIEW

MIDDLE EAST IN CRISIS

A HISTORICAL AND DOCUMENTARY REVIEW

Carol A. Fisher
and
Fred Krinsky

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Preface

This book had its inception in a common teaching experience. Although it is now almost two years since we were first involved in the preparation of materials on the Middle East for a course in the problems of American democracy, world events continue to remind us of the critical importance of the Mediterranean area. Our students were aware of an increasing variety of proposals for the role the United States should play in easing the tensions in the Middle East, but they were relatively unfamiliar with the general history and geography of the area. Thus they were unable to evaluate these various proposals critically.

As a result of this experience it was felt that there was a general need for a selection of materials designed to guide the citizen in formulating his own view of United States policy in this troubled zone. We then undertook a dual task: (1) the preparation of a descriptive essay which would meet the need of student and lay reader alike as a guide to the basic historical and geographical data of the Middle East; and (2) the provision of a source book of historical and recent documents which would constitute a framework for developing and testing foreign policy proposals.

We were assisted in our undertaking by many interested colleagues. We wish to express our appreciation to all of them with a particular note of gratitude to Professor Stuart Gerry Brown and Dean Harlan Cleveland of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University.

We would also like to acknowledge our thanks to the following for permission to quote privileged or copyrighted material:

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CAROL FISHER and FRED KRINSKY
Maxwell School, Syracuse University

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Introduction

The big failures are the most interesting part of history. This book brings together some of the crucial documents necessary to understand the recent failure of the West to read aright the signs of change in the Middle East, and to cope with changes when they occurred. Because the drama of American involvement in that turbulent area is only beginning, every American can usefully acquaint himself with the facts.

The twenty-one months, from the Suez crisis to the Lebanon landings, are truly a watershed in the history of the modern world. These stirring events—the rise of Nasser in Egypt, the Arab unity movement, the development and will-to-survive of Israel, the decline of European influence in the Levant, the competitive intervention of the Soviet Union and the United States—have their origins deep in a past but dimly remembered.

The state of Israel can be seen as a political fulfillment of the ancient Hebrew prayer to God to lead his chosen people back to Jerusalem. The Arabs grope toward unity spurred by the memory of an antique time, already a millenium past, when a Moslem empire spanned the world from central Asia to Spain. The British-French landings at Suez can be seen in perspective as a pathetic reversion to methods that used to work—in the nineteenth century In that same century, we learned in school, Tsarist Russia was forever pushing at the edges of the Middle East in search of a warm-water port. And as for the Marines in Lebanon, are they not the heirs and assigns of a tradition which includes a landing on the shores of Tripoli in search of pirates?

What's past is prologue, to be sure; but the roots of the contemporary crisis do not all lie deep in the kind of history that is measured in centuries. A closer look at the Middle East in 1956-58 shows us a past that is full of "proximate causes."

The ingathering of the Jews in Palestine would hardly have achieved a momentum so disturbing to the Arabs had Hitler not consigned six million of their brethren to confinement and death. When the Industrial

Revolution made petroleum a form of wealth, and petroleum was eventually found in unequal measure beneath the nations of the Arab World, a move toward Arab unity was fore-ordained—the "have-not" nations taking the initiative to federate with the "haves " Once Lenin took power in nearby Russia, and established the policy of undermining capitalist strength by cutting the West off from its colonial ties, it was only a matter of time before the Soviets would get around to penetrating the Middle East in earnest. The wonder is that it didn't happen sooner—before, rather than after, the much larger and more difficult operations in China and Southeast Asia.

Add to all of this the sudden emergence of the United States as the most powerful nation in the world—if also the one most astonished by its role—and American involvement in the Middle East can be seen as almost inevitable. The wonder is that we were able to stay on the sidelines as long as we did.

This little book might well be subtitled, "The Sudden Education of the United States." For two brief, crowded years, in the microcosm of the Levant, Americans have been exposed to three homely truths. We have learned that the mighty cannot avoid involvement in a crisis anywhere in so shrunken a world. A policy of studied disinterest—in Soviet arms traffic with Egypt, in Israel's desperate appeals for arms, in the precarious position of the Hashemite kings in Iraq and Jordan, in the growing power of the Arab unity movement—simply did not work. The same old problems remained and were rapidly joined by others. When President Eisenhower decided to "sit out" the Suez crisis, some kind of dramatic over-involvement at a later date was predestined. Destiny was in a hurry: less than two years later, the Marines were sloshing ashore at Beirut.

We learned, too, how unhelpful to our real interests are those clichés by which we have lived for more than a generation in our relations with the several regions of the world. Attractive ideas like "nationalism" and "self-determination" and "federal union" somehow look different when others take them up and use them to justify the assassination of Iraqi political leaders and Egypt's "federation-by-swallowing" with Syria.

If, a few years ago, you had asked most Americans what they really wanted in the Middle East, the unhesitating answer would have been: "stability." We have learned now that the attempt to assure stability by bottling up political forces both ineluctable and readily exploited from Moscow is a dubious way to seek peace and order in a revolutionary world. If we have learned this lesson well, all the diplomatic heartburn recorded in these pages will have been eminently worth while.

Taken together, the documents in this volume constitute a judgment of irrelevance against some of the methods powerful nations have long used to affect the actions of others. When the British and French attacked Egypt in that abortive and miserably executed little war of 1956, the outrage of the rest of the world soon gave way to amazement that any prime minister of Britain or France could have started so quaintly old-fashioned an enterprise. Similarly, while the real drama was being played out in the "internal" affairs of several Middle Eastern countries, men with international reputations for diplomatic sagacity were engaged in setting up military alliances, announcing "doctrines" against the least likely forms of aggression, and gravely pretending that the established order of tiny, unviable "nations" was not already beyond repair. How far some United States officials were from knowing the score was revealed when, a few days before the murder of Iraq's king and prime minister, an American intelligence agent reported in Baghdad that the stability of Iraq was assured. "These Iraqi Arabs are different," he averred. "They are congenitally incapable of assassinating their leaders."

In diplomacy as in genetics, only the fittest survive for long. The skills required to deal effectively across national boundaries are therefore undergoing rapid mutation these days. It is no longer adequate for American diplomats to negotiate with the thin upper crust of each foreign society, to deal only with other diplomats and high governmental officials. Americans abroad are engaged nowadays in *operations* on a very large scale—technical aid, industrial investment, military training, and overt or clandestine liaison with all significant elements of each nation's political, economic, and cultural life. The more deeply we become involved in other people's "internal affairs," the more conscious we are of the need to get along, not only with the existing authorities, but with their possible successors. In the Middle East, we temporarily laid aside this first principle of twentieth-century diplomacy. We opted for stability in a region where there will be no stability until there has been plenty of change.

Because the Middle East's *inter*-national affairs cannot be understood without seeing the dynamic change in their *intra*-national affairs, Miss Carol Fisher and Professor Fred Krinsky have not only put together a collection of timely historical documents but have produced a guide-book as well—an introductory essay which provides the background for understanding the place of each document in the tangled story of contemporary Middle Eastern history.

The resulting work is not just a "survey" of Middle Eastern affairs; it is, rather, a basis for discussion of United States interests and United

States policy in the area. More than that, it is a discussion guide tested and proved in terms of past success. The documents it contains were first assembled as a basis for a study-and-discussion project in a sophomore course in Citizenship, conducted by the Maxwell School as part of Syracuse University's liberal arts program.

Both authors teach in the Citizenship Program, a general-education curriculum designed to introduce freshmen and sophomores to the complexities of public affairs and to methods of making and executing public policy. Miss Fisher, a graduate of Colorado College, has combined anthropological field work with her duties as Instructor at Syracuse University and is completing her requirements for the interdisciplinary Doctor of Social Science degree in the Maxwell Graduate School. Dr. Krinsky, Associate Professor in the Citizenship Program, earned his Ph D. in Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania in 1951 and taught at the University of California before joining the Syracuse faculty in 1948. He is co-author of several textbooks used in the Citizenship Program and chairman of the editorial board which produced the sixth revised edition of *Problems in Democratic Citizenship,* published by the Maxwell School.

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PART I | HISTORICAL REVIEW

CHAPTER 1

The Land and Its Peoples

Many Americans first recognized the importance of the Middle East to the United States when Israel was established as an independent nation, May 14, 1948. The political attacks by Arab states on the new nation, the short but bloody Arab-Israeli war, the plight of Arab refugees, the continuing efforts of the United Nations to maintain a truce along the border of Israel, the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt in July, 1956, the frightening moment of war between Israel, France, and England on one side and Egypt on the other at the very moment of the Presidential election of 1956, the increasing Russian influence in Syria and Egypt, and the revolutions which have overthrown the monarchy in Iraq and threaten other Middle Eastern nations—all these events have brought the Middle East to the forefront of popular attention and concern. Yet perhaps the first thing an alert citizen needs to know about the Middle East is that behind these dramatic developments lies a complex history.

Many American citizens have viewed the happenings of October, 1956, and the troubled times that have followed as due somehow to an unfortunately volatile mixture of the Suez Canal and Israel. Some have assumed that there is necessarily a "right side" and a "wrong side" both legally and morally in these events, and have been disappointed in the search for a quick but just solution.

The purpose of this selection of readings is twofold. It is hoped that the geographical, historical, and cultural materials in the introductory essay together with the selection of important documents will provide the reader with a clearer understanding of the problems and tensions in the Middle East and of the importance of this area to world peace. It is further hoped that following developments in the Middle East from local tensions to the actual threat of world conflagration will serve as useful staging for illustrating the development of America's foreign policy.

The Middle East contains the most appalling contrast between wealth and poverty to be found anywhere in the world. It gave birth to and

contains treasured relics of three great religions—Hebrew, Christian, and Moslem. Here are found peoples enjoying the advanced technologies of industrial civilization surrounded by nomads living in mud huts and animal-skin tents, caring for small wandering herds of camels and goats as their ancestors did literally ten thousand years before them. The challenge of the environment is formidable in this land of deserts, swamps, barren rocky wastes, and isolated areas of fertile coastal plain. This variety in environment is matched by variety in the cultures of peoples relatively isolated for generations by almost impassable desert.

From earliest times this area has been the meeting ground of East and West. Overland transport depended upon long and tedious caravans for safe passage through desert and barren hills. Even ocean vessels relied upon Middle Eastern ports for provisions and welcome rest on the journey across oceans and around the tip of Africa. These deserts became the "Middle East"—midpoint between Europe and the exotic spices and wares of India and China—or the "Near East" with reference to Europe.

The building of the Suez Canal brought the Middle East into even sharper focus as a strategic geographical midpoint, and the discovery of incredible amounts of oil beneath the desert sands and coastal plains won for the Middle East the favors and attention of all the industrialized nations of the world. Unfortunately, but logically, the area became a pawn in the power struggles of the richer and more advanced nations. Its peoples know too well the yoke of foreign domination. To them imperialism is a word of hateful meaning. But before we begin a more detailed consideration of the several categories of tensions in the Middle East we might first turn to a brief contemporary political and geographical orientation.

During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Middle East, with the exception of Persia, came under the control of the Ottoman Empire, where it remained until the termination of World War I. Thus the contemporary political history of the Middle East begins at the war's close in 1918 with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the partitioning of the Middle East into spheres of influence and League of Nations protectorates awarded to Great Britain and to France.

The Middle East is an area about the size of the United States, mainly desert and wasteland, supporting approximately 80,000,000 people.* A majority of the people are illiterate and live in great poverty; a few are

* Population statistics for Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Lebanon and Turkey are taken from *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, Vol XII, No. 10 (Oct. 1958), Statistical Office of the United Nations, United Nations, New York. Population figures for Yemen, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Aden, and the Sheikdoms are current *New York Times* estimates.

among the richest men in the world. In some areas technological development is creating a growing middle class, not yet successfully integrated into the economic or political structure. The most modern buildings stand beside those many centuries old. Transportation may be by a camel caravan over desert trails, a "cadillac caravan" on a modern highway, or a public conveyance, often a late model station wagon.

Although some of the desert lands yield to cultivation if irrigated, water is universally scarce. Since water is differentially available, in many areas the full utilization of potential water resources will necessitate international cooperation. Mineral reactions in the soil, for example, "salting up," further complicate irrigation problems.

An estimated two-thirds of the world's known oil resources lie beneath this land but in general the people are not technically advanced enough to develop or use them. Most of the oil is produced by more advanced industrial nations on a fifty-fifty agreement basis.

Another of the Middle East's major advantages involves its strategic geographic location linking the three continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

Problems of commercial and agricultural development, intense nationalism, conflict in religious beliefs, resentment against former colonial powers, internal intrigues and rivalries between ruling families, as well as boundary disputes with frontiers periodically in motion, all encourage weak, unstable governments and increasing internal and external tensions.

EGYPT

On February 21, 1958, Egyptians and Syrians voted nearly unanimously to establish the United Arab Republic, a union of Egypt and Syria with Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser as its first president (see Doc. 44). On March 8, Yemen joined with the UAR in a federation to be known as the United Arab States. This agreement permitted Iman Ahmed of Yemen to remain as absolute monarch of Yemen, but provided for unified armed forces and foreign policies. A Federal Council of the UAR and Yemen representatives was granted veto power.

Let us look first of all at these three countries who have linked their political futures for better or for worse.

At the outbreak of World War I, Egypt, once a powerful civilization became a British protectorate. In the tide of rising nationalism before World War II Egypt was the first Middle Eastern country to achieve political independence, though British troops maintained a strong base

in the Suez area. After a period of continual tension, the last British troops finally left Egyptian soil in June, 1956.

Egypt has no coal or iron and only a little oil, not enough for her own needs. A population of 24,000,000 lives in an area about half again as large as Texas, 386,198 square miles. Ninety-six per cent of the country is desert, however, and most of the people are concentrated in a narrow strip of cultivated land along the Nile Valley. Although general living conditions are very poor and mortality rates high, the population is increasing, unemployment is rising, sales of cotton—the major export—are falling off, and the flow of imported goods is dwindling. Thus it is understandable that now, more than ever before, the Egyptians have come to look upon the Suez Canal as their greatest potential asset.

The government, prior to union with Syria, was a dictatorship under Gamal Abdul Nasser who rose to power in 1952 through an army coup that dethroned King Farouk. The government seeks to improve the economy, raise standards of living, increase industry, and generally strengthen the power and position of Egypt.

SYRIA

Syria, like Iraq, is underpopulated with a little over 4,000,000 people inhabiting an area of 66,039 square miles, a country about the size of New England. Some authorities estimate that up to 3,000,000 additional settlers are necessary to provide the manpower to develop Syria's resources.

Very little land is now under irrigation, although water is available in some quantity and the use of irrigation is increasing. Most Syrians are farmers and herders, and enough wheat and meat are produced to meet the country's needs. Other than building stone, raw materials are at a bare minimum. Syria is paid considerable rent, however, for oil pipelines running through its land from Iraq.

Syria was granted independence by the French in 1941, but French and British troops did not leave until 1946, and then only under strong United Nations pressure led by the United States. The government, prior to union with Egypt, was run by an unstable army clique closely allied with Nasser in Egypt and increasingly pro-Soviet.

YEMEN

This country, least known and most backward in the Middle East, is about as big as Nebraska, 75,000 square miles, and supports a population of

about 4,500,000. Yemen is not the typical Middle Eastern country recently released from colonial rule. Although controlled by Turks during the sixteenth century, Yemen, a completely independent oligarchy, has for centuries been closed to outside influences.

This country has no roads, no transportation facilities, and no industry of importance. It is rich in water and minerals, however, and has fertile plateaus where grain and coffee are grown, though at least 90 per cent of the population is both illiterate and poor.

JORDAN

On March 19, 1958, Iraq and Jordan formally proclaimed the constitution of a union between these two countries to be known as the Arab Federation (see Doc. 45). Although Jordan and Iraq under this union were to retain sovereignty over their own territories, the constitution of the Federation provided for equal representation in legislative, executive, and judicial bodies empowered to act for the Federation as a whole.

On July 28, 1958, the government of Iraq was overthrown and a republic sympathetic to the United Arab Republic established in its place. King Hussein of Jordan proclaimed himself head of the Arab Federation under the constitutional clause that delegated authority to him in the event of King Faisal's "absence," but without armed force he was powerless to support his claim and Iraq again operated as an independent government. Let us look for a moment at these two countries united as a Federation for such a brief period.

For a few years immediately after World War I, the area now known as Jordan was part of the Arab kingdom of Syria. With the collapse of the Syrian authority in 1920 it came directly under British supervision. Thus it was that Winston Churchill, acting as Colonial Secretary in 1922, was able to set up Jordan as an independent national unit under Abdullah, the second son of the Arab king, Hussein. His purpose in so doing was to divert this ambitious prince from leading a Bedouin army to war against French-held Syria. At this time the area, then known as Transjordan, was primarily a desert home for bands of wandering tribesmen, though some important towns remained from the centuries when the major caravan routes crossed these lands. The population there in 1922 was approximately 300,000. Today it nears 1,500,000. Since Jordan annexed some of the Palestine lands set aside by the United Nations for an Arab state, it now extends across some 37,500 square miles, making it a territory a little larger than the state of Indiana.

Severe desert conditions and scant material resources, except for an abundance of phosphate rock, constitute Jordan's grave economic handicap.

The political future is equally uncertain. Under Arab nationalist influences Jordan had ousted British officers from its territory in March, 1956. The July, 1958, revolution in Iraq, however, posed such a serious threat to the monarchy in Jordan that Great Britain at once returned troops to its support. Jordan's political uncertainty is based on a combination of unstable government and threats of revolution together with border struggles, high feelings of revenge against Israel and the problem posed by the return of British forces.

IRAQ

Long before biblical times, an ancient civilization flourished on the rich alluvial plain between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. This territory which we now know as Iraq was even then made fertile by an ingenious system of canals on which the life of the countryside depended. At one time or another over the centuries invading Persians, desert tribesmen, Asians, Greeks, Romans, and Turks destroyed the irrigation systems and so destroyed a succession of empires. The desert knew a hundred years of return to fertility in the eighth and ninth centuries only to fall back into wasteland again under the Ottoman Empire.

In World War I, British forces drove the Turks out of this land which was then known as Mesopotamia. Iraq was created under British protectorate as a constitutional monarchy and in 1932 was recognized as an independent nation. In 1956 under pressures of Arab nationalism the last British forces left Iraq and in July, 1958, a revolution overthrew the monarchy in favor of a republic sympathetic to the cause of an extreme nationalist group.

Approximately 6,500,000 people live in this country which is about half the size of Texas.

Oil was discovered in great quantities in Iraq and the present government has been directing oil profits into programs designed to raise the standard of living of the Iraqi who were, until just recently, as poor as any of the peoples of the Middle East. Long-term programs for roads, irrigation, dams, schools, and industrial development are in progress.

Iraq's oil moves to Europe through pipelines across Syria. These pipelines were damaged by Syria when Egypt was attacked in October, 1956. Oil income fell to a minimum and tension developed with Syria over repair of the pipelines.

Apart from oil the only major export is dates. When properly irrigated the soil is unusually fertile and the country could support and would need several million more people to develop its resources.

SUDAN

Though located on the southern Egyptian border and primarily a central African country, the Sudan has been included in this discussion of the Middle East because of its strategic and economic importance to Egypt. Long-range control of the Nile waters hinges on cooperation between Egypt and Sudan.

This area, about one-third the size of the United States, supports a population of about 10,200,000 people who live in tropical forests, wide plains, and fertile lands along the Nile. The population represents a variety of religious and racial groupings including Arabs, Negroes, Nubians, and Mulattoes.

Britain and Egypt ruled the Sudan from 1899 to 1953. The present government is a parliamentary republic. On January 1, 1956, under an agreement among these countries, Sudan proclaimed her independence. Serious disputes over the border between Egypt and Sudan remain unsettled.

The standard of living in the Sudan generally is still quite low, roads are few, and transportation minimal. There is an abundance of farm land with cotton as the major crop. Another natural resource is gum arabic and most of the world's supply comes from this area.

Though a member of the Arab League and in receipt of arms from Egypt, Sudan has not yet formally discussed military pacts with any country.

ISRAEL

In 1948 when Israel officially came into being through the United Nations as a parliamentary democracy, its Jewish population was 650,000. As a result of intensive immigration, inhabitants now total nearly 2,000,000 in an area about the size of New Jersey—8,048 square miles.

Although much of the land is sandy waste and stony hill country, intensive irrigation development is continually opening new land for cultivation, with the result that citrus fruit is now being exported in even greater quantity than before. Here, as throughout most of the Middle East, the struggle for water is intense.

The seaports of Tel Aviv, Jaffa, Haifa, and Elath are increasingly important in the Israeli economy, as are both fresh and salt water fishing.

Some mineral resources have been found in Israel, and recently several high grade oil strikes have improved and advanced an already ambitious industrial development program.

This industrial program together with transportation, health, and educational developments combine to bring Israel closer to "modern" states than any other nation in the Middle East today.

SAUDI ARABIA

Though Saudi Arabia includes some 870,000 square miles, a country three and one half times the size of Texas, most of it is a desert wasteland. Its 6,000,000 Arabs are forced to live mainly on the watered fringe of the Arabian peninsula and in its scattered desert oases.

Today the land and peoples of Saudi Arabia literally belong to one man—Saud Ibn Abdul-Aziz al-Saud. He inherited the property from his father who orginally united it by conquest of local tribal chieftains. On March 23, 1958, Saud conferred unlimited power over "internal, external and financial policies" on his prime minister and half-brother, Crown Prince Faisal. But Saud nonetheless remains king.

Oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia in 1928. A group of United States oil companies holds the concession to develop and market King Saud's oil. As a result the United States holds also a major air base in Saudi Arabia and trains and arms the Saudi army. Other than oil, Saudi Arabia exports only dates, camels and a few horses.

Since King Saud owns the land, all income from oil and export is his personal wealth. Although there is indication of an expanding middle class, the general population maintains a very low standard of living in a desert subsistence economy.

LEBANON

In this ancient land 1,500,000 people live in an area about half the size of New Jersey. At one time or another Persians, Egyptians, Romans, Crusaders, Turks, and numerous other groups have ruled the territory. At the close of World War I, Lebanon became a French protectorate under a League of Nations mandate, and in 1926 was organized as a republic. Although the French mandate remained in juridical effect until 1946, when the last French troops quit Lebanese soil, the French Com-

mittee of National Liberation and Great Britain recognized Lebanon as an independent republic as early as 1941. Even today the people of Lebanon are so diverse culturally that the seats in parliament are divided on the basis of religious affiliations. A slim majority are Christians.

Although Lebanon is the smallest country in the Arab League, it is considered by many as the most advanced. It has an infant industrial economy and natural resources to aid in its development. Water is available, though as yet only part of the land is under irrigation or even cultivation. Lebanon exports fruits, tobacco, and olive oil. It also collects rent for oil pipelines running through its territory from Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Most Lebanese are farmers, while city folk are devoted and skilled traders.

Since most of the Christians in Lebanon are Arabs, there is still no real peace commitment with Israel. Pro-Western sympathizers combined with increasing numbers of Moslem citizens and Arab refugees produce in Lebanon an increasingly difficult dilemma. National policy has often reflected this uneasy truce between Western and Arab affiliations. In 1958, when armed rebellion in Lebanon and the successful revolution in Iraq threatened the government in Lebanon, United States armed troops were sent to Lebanon at the request of President Chamoun. It is unlikely that there will be much lessening of tension in Lebanon for some time to come.

IRAN

The Persis of antiquity and the Persia of modern times, Iran is a kingdom of 628,060 square miles, an area about two and one-half times the size of Texas, containing 19,700,000 people.

Not an Arab nation, Iran's history has been in some real measure distinct from the development of other Middle Eastern nations since it successfully resisted attack from the Ottoman Empire and remained independent of Turkish control.

In 1907 a revolution, intended to overthrow the absolute Shah in favor of a constitutional monarchy, led in effect to a power vacuum. Russia and Britain moved in and divided Persia into "spheres of influence" with Russia looking after the northern and central area and Britain overseeing in the south. During the 1920's and 1930's the Riza Shah consolidated the nation, strengthened the constitutional government, brought an end to the Anglo-Russian agreements and thus established Iran's independence as a sovereign nation. During World War II, however, the USSR and Great Britain again sent troops into Iran. Though this was not technically an oc-

cupation, the presence of foreign troops renewed old fears among the people that Russia and Great Britain intended to occupy permanently. At the conclusion of the war British troops withdrew from the south and the Iranian government sent its own troops to the north to reclaim the last areas of Soviet control.

Up to this point the oil that had been discovered in the southern section was developed under agreement by a British company. The nationalist movement at the end of World War II, internal struggles, and government instability resulted, however, in abrogation of this agreement in 1951. The oil fields were nationalized under the leadership of the extreme nationalist, Mohammed Mossadegh, but nationalization proved no solution. Internal power struggles, often violent, continued. The signing in 1954 of a new oil agreement, discussed on pages 29 and 30 moderated the situation only slightly.

Iran formulated a policy of increasing economic and political cooperation outside the Soviet bloc, including membership in the Baghdad Pact and, at the same time, encouraged the development of cordial relations with the USSR. In April, 1957, Manouchehr Eghbal, with army support, took over as Shah, ended the martial law which had been in force for sixteen years, and entered upon the development of a freer two-party system in Iran.

Oil revenue is the greatest source of income to the country, and oil profits are going into a development plan that should slowly improve the general standard of living.

Iran has considerable mineral resources but, since these are as yet undeveloped, the people are still chiefly farmers and migrant tribesmen.

THE SHEIKDOMS

Around the rim of Arabia lie an assortment of Arab sheikdoms which have been under British protection since the last century. In the Yemen area alone Britain protects eight sultanates, two emirates, and seven confederations of small sheikdoms and tribes.

Much of this land is fertile and abounds in fresh-water springs. The people are tribesmen, herders, and farmers.

The discovery of oil in Kuwait has transformed the ruler of the 200,000 tribesmen in this area into one of the world's wealthiest men. In smaller quantities oil is produced in Bahrain and in Qatar, both under British protection. More oil is thought to lie under the Oman, Muscat, and Hadhramaut lands. Traces have been found in several of the smaller desert

sheikdoms near Yemen. This oil wealth, both realized and potential, provides real incentive for controversy over control of these lands. Internal rebellions and increasing pressures from neighboring nations continually threaten British hegemony.

ADEN

Aden is a British colony won from Yemen in 1839. Aden proper is only about 80 square miles in size with a population of 140,000. The city of Aden is among the busiest seaports in the British Commonwealth. This port is on the direct line of commerce between Africa and India and services a vast shipping trade. Aden proper has a large British air base and a petroleum refinery of considerable size.

Aden Protectorate, an area of Arab chiefdoms also under British control, is far larger. This territory covers 112,000 square miles and contains 650,000 people. Oil was discovered in 1955 in the eastern Aden Protectorate.

TURKEY

Although Turkey is not included in some Middle Eastern geopolitical groupings, its role as ruler of the Middle East during the centuries of the Ottoman Empire, together with the fact that 98 per cent of its people are Moslems, suggests a place for it in our survey.

Even though the later years of Ottoman rule placed France, Great Britain, and Russia in influential positions with regard to the Middle East (see page 4), the Ottoman Empire remained in control until Turkey's defeat in World War I. The abrupt swing at the close of the war relegated Turkey to a position of relative mediocrity as the newly mandated areas, freed from Ottoman control, attempted to win back from Turkey "stolen" trade and cultural centers. In the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, Turkey was established as fully independent. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, or Ataturk, in reality a benevolent dictator, a parliamentary republican system was developed.

With the termination of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, Turkey's pro-Western sentiment brought it back into a position of some importance. As a relatively stable republic, a founding member of the United Nations, and a strategic member of the NATO alliance and the Baghdad Pact, Turkey has become a committed Western ally.

Turkey's population numbers around 25,500,000 in 296,185 square

miles, an area a little larger than Texas. The growing economy includes sizable exports of tobacco, cotton, hazelnuts, chrome, and copper—exports sent mainly to the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany.

The government is planning programs for a stabilized economy, including industrial development and extension of facilities for transportation, education, health, and housing.

DIVERSITY AND UNITY

The Middle East is a land of sand and mountains, sparse in wood and water. The natural resources that do exist—metal ore, workable stone, tillable land, even flint—are often widely scattered, separated by burning deserts or malarial swamps. Such a land would seem a formidable challenge to peoples devoid of all power but that of human muscle. Yet such people living in this difficult environment produced in ancient biblical times many of those crucial inventions upon which modern civilization depends. From these early dwellers in the Middle East we have received most of the plants and animals we use daily. We owe to them likewise the inventions of metallurgy and glass making, the principles of the rotating shaft, the alphabet, and a religious way of life deeply affecting our contemporary culture.

In a land where resources are so widely scattered and transportation so minimal we might logically expect to find the development of specializations confined to an area where necessary materials are immediately available. In the Middle East, however, the specializations have been developed to a point where an entire village or area concentrates on one vocation, be it metalwork, pottery, silken textiles, woolen rugs, or the breeding of camels and horses. From fathers to sons for generations have passed secrets of working with metal or wool. In geographic isolation communities have practiced their skill to its perfection. Such specialization is an efficient way to exist in a poor environment, but it depends upon the development of an adequate means of transportation. A village devoted to silk spinning or metalworking relies for its very life upon transport of its goods out to trade centers and a flow of necessities in from other centers. A complex of transportation specialists must develop along with traders and merchants.

Many areas, because of this relative isolation and economic specialization, developed unique customs among their people—special mannerisms, modes of dress, colloquial speech, and later even variations upon the basic faith of Islam. If their journeys took them from home these special

customs identified them, for example, as well-diggers of the north or rug-weavers of the south.

The relationship established between man and land has traditionally been successful in supporting a stable population. Introduction of modern means of power, sudden population increases, a transportation system adequate for transporting finished goods and also for transporting raw materials from one area to another have demanded the establishment of new man-land relationships in parts of the Middle East. In some areas the ancient village specializations have broken down and a more diversified way of life has developed. In other areas, and even in the large modern cities, the ethnic division of labor has simply been adapted to supply men for the new jobs created by industrialization. Until recently, for example, most of the clerks in Egypt were from an ethnic division known as the Copts.

Although the introduction of modern power has required readjustments in the original pattern of living, leaving the cities and the few main highways even today brings us back relatively swiftly to the old pattern where we find peoples living as they did in the times of Abraham and Isaiah. A crucial development over the past ten years that has disrupted more seriously the stable organization of life in the Middle East, involves the phenomenon of mass migrations numbering into the hundreds of thousands. Thousands of Jews, economically specialized in this Middle-Eastern mode of living, moved into Israel from areas that had been their homes for generations. Arabs moved out of Israel, away from their ancestral homes. In Yemen, for example, the Jews had almost a monopoly on the export-import trade, ironworking, stone masonry, money exchange, and marketing of textiles. Who can be found to adopt these vocations for centuries exclusively Jewish? Such losses in human ability have disrupted and strained the system throughout the Middle East.

Even as ethnic specialization has formed the pattern of living in the Middle East, religion has been the bonding agent holding these diverse human beings together in an exchange of mutual confidence.

About A.D. 570, Mohammed, Prophet of Islam, was born in Mecca. Before Mohammed's time the peoples of the Middle East worshiped in many forms, ranging from local tribal superstitions to universal religions like Buddhism, Judaism, and Christianity. Mohammed and his followers succeeded where all others had failed and united the Arab world under a common god and a single code of ethics.

Mohammed's code was built upon the religious outlines of Judaism and Christianity. Moslems see these three faiths as identical in their early

development. They feel, however, that Judaism corrupts the true faith in its refusal to accept Mohammed as the last and complete prophet whose words were the fulfillment of God's communications to mankind. Christianity corrupted the true faith by turning Jesus (to the Moslems only a prior prophet) into a god. Thus the Middle East, holy land for the three faiths, contains objects and places enshrined and reverenced alike by Jews, Christians, and Moslems. The kinship was in part responsible for the relatively peaceful cooperation among the faiths characteristic of the early development of Islam. This same kinship, complicated by political differences between Christian nations and the Arab world, and with the emphasis shifted from likeness to difference, bred hostility and suspicion in later years.

The faith of Islam cultivates the virtues of devotion, humility, and acceptance—virtues achieved through obedience to the Law. The Law itself is a carefully detailed code of behavior derived from the Koran (the will of God spoken through the mouth of Mohammed) and from the Traditions, noninspirational sayings and records of the action of the prophet.

Deviations from the original code are common throughout the Arab world. Some sects, perhaps more seriously influenced by Christianity, attribute varying measures of divinity to Mohammed. Other variations stem from differing opinions on the meaning of some passages in the Koran. More limited deviations result from the natural addition of local superstitions to the body of basic Islamic beliefs.

In spite of these deviations, however, the incredible success achieved by Mohammed and his followers deserves special notice. Carleton Coon in *Caravan,* his definitive book on Middle Eastern culture (see Bibliography), has this to say of the religious unity of Islamic peoples:

> If ever a religion were built to fit a cultural situation, Islam was it Its principal differences from Christianity (and here I expose myself to criticism from both sides) are· that it was suited to a particular environment and culture, while Christianity is applicable to all time and space, and that by so limiting itself Islam became correspondingly more practical in the immediate situation, and surer of success within its smaller field Conceptually a less ambitious and more certain venture, it produced its golden age earlier than that of Christianity, which, though older, required a wider canvas, greater resources, and a more elaborate technology for its fruition.

The peoples of the Middle East are united, then, in diversity—a diversity born of specialization and a unity born of necessity and bonded by religion.

Nationalism is a strange phenomenon to place against this mosaic of diversity. Peoples whose loyalty has rested for generations within an isolated community, peoples who have looked upon all others outside of their local specialization as strangers, do not easily learn to shift their loyalty from the real and immediate to the larger and, to them, entirely unreal and arbitrary "national" identity. The two seem to be incompatible. The fact of their union is again due in no small part to the uniting of human beings in a common emotion—this time an emotion of hatred.

CHAPTER 2

Nationalism and the Arab League

Until the termination of World War I the Ottoman Empire of Turkey ruled the Middle East from Persia to the Sudan, uniting it again under foreign rule. This time, however, as had not been true under the Romans, conqueror and conquered shared a common religious faith and, to a large extent, many common aspects of cultural life. Under the despotic rule of the Ottoman Empire, cultural and commercial centers of the Middle East declined as trade and commerce shifted to the Bosphorus and Constantinople.

Little distinction was made in terms of any national boundaries within the Empire. The distinctions that remained were in terms of local tribal chiefdoms and heads of leading families who through inherited religious office maintained control of important religious centers, as for example, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem or the Sherif of Mecca.

The exception to this situation was found in Egypt which managed to retain identity as a national entity. The French occupation under Napoleon at the end of the eighteenth century brought with it a new scholarly interest in the past glories of Egyptian civilization which was not without its long-range effect in reawakening Egyptian self-consciousness. Furthermore, British military and economic control in the nineteenth century, together with Egypt's location in relation to the Suez Canal, served to enhance Egypt's position as a strategic area and bring its people to national awareness.

Egyptians were also Moslems, however, and the Moslem religion can be called to account in part for the degree of unity as well as fatalism with which Ottoman rule was accepted. It must be remembered that the Middle East is a harsh environment. Peoples isolated for centuries continued in isolation throughout the Ottoman period. The Ottoman rulers interfered rarely with internal tribal affairs. Commercial centers with their classes of tradesmen and merchants felt the foreign rule most strongly, but the fatalism inherent in the Moslem faith and the fact that the rulers shared this faith made the situation more palatable if not thoroughly acceptable.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic nationalism began to appear, first as an organized movement in greater Syria, spreading thence throughout the southern Middle East. This movement envisioned release from Ottoman rule and the establishment of some sort of autonomous Arabian polity. Opposed by several leading Arab families and without strong leadership of its own, the movement constituted no great threat to Turkey until World War I. Under stimulus from French and American mission schools throughout the Middle East, deeply disappointed in a rebellion in Turkey itself which resulted only in increased "Turkification," and heartened by vague British references to an Arab State, the Middle East Arabs rallied to the allied cause in World War I, helping in the defeat of Turkey and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

The Arabs had not reckoned with European politics, however, and the close of World War I found Britain involved in commitments to France and the Zionists. France was granted control of Syria. Concessions were made to Zionism (see page 41 ff) through the Balfour Declaration. Arab visions of a great Arab nation became swamped in the embroilments of European politics, and the Middle East was divided into a series of British and French protectorates under mandates from the League of Nations.

Nationalism to this point had been twofold: British-inspired Pan-Islamic in the south and French-inspired libertarian in the north. At the close of the war, Faisal of the Hashemite family ruling the Holy City of Mecca, who had been cooperative and sympathetic to the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine, entered Damascus and declared himself king of Greater Syria. Britain, fearing loss of her Middle Eastern power, could not support such a move. By 1920 Faisal was forced to surrender his power to France and the partitioning of the Middle East began in earnest. Faisal was pacified by the British and given the kingship of Iraq. His brother Abdullah was made regent of Transjordan in order to put down a Bedouin revolt against French-held Syria.

In 1925 the King of Hejaz and Sherif of Mecca, father of Faisal and Abdullah, was overthrown by Ibn Saud, a former chieftain of a small and humble tribe who, with British help, was establishing himself as supreme leader over all the Arabian peninsula. A bitterness which has been the basis of much insecurity in the Middle East developed between Saud's family and the Hashemite family. It was not surprising that the Hashemites felt that Saud was in illegal control of a land rightfully belonging to them, while Saud for his part feared that the Hashemites might some day command enough power to dethrone him.

Over a period of years Faisal and Abdullah advanced Greater Syria plans, sometimes in cooperation with and sometimes opposed to plans for a Jewish national home—but always with a view to restoring the Hashemites to what they considered their rightful throne in the Arabian peninsula. The success of any Greater Syria plan would undermine Saud's security; even control of southern Palestine by Jordan would threaten both Saud's power and the security of Egypt.

In 1949, when the Syrian army took control of the Syrian government, relations with Jordan were severed, the borders were closed and the announcement was made that not only did Syria reject categorically all plans for an Abdullah-led Greater Syria but threatened to annex Jordan and warned Iraq against interference.

In 1951, Abdullah was assassinated, reportedly by agents of the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem. The ex-Mufti, alternately pro-Nazi or pro-Soviet, was desperately bitter over his loss of influence when the British established Abdullah as king in Jordan. Abdullah, a commanding personality with a strong following, occupied a highly strategic position as king of Jordan. Toward the close of the Second World War events surrounding the establishment of a Jewish national home had often waited upon the political movements of this man. His violent death precipitated fears of invasion from Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, thereby upsetting the delicate balance of power in the Middle East. Britain stepped in to fill the power gap, promising aid to Jordan if attacked. Abdullah's son Talal took the throne and made overtures to end the long feud with Saud, leaving Britain fearful of the loss of her alliance with Jordan. In 1952, Jordan's parliament deposed Talal, an ineffective man, harrassed by ill-health, and set up in his stead his young, English-educated son Hussein. Anti-British elements, pro-British elements, and pressures from Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt all contributed to a complex, politically unstable situation for Jordan's young king. The spring of 1951 brought another threat of invasion by Syria and Saudi Arabia to the little kingdom and again British intervention protected Hussein's throne.

The establishment of the League of Arab States introduced one more factor influencing Arab relationships. The Arab League, while seemingly representative of Pan-Arab unity, in reality based its strength on its success in redirecting internal rivalries and bitterness outward against any foreign intrusion or intervention in Arabian affairs.

In 1942, the prime minister of Iraq, fully supported by Great Britain, proposed an Arab federal union of Iraq, Palestine, Jordan, and Syria. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, afraid of such united strength, violently opposed

the plan. Nahas Pasha, prime minister of Egypt, suggested instead and won support for the formation of an association of sovereign Arab states which was then formally established in Cairo in 1945 (see Doc. 9). Although first plans envisioned the League as a prior step toward an eventual Pan-Arab polity, the final form specifically called for "respect for the independence of these (member) states." The League in its initial organization became Pan-Arab not Pan-Islamic. It allowed for limited association with Palestine, provided for association with nonindependent Arab countries, pledged every nation against any undertakings thought to be to the detriment of the whole, and specifically warned against any outside intervention in the internal affairs of any member nation. Contrived by Egypt with the blessing of Great Britain, the leadership of the League fell to Egypt and a campaign designed to secure its position of leadership was inaugurated at once—a campaign committed to the promotion of intense nationalism, heightening the fervor against "Western imperialism" and "foreign domination."

The League might well have collapsed for lack of strength in its earliest months had not Britain and the United States intervened in its support in the League's first trial. In 1941, Syria and Lebanon had been pronounced independent by France but France continued to exert pressures to control their internal affairs. By 1945, Syria and Lebanon severed relations with France in spite of French armed advances. The Arab League accordingly issued warnings of armed protest to France. Since the League was in no position to supply either arms or men in support of Syria and Lebanon, France ignored the warnings and undertook military occupation. Britain, with the support of the United States, then sent troops to Syria to enforce a cessation of hostilities and support the Arab League demand for the removal of French forces. Largely due to this intervention the League emerged from her first trial with added strength and support.

There were points of both strength and weakness in the League's secular, individual sovereign approach. It was probable that cooperation among these widely divergent governments, hostile and suspicious toward one another, could not have been achieved on any ground other than individual member sovereignty. But such a concession meant a continuance of rivalries between nations and hostilities within the League itself. Certainly the failure of the League in the 1948 war with Israel was largely due to a compounding of these tensions.

On May 14, 1948, with Israel's declaration of independence, the Arab World presented a strongly united front in its apparently unanimous decision to "drive Israel into the sea." This was, in reality, an enforced

unity, made necessary because of the hatred existing between the Arab nations themselves. Each nation, deeply suspicious of all its neighbors, could not afford to let any one other nation invade Israel alone on the risk that it might win Palestine and thereby increase its own power sufficiently to dominate other Arab nations. The only self-defense in this situation became, paradoxically, a united war against Israel. Even Lebanon, predominantly Christian and benefiting enormously from trade with the Palestine area, found it necessary to send a token force into the war. (See page 49.)

In 1950, in an attempt to strengthen the League and, incidentally, Egypt's position of leadership in the Arab World, Egypt proposed a joint defense and economic treaty (see Doc. 12) and by 1952 won total ratification of the treaty. In addition to pledging the military assistance of the whole League to the aid of any attacked member nation, the treaty provided means for enhancing economic and cultural cooperation. The hope that such a treaty would open the arms embargo and allow free shipments of arms from Western democracies without restrictive commitments was frustrated in 1950 with the announcement of the tripartite agreements between France, Great Britain, and the United States (see Doc. 13). According to the terms of these agreements, arms would be shipped to Israel and Arab nations provided assurances were given that such arms were to be used nonaggressively.

Frustrated in the arms agreement, embittered by the power struggles of Western democracies over control of Arab lands, and finding it impossible to live with the pro-Israel sentiment of these same Western democracies, some individual member nations began more and more to flirt with Soviet Russia for economic and military aid (see Doc. 17).

It must be remembered that among Middle East nations all but Egypt owe their national existence less to efforts of their own than to the political maneuverings of the great powers of Western Europe. Their leaders had come to recognize the insecurity of weak peoples, too long exploited by the political ambitions of stronger nations, but they had come to realize too that their continued existence depended, in part at least, upon the support of stronger powers. National independence had been achieved in large part in an atmosphere of violent hatred for former colonial powers and "Western imperialism." Israel became in Arab minds another attempt at Western imperialism in the Middle East. Once having produced this state of hysteria, it became increasingly difficult for Middle Eastern leaders to deal with Western powers or seek their support without cries of "traitor" arising from other Arab nations, or from their own people. In the

view of the leaders, Soviet Russia became the logical and "safe" power from which to seek aid.

The Arab League achieved a real measure of economic and cultural cooperation by uniting these insecure, suspicious nations, each individually aspiring to influence and control within the Arab world, each alert to prevent any neighbor from accomplishing any similar ambition. In turning the great part of the internal fear and resentment outward into resentment of foreign intervention, in defining Israel as another Western scheme for further imperialism, the League managed to produce a substantial measure of political unity. It has become a focal point for intense Middle Eastern nationalism and as such constitutes an ethical and attitudinal position not to be overlooked or treated lightly, even though this "unity" is precariously balanced and easily disrupted. The importance of the Arab League was manifested in its resolution, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in August, 1958, breaking the deadlock on the Middle Eastern issue then before the Assembly (see Doc. 48).

The unity of the Arab League was seriously disrupted by the Middle East Treaty Organization, or the Baghdad Pact (see Doc. 16), an alliance of Great Britain, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq—the so-called "northern tier." This alliance, initiated by Great Britain with the approval of the United States, attempted to halt the erosion of British and Western power in the Middle East, form a stronghold against Russian intrusion, and provide a nucleus for a general Middle East defense system.

Hopes that the Baghdad Pact would be a rallying point for other Middle East nations were soon dashed by the creation of a "southern tier" military alliance among Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria with the support of Soviet Russia and in direct opposition to the Baghdad Pact. True to earlier Egyptian aims, President Nasser aspired to Egyptian supremacy in the Arab world (see page 57 ff). The northern coalition presented serious obstacles to such an ambition. Bitter riots and demonstrations against the Baghdad Pact, accusations of Western imperialism and of pro-Israel sentiment in the Baghdad Pact countries breached the tenuous unity of the Arab League. Even British-created Jordan was torn by violence and its government seriously shaken by rumors that it considered joining the Pact. The change in government in Iraq as a result of the July, 1958, revolution in effect leaves the Pact without a single Arab member nation and its usefulness in the future is in serious question.

The United Arab Republic was formed in February, 1958 (see page 5) at the height of the Middle East Treaty Organization Council meeting held in Ankara. Both President Nasser's opposition to the Baghdad Pact

and his aspiration to Arab leadership were manifest in this union of Syria and Egypt under his personal leadership. In his installation speech President Nasser invited all Arab states to join the United Arab Republic in a Pan-Arab polity. The immediate response of Jordan and Iraq, in obvious mistrust of the Syrian-Egyptian alliance, was to join together in the Arab Federation. The Arab Federation, like the United Arab Republic, also urged other Arab nations to join with Jordan and Iraq in Arab unity.

Again the old rivalries and suspicions among Arab leaders resulted in the development of opposing factions in the Middle East. The Hashemite dreams of a great Arab kingdom with its center in Damascus and the Egyptian drive toward a Pan-Arab polity centered in Cairo met squarely in troubled Syria.

At the time of its union with Egypt, Syria was rocked with internal violence. The army, under strong pro-Soviet leadership, was threatening the moderate nationalist government of President Shukri el-Quwatli. Observers in Syria expressed the opinion that Quwatli accepted Nasser's control as a means of dealing with the unruly Communists in Syria, since Nasser, while carefully courting Soviet economic and military aid, had severely suppressed the Communist Party within Egypt. Shortly after the formation of the United Arab Republic, Nasser flew to Moscow for extended talks with the Soviets which resulted in a joint pledge of friendship and cooperation, and an extension of Soviet economic and military aid to the newly formed union.

With their hopes of a Greater Syria now thwarted and under pressure from Syrian and Egyptian agitation, Jordan and Iraq found the resolution to their dilemma in the union of these Hashemite kingdoms. The treaty of federation stipulated that neither partner would be committed by the other's prior alliances nor would the union abrogate alliances of either partner.

This did not prove to be a solution to the growing nationalistic, pro-United Arab Republic fervor in Jordan and Iraq, for on July 28, 1958, the government of Iraq was overthrown, King Faisal and Premier Nuri were killed, and a republican government was installed under the leadership of Brigadier Abdel Kerim el Kassem. Revolutionists, encouraged by the turn of events in Iraq, posed a serious threat to the governments of Jordan and Lebanon. In response to requests for aid the United States sent troops to Lebanon and Great Britain sent troops to Jordan (see Docs. 46 and 47).

Again the Middle East became the source of a major world crisis. Anti-Western elements charged the West with imperialism and intervention in violation of the United Nations Charter. The Western powers responded

that Iraq had fallen prey to "indirect aggression" from the United Arab Republic and that Jordan and Lebanon were likewise severely threatened. The Western nations contended that they had acted in compliance with the United Nations Charter since they had entered these countries at the request of their official governments. Russia threatened not to remain indifferent to these "acts of aggression" near her borders and the matter was referred to an emergency session of the Security Council. A Western proposal to remove the troops as soon as a United Nations police force could be empowered to protect the sovereignty of Middle East nations was vetoed by the Soviet Union and the issue was referred to the General Assembly. On August 21, 1958, the General Assembly adopted a resolution drafted by the Arab League plus Tunisia and Morocco which in its two main clauses:

1. called on members of the Arab League to observe the pledge of noninterference in one another's internal affairs contained in the League Pact,

2. requested the United Nations Secretary General to uphold "the purpose and principles of the United Nations Charter in relation to Lebanon and Jordan . . . and thereby facilitate the early withdrawal of the foreign troops from the two countries." (See Doc. 48.)

Despite the advantage of geographic contiguity and strong family ties between two leaders, the Arab Federation has dwindled to an ineffectual status. On the other hand, the United Arab Republic has apparently surmounted the severe disadvantage of geographic separation, deriving its strength from increasing military and economic aid from the USSR, control of the Suez Canal, and control of the oil pipelines that run through Syria. Problems of economic and political adjustment, however, still face the United Arab Republic. Yemen's membership, for example, raises serious questions of political relations with this independent oligarchy.

The many difficulties facing Lebanon and Israel have been increased now that they have become obstacles in the path of geographic union between Syria and Egypt. In Lebanon, the disruption of the delicate balance of power through intense agitation and violence inspired by pro-UAR elements led to an armed rebellion in May of 1958.

The revolution was led by extreme nationalists who were opposed to the government's acceptance of United States military aid and were angered by reports that President Chamoun would seek a constitutional amendment that would allow him to run for a second term. The introduction of United States troops in late July did not prevent the revolutionists from continuing their activities against the government. In September of 1958,

Chamoun surrendered the presidency to the newly elected president, General Fouad Chebab, a man who is more popular with the nationalists than Chamoun. Nevertheless it is unlikely that the tensions resulting from the presence of foreign troops and continued revolutionary agitation will be resolved without further turbulence.

King Saud of Saudi Arabia, tentatively pro-Western, but at times given to outspoken support of President Nasser's ambitions, has encouraged both the United Arab Republic and the Arab Federation while remaining apart from commitment to either. By acting thus he hoped perhaps to strengthen his own role in Middle Eastern affairs. The transfer, however, of the principal reins of power to his half-brother, Faisal, suggested a significant measure of support for Nasser.

Although these two unions involved a recurrence of old rivalries, it must be remembered that both are steps toward strengthening the political unity of the Middle East. President Nasser's ambitions do not stop with the Middle East. His vision of an Arab union includes the troubled Arab nations across the whole of North Africa.

Our newspapers will continue to carry news of turmoil in the Middle Eastern states. Often these tensions do not involve Israel, or, for that matter, the Suez Canal, but instead reflect both the political maneuverings of the Cold War and the interfamilial suspicions and hatreds between Middle East leaders themselves.

The nationalistic fervor would seem to suggest that we should cease "meddling" in the affairs of the Middle East, but the Western World will continue to pursue its interests in the face of this adversity. Abandoning the Middle East might well mean abandoning it to Soviet Russia. Our moral commitment to democracy as well as the strategic location of the Middle East forbids us this option. And to this already volatile brew we must add the ingredient that most uncomfortably gives flavor to the Middle Eastern charge of foreign imperialism—oil.

CHAPTER 3

The Problem of Middle Eastern Oil

Even a very cursory examination of the Middle East and its role in world affairs since World War I shows conclusively that water and oil are not the only incompatible elements in the area. Most recent studies of this trouble spot indicate that Middle Eastern oil is one of the fundamental issues at the root of the problems that prevail there. Thus, an eminent Middle East analyst, Benjamin Shwadran, in a recently published work (see Bibliography) put the matter in strikingly clear-cut alternatives: the Middle East "must be held by the West as a vital strategic base and as an invaluable source of petroleum with which to oil a possible future war; conversely, it must not be allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy." Let us, therefore, first present the oil statistics and then proceed to an evaluation of the political problems arising therefrom.

Two-thirds of the world's proved oil reserves are in the Middle East. As a comparison, it may be noted that whereas America has some 31.3 billion barrels of proved oil reserves, the Middle East has no less than 144.8 billion barrels. In 1955, Britain and the Western powers used 75 per cent of the area's total output. In 1956, up to the time of the sabotaging of the Iraqi pipelines and the closing of the Suez Canal, Europe and North Africa were receiving over three million barrels of oil *a day* from the Middle East. This marked a sixfold expansion since 1945. Barring further political complications, there is a bright promise for a continued high rate of expansion. The sources of this flow are oil concessions almost entirely in American, British, French, and Dutch hands. The total gross investment in all aspects of the oil industry in the Middle East is probably in excess of $2.5 billion. The usual arrangements call for something like a fifty-fifty division between the oil companies and the governments involved. Suggestive of the great financial returns in this area is the fact that net profits of the American oil companies alone in the Persian Gulf were approximately $900 million for the year 1955. It is expected that in 1958 the oil companies and the producing states will split a profit of more

than $2.5 billion. This marks a trebling of the 1951 figure which in itself constituted an increase from about $115 million in 1947. The following list shows the expected oil returns in 1958 for these countries:

Kuwait (approx.)	$375 million
Saudi Arabia	300 million
Iraq	260 million
Iran	275 million
Qatar	50 million

Further indirect revenues, which when added up amount to very substantial sums (estimated as high as half of the direct payments), result from wages paid to native labor and from other expenditures by foreign companies and their employees. A country-by-country breakdown presents the following picture of concession arrangements:

Kuwait

This tiny sheikdom, a British protectorate, is now the largest single oil producer in the Middle East, supplying one and one-half million barrels a day. The concession, owned jointly by the British Oil Company and the Gulf Oil Corporation, is contracted for until the year 2026.

Saudi Arabia

Here the concession, which runs to the years 1999-2005, is held by the famous combine known as Aramco, the Arabian American Oil Company, which consists of the Standard Oil Company of California, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Socony Vacuum Oil Company, and the Texas Company. Crude oil production prior to the Suez crisis ran around one million barrels a day. This has now increased by approximately 50,000 barrels per day.

Saudi Arabia is the country most often cited by the critics of "oil diplomacy" as a dramatic manifestation of all that the term implies. They point to Aramco, for example, as being responsible for securing for Ibn Saud some $100 million in direct and indirect lend-lease aid in the years 1940-1947 despite the fact that his kingdom was not directly involved in the Second World War.

Iraq

The concessions in Iraq, running till the year 2000, are owned almost in their entirety, by a combined British, French, Dutch, and American group. Approximately 750,000 barrels are produced daily.

Of particular significance to the West was the announcement by the new premier and revolutionary leader, Abdel Kerim el-Kassem, that he will continue to honor the nation's lucrative oil contracts with the West.

Iran

The original concession was granted in 1909 to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, now known as the British Petroleum Company. Controlling stock in the company was purchased by the British government at the start of World War I. These were the assets which were so dramatically nationalized by the Iranian government in 1951 (see Doc. 14). This seizure marked the first successful attempt by any segment of the new Arab nationalism to nationalize vast holdings of a former imperial power in that area. It thus has served as a continual impetus for further similar action throughout the Middle East. Three years later, after lengthy negotiations, the Iranian government came to terms with a "consortium" of companies representing private British, American, French, and Dutch interests and provision was made for short-term (25-40 years) operation by this group of oil installations formerly held by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Iran's current oil production is reportedly 850,000 barrels a day.

In addition to these major concessions, there is a combined production of approximately 200,000 barrels daily in the sheikdom of Qatar, the island of Bahrain and the so-called neutral zone between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Turning now to some of the political considerations, we can start by presenting the unavoidable dilemma which plagues Western policy makers. The West feels that it must have Arab good will and knows that it must have Arabian oil, but neither can be purchased in the future by the same means as used in the past. The wave of nationalistic outbursts which have so characterized this area in the last decade has made it abundantly clear that, despite the fantastic revenues accruing to the oil concessions, the gap between Arab social and political demands and Western ability to fulfill these demands continues to grow. To put it in the simplest terms, the profit demand of Western oil companies and the political demands of the Arab nationalists do not and cannot in the foreseeable future coincide. Furthermore, the situation is one in which the Western bargaining position must become progressively worse. The continued dependence of Western European nations in general and Great Britain in particular on the uninterrupted flow of Middle East oil has made of them nervous hostages of Arab good will. This dependence has become symbolic of the West's

apparent helplessness and diplomatic weakness in regard to the Middle East. It also helps account for the French-British gamble upon a military *coup de force* in 1956. Contrariwise, the same juxtaposition of circumstances has led to everincreasing aggressiveness on the part of Arab diplomacy, thus further crystallizing the dilemma.

To complicate the matter further, we should consider the effect of the USSR'S new role as a major participant in Middle East affairs. For some time prior to the Western debacle at Suez, the Soviet leadership had shown evidence of great interest in the oil situation. As elsewhere, in their approach to the Middle East they adopted an initial position of altruistic and disinterested onlookers. They, their argument ran, had no need for Middle East oil; they were only concerned about Western exploitation of the Arabs. Thus, in a portion of his speech at the momentous Twentieth Party Congress, Anastas Mikoyan, a leading figure in the new Soviet hierarchy, had the following to say: "In the Middle East in 1955, the United States and British monopolies took out 150 million tons of oil at a cost of $240 million. This is fabulously cheap. The net profit they made on this oil amounted to $1.9 billion—one year's return covered the entire capital investment in that area . . . . If all the income earned from oil were to remain with its legitimate owners, the Arab and other peoples of the Middle East, how speedily might not these peoples abolish poverty and go forward with their economic and cultural development, which has been retarded for years by the ruthless exploitation of the foreign capitalists."

The point here is not the inaccuracy of Mr. Mikoyan's figures, though we have already noted above that there is at least an element of truth in them. What is of greater immediate consequence is the fact that this theme of imperialist exploitation was constant in the Soviet propaganda bombardment of the Middle East for at least six months preceding the war in Suez. Excerpts from only one of many Egyptian radio broadcasts echoing the theme give ample evidence of the degree of skillful influence exercised by the men in the Kremlin. The Cairo radio on March 6, 1956, announced:

> The Arab rulers granted the exploiting imperialist companies a host of rights and concessions at the expense of the people struggling against them. The Arabs allow the crude oil to go to the countries of their enemies and colonizers. We do not want United States dollars, British pounds, French francs, or Dutch guilders . . Oh Arabs, our oil is plundered by aliens, it is seized by your enemies Remember oil—it is our last wealth! Oil is for the Arabs!

An ever present element of the Soviet "line" is the implied promise (sometimes made explicit) that should the West make difficulties, the USSR is

ready to move in from the sidelines and provide all the aid necessary—including the purchase of Arab oil.

It is this combination of factors which leads so many "realistic" commentators to dismiss as childish naiveté the criticism of those who refer to any diplomacy in the Middle East as "simply" oil diplomacy. Such observers particularly abhor the attachment of the value-judgment "evil," for their contention is, obviously, that all things considered the West, particularly Western Europe, has no alternative but to deal for Arab oil on whatever terms it can.

One more factor must be considered. Since the Iranian nationalization, it has become an inescapable conclusion that Arab nationalism, whatever its particular form, has marked off the heretofore privileged position of the Western oil companies as a primary target for elimination. The limited success of the Iranians, and later the Egyptians (albeit with the aid of foreigners), in handling the intricacies of a technical operation long considered beyond their ability has further encouraged the extremists in all of these countries. As a result of this heightened impatience, the emergent Soviet-Arab alliance becomes even more significant.

CHAPTER 4

The Soviets Enter the Middle East

The machinations of Soviet diplomacy in the Middle East make it abundantly clear that the Russians have serious intent in terms of permanent policy-making in that area. However, to get a truer picture of Soviet ambitions one must place USSR involvement within the context of a much broader Soviet and Russian foreign policy.

The entire history of Czarist Russia is marked by consistent efforts to find a warm-water port, particularly on the Mediterranean. The penetration of the Middle East also has stood high on the list of Soviet priorities. Only since the Geneva Conference of 1955 and, more particularly, since the Czechoslovakian-Egyptian arms deal have these ambitions been realized. As long ago as 1940 the Russians entered into secret protocol agreements with the Axis powers which stated that "The Soviet Union declares that its territorial aspirations center south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean." This in itself is but the continuation of a yet older Soviet theme in the Middle East. As far back as the First Congress of Peoples of the East some thirty-seven years ago, the Russians had already enunciated their strident theme of anticolonialism. Whereas the implementation of a policy in keeping with this approach remained relatively dormant, its eventual emergence in the form of a new Soviet imperialism has always been imminent.

The degree to which the Russians have successfully entered into an area which in the past seemed closed to them can be traced to major psychological as well as political and economic reasons. To the peoples of the Middle East, as in Asia generally, the Russians have appeared as comparatively disinterested and unselfish benefactors. In their manifold relationships with the new sovereign states of Asia the Russians have gone to great pains to indicate their desire simply to help these new peoples establish political freedom and economic viability. Time and again Russian headway was made by offering Asian nations what they desired; no direct gifts were proffered but so-called business deals almost amounted to phi-

lanthropies. Because in tendering aid and trade they have been oblivious to the rules of economics but fully aware of the rules of politics, each deal has created much good will at relatively low cost. Perhaps the most vital consideration in Soviet success has been the very absence of Russian power in the Middle East for so long a period of time. As a result, the Russians entered the arena untainted by the epithet "colonial imperialists." While the Western powers have a long history of intervention in the affairs of Arab and Asian nations and have thus built up a tremendous reservoir of ill feeling, the Soviets by comparison often appear to native nationalists as innocent and as disinterested as they claim to be. There has been also, unfortunately, an American record of offers of aid with political or military strings attached, which tended to confirm pre-existing nationalist suspicions of the United States as nothing better than a replacement for the recently ousted Western European "imperialists." The combination of these factors with those described above pertaining to the rise of Arab nationalism led to the emergence of a common goal for the Soviets and Arab nationalists in the Middle East. A simple definition of this goal would be the elimination of Western power in the Middle East and Africa.

Soviet aims can perhaps be better understood by briefly analyzing the series of steps employed to realize them. The first aim may be seen in the formulation of a policy which the Soviets hope will lead to the breakup of Western concessions in the oil fields (see pages 29-30).

The second can be stated in negative terms as the prevention of the establishment of a combined Middle Eastern-Western collaborative defense organization. By the end of 1955 this goal was achieved for all practical purposes, as we have seen. Until the recent revolt which deposed the pro-Western government, only Iraq, among the Arab countries, retained any major ties with the Western powers.

The third goal can be described as the eventual dismantling of Western military bases in the Middle East. This aim likewise seems well on the way toward realization.

The Arab attitude in regard to the fulfillment of these aims was perhaps best stated by Moscow's strongest ally in the Arab World, President Nasser of Egypt. At the conclusion of his work, *The Philosophy of the Revolution,* which is in effect a prospectus for the future, he has this to say:

> When my mind travels to the eighty million Moslems in Indonesia, the fifty million in China and the several other million in Malaya, Siam, and Burma and the hundred million in Pakistan, the hundred million or more in the Middle East and the forty million in Russia, as well as the other millions

> in the distant parts of the world, when I visualize these millions united in one faith, I have a great consciousness of the tremendous potentialities that co-operation amongst them all can achieve· a cooperation that does not deprive them of their loyalty to their countries but which guarantees for them and their brethren a limitless power.
>
> I now revert to the wandering role that seeks an actor to perform it. Such is the role, such are its features and such is its stage
>
> *We and only we are impelled by our environment and are capable of performing this role* [Italics ours.]

It is doubtful that the Soviet Union is much concerned with either the national or international aspirations voiced in the above declaration. What is much more probable is that the Russians are very much interested in maintaining a constant "crisis" situation in the Middle East which would serve to embarrass and eventually dislodge Western influence. To the degree that Egypt, Syria, or others serve this purpose for Soviet foreign policy, the present Russian leadership can be expected to remain comparatively unconcerned with either the manifestoes of would-be Arabic Caesars, or for that matter with any of their local intrigues. The Egyptians seem to be aware of the Soviet attitude and quite willing to play the Soviet game so long as their own ambitions are realized at the same time. Thus we have Colonel Nasser explaining to *New York Times* correspondent Osgood Caruthers (April 1, 1956): "The Russians are very clever. They know what I want to say and they please me by saying what I want to say." Both the Russians and the Egyptians have also apparently learned that, in an era when any "minor war" might erupt into an atomic holocaust, prudential bluffing becomes a workable foreign policy. What the Russians hope to achieve is perhaps best stated by *U.S. News and World Report* (March 16, 1956):

> If Russia succeeds in provoking an Arab-Israel war, a big area of strategic importance to the West is thrown into chaos. Western defense systems are broken or imperiled . . . Even if war is averted, Russia still stands to gain the regard of Arab countries as the only big power that gave them military aid . . . . Armies equipped with Soviet weapons become dependent on Soviet repairs, spare parts and ammunition. Russia thus sees a chance to infiltrate some of the very armies on which the West is relying for military support in event of war with Russia.

A specific example of how Russian and Arab nationalist demands often coincide can be seen in the demand for the nationalization of Middle Eastern oil fields. Egypt and Syria, neither one a major oil producer, were,

prior to their union, the most pro-Soviet of the Arab nations. Thus, even such acts as closing the Suez and cutting Syrian oil pipelines need not necessarily prove to be disastrous for the Western powers, since more than 80 per cent of Middle Eastern oil could be carried in tankers around the Cape of Good Hope. The Russians, therefore, have openly supported Arab demands for nationalization of the oil fields which would cut off the oil at its source. Needless to say the Soviet political support both in the United Nations and elsewhere of Egypt, Syria, and others in their attempts to eliminate Western might from the Middle East is another manifestation of this alliance (see Docs. 24, 41).

Against this background let us now examine the specific means by which the Soviets have entered the Middle Eastern scene. Their approach has been made on separate political, cultural, and economic levels. On each of these levels a relationship of friendly reciprocity has been established between the USSR, or its satellite nations, and members of the Arab bloc. For example, in terms of economic aid the following have either taken place or been promised:

1. installation of Egypt's first nuclear laboratory by the Russians;
2. construction of a new railroad in Saudi Arabia and steel plants in Egypt by the Poles;
3. purchase of Egyptian cotton by Russia, China, and Czechoslovakia (it was, in fact, the bulk purchase by Czechoslovakia of surplus Egyptian cotton which made possible the famous arms deal of 1955, see Doc. 17);
4. construction of oil refineries in Syria by the Czechs;
5. building of bridges across the Nile by the Hungarians;
6. construction work in Alexandria's harbor by the Bulgarians;
7. drilling for water in the Sudan by East Germans.

On the political level the Russians have either established or renewed relations with Yemen, Sudan, and Libya. In addition, there has been a general strengthening of the Russian diplomatic corps throughout the entire Middle East, with the moves of the Soviets being supplemented by the action of their satellites. Added to the growing number of Soviet diplomats is the veritable army of advisers and technicians on military and economic, as well as political matters. There has also been many a rumor concerning the presence of Soviet military missions, particularly in Egypt and Syria. More than one commentator has attributed the Anglo-French-Israeli attack upon Egypt in part at least to the fear of what the Soviet military technicians might achieve with the Arab armies. A further example of the great significance with which Soviet leaders now regard this

area is the public apology made by V M. Molotov to the Twentieth Party Congress for not having paid proper attention in the past to the Middle East.

Recognizing the great susceptibility of the Arab leaders and people to public flattery, the Russians have given particular attention to the technique often referred to as "cultural exchange." Thus, at any time since the middle of 1955, the natives of Cairo and Damascus, in particular, but of other Arab lands as well, have had the opportunity of viewing ballets, soccer teams, movies, and cyclists on tour from Russia and the satellite nations. As a special treat one might even have attended the performances of the Peiping Opera Group. In addition, exhibitions and fairs were constantly being opened to the Arab public. There began, too, to appear an inordinately large number of new periodicals representing the ideology of the Soviet-Arab bloc. News reports emanating from Moscow radio and the Tass News Agency became regular features in Egypt and Syria. That the Soviets overlooked nothing in their attempt to win over mass Arab support can be seen in their wide use in all of their delegations of representatives of Moslem origin It should be added, too, that in all of these undertakings the Soviets have readily availed themselves of the machinery of the Arab League. This in itself served to endear them to a vital element of the Arab leadership.

Much has been made here and in the public press of the Soviet inroads into Egypt. On pages 57-58 we will discuss further the 1955 arms deal. There are, however, some mitigating factors which should be considered. There is now some evidence of the existence within Egypt of groups which are fearful of the additional strain on Egypt's economy involved in military adventurism. There is also the possibility of restraint being exercised by those who have become an established bureaucracy in the new Egypt and see in Nasser's ambitions a threat to their own security. Above all, there is the historical record that when faced with a determined adversary (as, for example, Adenauer's inflexible policy of continuing war reparations to Israel, or Sudan's stubborn stand against merger with Egypt), Nasser has shown himself both reasonable and flexible.

The other great area of Soviet concentration had been Syria. The development there of the largest Communist Party in the Middle East can be attributed to its background of political immaturity combined with social and institutional instability. When one adds to this the additional combination of a restless and impoverished peasantry, a similarly discontented urban proletariat plus support of the majority of the Army's high command, it is little wonder that the extravagant appeal of the Commu-

nists found ready receptivity. One of the remaining paradoxes attendant upon the recent emergence of the United Arab Republic has been the relative eclipse of the Syrian Communist Party despite the general cementing of ties between President Nasser and the USSR (see page 24).

As one might expect, Soviet friendship with the Arab bloc has led to a corresponding attack on Israel. In the Soviet press and radio Israel is constantly attacked as an "aggressor," a tool of the "Western Imperialist Powers." The Arabs on the other hand are constantly portrayed as "peace-loving people" whose sole desire is to rid themselves of the domination of their former colonial masters. Only one familiar with communist jargon is aware of the extent of the Soviet attack, which in the Twentieth Party Congress singled out Israel alone among the nations of the world as being guilty of "fascization."

Against this background of political intrigue and raging nationalism, let us now proceed to a closer survey of the role in the Middle East played by the old-new nation of Israel.

CHAPTER 5

From Palestine to Israel

It is almost impossible to set forth a specific set of events or a given era of historical time as the exact point of origin of a reborn Jewish nationalism. But perhaps the most striking conclusion to be reached from any survey of Jewish history is the prevalence of strong nationalistic feeling among the Jewish masses ever since their dispersion from Palestine in A.D. 70. It was in recognition of this unbroken attachment to an ancestral land that the British government referred to Jewish nationalism as "the oldest nationalist movement in history." *

The idea of a return to Palestine was ever a dominant theme of Jewish life in the diaspora, which term applied to any Jewish community living in exile from Palestine. The whole history of the Jew lies in a demand for political restoration. This helps explain why most Jewish leadership as well as the Jewish masses have persistently rejected schemes such as the British Uganda Plan in 1903 which aimed at resettlement of persecuted Jews in a land other than Palestine. The idea found expression in the past in both successful and abortive attempts to colonize Palestine. It constantly emerged in the form of prayer and poetry and general religious practice.

The method whereby the Jews succeeded in maintaining their identity as a unit throughout the long centuries of their dispersion was a reversal of the usual procedure of making religion a part of national life, for the Jews transformed all the elements of nationalism into religious practice. Thus, by surrounding their nationalism with a halo of sacredness, they succeeded in warding off all attempts to assimilate them culturally or obliterate them physically. It is on this tenacious, unwavering concentration that the nonlegal Jewish claim was based and not alone on the mere existence of a Jewish state in antiquity. It should be added, however, that as early as 1891 a host of experts in international law contended that since

* *Peace Handbook No. 162 on Zionism,* London, 1920.

the Jews never gave up their title to Palestine the "law of dereliction" did not hold in their case.*

Toward the end of the nineteenth century groups of Jews were attempting to extricate Jewish nationalism from the confines of its religious bonds and set it up as an end in itself. Among the groups were a few Hebraists who were themselves the product of a Hebrew cultural renaissance. These men differed from their medieval predecessors in that they undertook the task of establishing a Jewish national movement independent of religion. They secularized and expanded the Hebrew language. They undertook vast research into Jewish history. They glorified Palestine in song, drama, and novel and spoke of it in terms of geography and history rather than religion. In essence, these men were attempting to reverse the medieval trend of Jewish nationalism, which had emphasized the protective bond of religion, and to re-establish a completely independent and secular Jewish nationalism. The one thing both these forms of nationalism had in common was Palestine as the symbol of their vision.

Another major cause of the rebirth of a vital Jewish nationalism was the outbreak of violent anti-Semitism. The wave of anti-Semitic outbursts in Russia in the 1880's, accompanied by further government restrictions upon the Jews, served as a great catalytic agent in popularizing nationalistic ideas. The pogroms crushed all hopes of free Jewish survival even in an enlightened Russia, and spurred the efforts toward the colonization of Palestine. Furthermore, the growing discrimination against the Jews of Eastern Europe for economic reasons, coming as it did on top of a seemingly endless struggle with the Christian church and a generally hostile Gentile community, convinced many others of the inevitability of choosing Zionism as the only remaining path to freedom, social justice, and security.

Colonization of Palestine as the only solution of the Jewish question was advocated quite often in the late eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth centuries by many statesmen and writers, Jew and Gentile. It culminated in the foundation in 1884 in Russia of a society known as Hovevei Zion (Lovers of Zion), whose avowed purpose was to promote Jewish resettlement in Palestine upon a more extensive scale than the isolated new settlements that had already been founded in the two preceding decades. It should be noted here that at no time did the Jewish returnees ever forcefully oust Arabs from their land. The Jewish aim was the restoration of a people in its homeland, and not the establishment of an alien rule

* See, particularly, Dr. William E. Blackstone, "May the United States Intercede for the Jews?" *Our Day,* October, 1891.

over the population and resources of the country. Thus all the land cultivated in both the early and later days of the Zionist movement was purchased from the Arabs either by leading Jewish philanthropists or by a fund set up for that purpose, the Jewish National Fund.

Yet only with the advent in 1896 of Theodore Herzl, an Austrian playwright and man of letters, was the Jewish national sentiment propounded as an idea whose expression should not limit itself to the creation of scattered colonies in the Holy Land, but should expand into an organized endeavor of the Jewish people to work for its national regeneration.

Herzl published his first ideas on the reorganization of the Jews in a pamphlet, *Judenstat* (the Jewish State), in which he advocated the creation of an autonomous Jewish settlement as the solution to the Jewish question. Despite relentless and powerful opposition, Herzl succeeded in bringing together the First Zionist Congress for the purpose of considering his project. It convened at Basel, Switzerland on August 27, 1897, and was attended by delegates from all parts of the world. After much discussion the Congress adopted as the aim of Zionism: "The creation for Jewish people of a publicly and legally assured home in Palestine." To realize this aim, the Zionist Congress proposed the following measures:

1. to promote through effective means the settlement of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers;

2. to organize the whole Jewish people by means of local and international institutions suitable for the purpose and conforming with the laws of the countries in which Jews live;

3. to strengthen Jewish national sentiment and consciousness;

4. to take proper steps toward securing the concurrence of the Powers, insofar as their assent might be necessary, for the achievement of the Zionist goal.

Thus Zionism, for the first time in modern history, strode onto the arena of world politics and international diplomacy. Virtually everything that was to unfold in the Zionist movement of later years was already discernible in this first Congress in Basel.

Herzl died in 1904, heartbroken and penniless, without having achieved his purpose. But others took up the cause and the task of colonizing Palestine went on in almost uninterrupted fashion, so that, at the termination of World War I, the Jewish community there numbered some 80,000 in a total population of about 850,000. Over fifty agricultural colonies, with a total of over 100,000 acres, were firmly established as were the beginnings of the Israeli metropolis of the future, Tel Aviv.

The outbreak of World War I brought colonization to a comparative

standstill, but the course of the war led to the issuance, on November 2, 1917, of the Balfour Declaration, a letter from Lord Balfour to Lord Rothschild supporting the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. The Declaration was hailed by the Zionists of the day as a Magna Carta of future Jewish rights in Palestine (see Doc. 4).

In retrospect, it seems that the promulgation of the Declaration was prompted by at least four major considerations. Firstly, there was a long history of British concern over the fate of European Jewry. For a period of 50 to 75 years prior to World War I there had arisen in England a Christian-sponsored movement favoring the return of the Jews to the Holy Land as the only solution to their chronic woes on the Continent. Secondly, there was the serious military problem posed by the Turkish threat to Suez. A protective bastion had to be erected on the Palestinian coast to help keep open the lifeline to India. Thirdly, the Declaration would draw the enthusiastic support of the masses of Jews in Eastern Europe—a sector facing total capitulation to the German war machine. It would also gain the very important backing of leading American Zionists.

In fact, in his appearance before the Palestine Royal Commission of 1936, Lloyd George testified that the launching of the Declaration at that specific moment was due to "propagandist reasons." He remarked further that "the Zionist leaders gave us a definite promise that if the Allies committed themselves to giving facilities for the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine, they would do their best to rally Jewish sentiment and support throughout the world to the Allied cause. They kept their word."

It must be remembered that at the time of the Balfour Declaration there were over 600,000 Jews in the ready-to-collapse Russian army. These men were fighting for a government they hated and whose success in the war they did not anticipate with relish. That the Germans were aware of this is evident in the daily proclamations they dropped over the Russian lines promising that a German victory would bring them true liberty. The following serves as an example:

TO THE JEWS OF POLAND:

The heroic armies of the great mid-European governments, Germany and Austria-Hungary, have entered Poland . . . Our flags bring you rights and freedom; equal citizenship rights, freedom of belief, freedom to work undisturbed in all branches of economic and cultural life in your own spirit . . . . Remember Kishinev, Homel, Bialistok and many hundreds of other pogroms! . . . You . . . must rise as one man to aid in the holy cause . . APPLY WITH THE GREATEST CONFIDENCE TO THE COMMANDANTS

OF OUR MILITARY IN THE PLACES THAT ARE NEAREST TO YOU. HELP BRING THE VICTORY OF FREEDOM AND JUSTICE.*

After the Balfour Declaration was finally issued the German and Turkish governments issued a similar promise which, if anything, was more in line with Zionist aspirations than was the British declaration. But by then the propaganda victory had been snatched from their hands.

A fourth motivating factor behind the release of the Declaration at this time was the British fear of postwar French domination of the entire Mediterranean littoral. The French, through M. Georges Picot, had already insisted that any postwar settlement should place the whole of Syria down to the Egyptian frontier under their control. The British looked upon a Jewish home in Palestine, under their mandate, of course, as an almost heaven-sent means of thwarting the French pretensions. What made the entire scheme even more appealing was the fact that this new fortress on the imperial lifeline would be self-supporting in the sense that it would be built as a Jewish undertaking supported by Jewish financing. Negotiations were undertaken with Jewish leaders headed by Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the emerging leader of the Zionist forces and destined to become the first president of the state of Israel. From the middle of 1916 on, these discussions were carried on in great earnestness and with obvious progress. It should be added for the record that President Woodrow Wilson, an acknowledged champion of the Zionist movement, was constantly consulted and the drafts of the proposed Declaration were submitted to him for approval. That the Arabs, too, were duly informed of the Balfour Declaration is made clear by Lloyd George in his book, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*. In it he states:

> Through Sir Mark Sykes and Colonel Lawrence we informed the Arab leaders, King Hussein and his son, Faisal, of our proposals (regarding the Balfour Declaration). We could not get in touch with the Palestine Arabs *as they were fighting against us*
>
> The Arab leaders did not offer any objections to the Declaration so long as the rights of the Arabs of Palestine were respected Pledges were given to the non-Jewish population of Palestine who constituted the great majority of its inhabitants, as well as to the Jews These were the results of conversations which we had with such Arab leaders as we could get in touch with. There was a two-fold understanding given to them, that the establishment of a Jewish National Home would not in any way, firstly, affect the civil or religious rights of the general population of Palestine; secondly, would not diminish the general prosperity of that population. Those were the only pledges we gave to the Arabs

* William B. Ziff, *The Rape of Palestine,* New York, 1938, pp. 530-531.

A great number of debates were to occur in later years regarding the "true meaning" of the Balfour Declaration, but at the time the Declaration was unqualifiedly endorsed by the Allied powers. Statements of approval came from as far away as China and even the French formally committed themselves "to the renaissance of Jewish Nationality." President Wilson echoed the prevailing sentiment in America when he declared: "The Allied nations, with the fullest concurrence of our own government and people, are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundations of a Jewish Commonwealth." (See Doc. 5 for President Wilson's recommendations on Palestine.) The original favorable attitude of the Arab leaders can best be determined from a joint agreement signed by Dr. Weizmann and Emir Faisal in Paris in 1919 (see Doc. 6).

Later Arab claims that Palestine had been promised to them and not the Jews were based largely on the exchange of letters and negotiations between King Hussein and Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt (see Doc. 3). In answer to these claims, Sir Henry himself had this to say in a letter to the *London Times* on July 23, 1947: "I feel it my duty to state, and I do so definitely and emphatically that it was not intended by me in giving this pledge to King Hussein to include Palestine in the area in which Arab independence was promised. I had also every reason to believe at the time that the fact that Palestine was not included in my pledge was well understood by King Hussein." It is no wonder then that in February, 1919, the Zionist Organization submitted a special request to the Allied Supreme Council that, in keeping with the principle that the popular wish of the people involved be honored, the mandate for Palestine be granted to Great Britain. Their wish was granted at San Remo on April 25, 1920. It took another two years, however, before the Mandate, in its final form, was submitted to the League of Nations (see Doc. 7). The delay was occasioned by intervention on the part of the American government which had evinced a great interest in the entire undertaking. The end result of this interest was a "Convention between the United Kingdom and the United States of America" signed on December 3, 1924, which forbade any modification in the terms of the Mandate without American consent. If this was not enough to assure the Zionist leadership that the future held naught but promise, there was in the preamble to the Mandate the specific commitment to translate the Balfour Declaration into practice (see Doc. 7). Thus, when on September 29, 1923, the Palestine Mandate formally came into force the vast majority of those who were interested in the Zionist venture were convinced of its promise of fulfillment. What followed instead was a generation of frus-

tration and bitter disappointment culminating in the British White Paper of 1939 (see Doc. 8). This document completed a cycle for, in effect, it put the British government in the position of denying an independent Jewish state in Palestine. In these days of bitter Arab-Jewish warfare in the Middle East one is prone to forget that by 1939 Britain and not the Arabs had assumed the role of "villainous enemy" as far as the Zionists were concerned

Volumes have been written regarding the record of British rejection of all that was implied in the earlier promises. What lies behind this change in British attitude? There was, first of all, the complete rejection of the ideas made explicit in the Mandate by both the British military in Palestine and, more important, by the British Colonial Office. The latter in particular was convinced that affairs in Palestine should be conducted in the same tradition of imperial rule which characterized the British dominion over India and the rest of the Empire. Since the promise of an independent Jewish state in Palestine stood squarely in the path of such a policy they did all that was in their power to subvert the Zionist goal. In addition, it must be added that even then the British Foreign Office already dreamed of a network of semifeudal Arab states under British hegemony.* Only a successfully independent Jewish state loomed as a threat to this undertaking.

What must be said is that despite every obstacle placed in its way, despite the gradual truncation of Palestine from an area of 45,000 square miles in 1920-1922 to an area of 10,000 square miles in 1922-1948, despite the British restrictions on immigration and economic development, despite the barrage of anti-Zionist White Papers, the Zionist experiment grew ever more successful. Wave after wave of immigrants, legal and illegal, developed oases from desert lands. A new communal form, the Kibbutz, combined Anglo-American political democracy and socialist economics with great success. Self-governing bodies within the framework of the Mandate received the vital experience necessary to the public administration of a modern society. The political parties were as mature and literate as any in the Western World.

The most notable Zionist achievement in this period of trial and stress was the psychological and political transformation of the Jews. The great mass of Jews who migrated to Palestine—by 1939 the figure had reached 500,000—seemed to thrive in the face of the many challenges placed in their path. Gone now was the abject creature of the medieval era whose main hope

* For detailed documentation see. William B Ziff, Paul L. Hanna, and Pierre Van Paassen in Bibliography.

for salvation lay in messianic redemption. Gone, too, was the rootless mass, universally cut off from the soil and normal economic productivity. In its place had emerged a thriving, spirited, and determined people bidding for recognition as equals in the family of nations. It was this rejuvenated Jewish community also which gave the Allies their most reliable locally-derived Middle East fighting contingent during World War II.

The years immediately after the war, 1945-1947, were marked by unprecedented violence in Palestine and continued diplomatic bickering over the question of Palestine's future. The Jewish position could be paraphrased thus: "There is but one refuge for the Jews who survived the terrors of Hitlerism—Palestine. Therefore, the restrictions on immigration must be lifted and we must be allowed to progress along the road to independence. If the British government returns to its promises in the Mandate we shall not press for immediate statehood. If, however, the British remain adamant in their refusal to allow our natural flowering we shall have to establish a Jewish state independent of their wishes."

The Arab reaction to the stated aims of the Zionists can best be gauged from the remarks made by Azzam Pasha, Secretary of the League of Arab States, early in 1946 before an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry:

> Our brother has gone to Europe and to the West and come back something else. He has come back with a totally different conception of things, Western and not Eastern. That doesn't mean that we are necessarily quarreling with anyone who comes from the West. But the Jew, our old cousin, coming back with imperialistic ideas, with materialistic ideas, with reactionary or revolutionary ideas and trying to implement them first by British pressure and then by American pressure, and then by terrorism on his own part—he is not the old cousin and we do not extend to him a very good welcome. The Zionist, the new Jew, wants to dominate and he pretends that he has got a particular civilizing mission with which he returns to a backward, degenerate race in order to put the elements of progress into an area which wants no progress. Well, that has been the pretension of every power that wanted to colonize and aimed at domination The excuse has always been that the people are backward and that he has got a human mission to put them forward The Arabs simply stand and say NO We are not reactionary and we are not backward. Even if we are ignorant, the difference between ignorance and knowledge is ten years in school We are a living, vitally strong nation, we are in our renaissance, we are producing as many children as any nation in the world We still have our brains. We have a heritage of civilization and of spiritual life. We are not going to allow ourselves to be controlled either by great nations or small nations or dispersed nations

When the Anglo-American Committee, appointed by President Truman and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, recommended that 100,000

Jews be admitted into Palestine as rapidly as possible and that restrictions on sale of land to Jews in Palestine be lifted, the government of Prime Minister Clement Attlee disavowed the report. Hopes of conciliation threatened to evaporate. Underground Jewish forces began an incessant harassing of the British in Palestine which the latter proved incapable of suppressing. Every measure taken by the British, from imprisonment of Palestine's foremost Jewish leaders to severe military countermeasures and the interception and sinking of boats, arriving constantly with "illegal" Jewish refugees, failed to stem the tide of the Jewish uprising. Matters were not at all eased by the additional announcement by the Arab Higher Committee in Palestine that as soon as the Mandate should come to an end an Arab army would drive the Jews out of Palestine. In February of 1947, after several last-ditch attempts at conciliation had failed, Mr. Bevin formally announced that his government had decided to refer the whole problem to the United Nations.

The urgency of the situation dictated immediate action and it was not long in coming. A special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations was called for April 28, 1947, to discuss the Palestine situation. At this session, the Arabs were represented within the United Nations by the states of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. The Palestinian Arabs, through the Palestine Arab Higher Committee, and the Jews, through the Jewish Agency, pleaded their cases before the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly. The first bombshell in the proceedings was thrown by the Soviet United Nations delegate, Andrei Gromyko who astounded the Assembly by deserting the former Soviet anti-Zionist position and declaring in favor of a binational state in Palestine. Failing that, he said that the Soviet government would accept partition as a solution to the Palestine problem. On May 15, a Special Committee on Palestine presented its majority report favoring the political partition of Palestine as the only feasible answer to the entire problem. It recommended an economic union between the independent Arab and Jewish states, including a customs union, a joint currency system, joint economic development schemes, joint operation of ports and airports as well as interstate railway, highway, and postal services. The committee further recommended a United Nations trusteeship over Jerusalem and special safeguarding of the Holy Places. It dealt with the Jewish demand for free immigration by proposing the admission of 150,000 Jews during the first two years of transition and an additional 60,000 per year should the transition period go beyond two years. A minority report submitted by

India, Iran, and Yugoslavia recommended a federal state in Palestine akin to binationalism with severely restricted Jewish immigration.

Speaking for the United States, Secretary of State George Marshall approved the majority plan. The Russian government did likewise. The British government rejected both plans. Jewish reaction to the plan was stated by Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, spokesman for the Jewish Agency:

> If heavy sacrifice is the inescapable condition of a final solution, if it makes possible the immediate reestablishment of the Jewish State, that ideal for which a people has ceaselessly striven, then the Jewish Agency is prepared to recommend the acceptance of the partition solution. That sacrifice would be the Jewish contribution to the solution of a painful problem and would bear witness to the Jewish people's spirit of international cooperation and its desire for peace.

The following comments typify Arab reaction to the plan.

Mr. Mahmoud Fawzi, the Egyptian representative at the United Nations:

> We do not choose to comply with the General Assembly's resolutions on Palestine. The Charter and the United Nations will not fall apart if one more of the General Assembly's resolutions is not put into effect.

Mr. Adil Arslan of Syria:

> My country will never recognize such a decision

Dr. Fadhil Jamali, Foreign Minister of Iraq:

> Iraq does not recognize the validity of this decision and will reserve freedom of action towards its implementation.

The Partition Plan was introduced at the plenary session of the General Assembly on November 26, 1947, and adopted three days later (see Doc. 10). However, a major flaw in the resolution—the absence of provision for implementing the Partition Plan—led rapidly to an even greater deterioration of the situation. Shortly after the General Assembly session, Great Britain announced that it would terminate the Mandate over Palestine on May 15, 1948. It also insisted that until that date it alone would be responsible for maintaining order in Palestine and would not tolerate United Nations interference in the administration of that land. The Arab League, too, made no secret of its opposition to the implementation of the

Partition Plan. The Arab states and the British government both announced that British arms would continue to be sent to the Middle East in fulfillment of "contractual obligations."

Meanwhile, various elements in the American State Department began to favor a reversal of the American position in Palestine, arguing that United States support of the Jewish state in Palestine would provide an opening wedge for the Soviet Union in the Middle East, and that Arab rulers might cancel American oil concessions as a retributive measure. The growing strength of this viewpoint was reflected in a series of speeches made before the Security Council by the American United Nations delegate, Warren R. Austin. On March 19, 1948, Ambassador Austin made explicit the reversal of the American position in the following proposals submitted to the United Nations:

> 1. The plan proposed by the General Assembly is an integral plan which cannot succeed unless each of its parts can be carried out There seems to be general agreement that the plan cannot now be implemented by peaceful means
>
> 2. We believe that further steps must be taken immediately not only to maintain the peace but also to afford a further opportunity to reach an agreement between the interested parties regarding the future government of Palestine To this end we believe that a temporary trusteeship for Palestine should be established under the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations Such a United Nations trusteeship would be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned or to the character of the eventual political settlement, which we hope can be achieved without long delay In our opinion, the Security Council should recommend the establishment of such a trusteeship to the General Assembly and to the mandatory power This would require an immediate special session of the General Assembly, which the Security Council should request the Secretary General to convoke under Article 20 of the Charter.
>
> 3 Pending the meeting of the proposed special session of the General Assembly, we believe that the Security Council should instruct the Palestine Commission to suspend its efforts to implement the proposed partition plan.

In America, Mr. Austin's statement elicited an extraordinarily vocal negative public opinion. In the United Nations Mr. Gromyko blamed the United States for the breakdown in the attempts to solve the Palestine problem. England readily announced its support of the American stand. In Palestine, organized anti-British military and terroristic measures were renewed on a large scale. Conditions became such that Trygvie Lie, United Nations Secretary General, was obliged to call into being another special General Assembly session on Palestine. The Assembly convened

on April 16, 1948. The American delegation to the special session submitted a series of proposals recommending a temporary trusteeship over Palestine, pending Arab-Jewish agreement on a future government; a restriction upon Jewish immigration and land purchase (pending such agreement); and election of a legislature (which would necessarily have an Arab majority). The Soviet Union countered by demanding, as under the United Nations Charter it had the right to do, a seat on any trusteeship over Palestine.

So matters stood on the afternoon of Monday, May 14, 1948. At 5:00 P.M. that day the final plenary session of the special session was scheduled to convene. At exactly 4:06 P.M. the state of Israel declared its independence.

The Arab World reacted swiftly. On May 15, the regular armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon invaded Israel. Their purpose as stated by Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, was clear: "There will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades." One week after the beginning of hostilities, the Security Council issued the first of several cease-fire orders which were accepted by Israel and rejected by the Arabs. The weeks and months that followed were marked by the establishment and abandonment of several truces. They were also marked by a series of surprisingly conclusive Israeli military successes. After eight months of heavy fighting the military phase of the war came to an end with the crushing defeat of the Egyptian armies which had invaded southern Israel.

During the months of February, March, April, and July, armistice agreements were reached between Israel and her Arab neighbors. (See Doc. 11. for Egyptian-Israel armistice agreement.) To date, no further progress has been made toward permanent treaties of peace. By October of the same year it had become apparent that the Arab nations were already arming for a "second round." Thus Mohammed Saleh El-din Bey, a leading Egyptian statesman and former foreign minister, declared, "The Arabs intend to annihilate the state of Israel." This cry for revenge remained consistent in the Arab countries.

April 14, 1950, Akram Hourani, the Defense Minister of Syria, declared:

> The Syrian army is ready to take revenge for the shame of the defeat in Palestine. We call on Arab countries to unite towards the national war, the battle of revenge.

June 17, 1951, Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, announced:

> The United Nations will not solve the Palestine problem but only the Arabs themselves can do it They are now getting ready and preparing to take back Palestine . . the day is not far

April 24, 1952, Faris El Khouri, chief Syrian delegate to the United Nations, stated:

> The only way open to the Arabs to achieve a solution of the Palestine problem is the way of force

January 9, 1953, King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia declared:

> Israel to the Arab World is like a cancer to the human body and the only remedy is to uproot it just like a cancer.

May 8, 1954, Colonel Nasser had this to say:

> Israel is an artificial state which must disappear.

And on October 14, 1955, Colonel Nasser added:

> There is no sense in talking about peace with Israel. There isn't even the smallest place for negotiations between the Arabs and Israel

April 11, 1956, the Egyptian government-controlled newspaper *Al Gomhouria* remarked:

> The only reasonable proposal which Mr Hammarskjold can make is the obliteration of Israel from the face of the earth.

These expressions of Arab intent, coupled with their categorical refusal to translate the uneasy armistice terms into a permanent peace, were among the major causes of unabated friction in the area. Among other factors which exacerbated the situation were:

1. The unending series of raids and counterraids along every Arab-Israeli borderline. The United Nations Security Council has chastised both Israel and the Arab states on her border for constantly violating the armistice agreements. The United Nation and world public opinion were partic-

ularly disturbed over several major retaliatory raids conducted by Israel against Egypt and Syria.

2. The dispute over boundaries. The Arabs have demanded that Israel return to the boundary lines set by the Partition Plan of 1947. Israel has refused to consider any major boundary revisions claiming that to do so would dishonor those who died defending the present boundaries against aggression.

3. The dispute over water rights. There has been particular bitterness over harnessing the waters of the Jordan River.

4. Free passage in the Suez Canal. Nothing ever came of a Security Council order calling upon Egypt to end its blockade of Israel by opening the canal to Israeli shipping.

5. The status of Jerusalem.

6. The Arab refugees.

With the possible exception of the border clashes, no single issue in the Middle East prior to the Suez War aroused as much public interest as the problem of the Arab refugees. It is generally agreed that this is one of the important obstacles to peaceful settlement of Arab-Israeli differences. The problem has its origin in the mass Arab exodus from Palestine which began shortly after the United Nations Partitions Resolution was announced and which continued through the early phases of the Arab-Israeli War of 1948-1949. The number of Arabs who left Palestine has been estimated as anywhere between 550,000 and 750,000.

Today there are over 900,000 Arab refugees living in several Middle Eastern lands under the most miserable conditions imaginable. The bulk of them, some 500,000, are in Jordan; the remainder, with approximation as to totals, are dispersed as follows: Lebanon, 120,000; Syria, 90,000; Iraq, 5,000; Gaza 220,000; and a sprinkling in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

The Arabs have insisted that Israel repatriate all those who wish to return and compensate the others for their properties. The Arabs have argued that Israel could settle many of these refugees in the territory it acquired during the Palestine War beyond the original Palestine boundaries.

When Israel declared its independence, the new nation was established within the boundaries set by the United Nations in its 1947 Partition Plan. Under the terms of that proposal an area of 5,670 square miles of the former territory of Palestine was to be set up as an independent Jewish state. The present territory of Israel—8,048 square miles—consists of that original territory plus 2,378 square miles acquired in the war waged against the Arab states in 1948-1949. As a result of the same war

Jordan acquired 2,222 square miles and Egypt assumed control of the 135 square miles which comprise the Gaza Strip.

The Gaza Strip is a narrow rectangular piece of land some six miles in width extending north of the Egyptian frontier for approximately 26 miles along the Mediterranean coast and includes the town of Gaza. Its military importance can be gauged by the fact that it is within 35 miles of Tel Aviv. The resident population is about 90,000. The additional 200,000 Arab refugees who have encamped within the narrow confines of the strip are almost entirely dependent upon the United Nations Relief and Works Administration and other international relief agencies. Though Egyptian representatives at the United Nations often referred to the Gaza Strip as "Egyptian controlled territory," Egypt never actually annexed the Gaza Strip. It was treated as occupied territory provisionally administered by the Egyptian military authorities. Thus, in September, 1955, the Cairo Court of Administrative Jurisdiction stated that the Gaza Strip was outside Egyptian territory and that the Egyptian authorities were exercising "a kind of control over part of the territory of Palestine."

Israel has argued that the mass resettlement of obviously hostile Arabs would be tantamount to inviting a "fifth column" more than half the size of its own population. The Israelis also point out that the "refugee problem" is a two-sided affair since Israel has had to absorb, in addition to the masses of East European Jews, some 400,000 Jewish refugees who have been forced to emigrate in recent years from Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and other Arab lands. Israel, as has already been noted, is adamant in its refusal to make any but minor boundary adjustments and consistently points to the fact that Jordan, too, acquired some 2,200 square miles of additional land as a result of the same Palestine War.

In 1948, Israel offered to accept 100,000 returning Arab refugees as part of a general peace settlement but, in the absence of such a settlement, has withdrawn the offer. The Israel government has, however, absorbed some 30,000 illegal Arab immigrants who infiltrated across the border, and has released most of the $12 million in frozen bank accounts belonging to Arab refugees. The feeling nevertheless persists within the councils of the United Nations and elsewhere that, all its arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, Israel's attitude toward the Arab refugee has been far too rigid.

The United Nations position can be summarized as a shift from the view that a compromise was possible between repatriation and resettle-

ment, to a view in which the emphasis has shifted to resettlement in the Arab World.

Despite the numerous points of friction many people still believe that an eventual peace settlement might have been possible were it not for the dramatic suddenness with which Egypt emerged as a close collaborator with—if not ally of—the Soviet Union. The turning point in this history can be dated as September 27, 1955. At that time Egypt consummated an arms deal with Czechoslovakia estimated at over $250 million, which resulted in its assuming the role of a much more powerful leader of an Arab military entente. It is to the details surrounding the development of this "new Egypt" that we now turn.

CHAPTER 6

Egypt and the Suez Canal

In July of 1956, when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, many observers condemned this action without realizing that Egypt was doing what would be legally acceptable for it to do twelve years later. The original agreement, by some interpretations, might even be construed to permit the legality of such action as early as 1956. The final agreement for the management of the Suez Canal, however, provided that the Canal would be turned over to Egyptian control and ownership 99 years from the date of its completion (see Doc. 1). Since the Suez Canal began operation in 1869, under the terms of the agreement it would have been transferred to Egypt in 1968. Justifying its action in nationalizing the Canal twelve years early, Egypt cited reasons of national security, economic necessity, and indemnity for economic deprivations caused by the construction and operation of the Canal. It was a bold move on the part of Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, insecurely established leader of a bankrupt and highly nationalistic people. With one stroke he could hope to secure the economy of his country and at the same time play upon and heighten nationalistic fervor.

To be a pawn in the international economic and political game was not in any sense a new role for the Suez Canal. Its very inception logically involved immense economic and political complexities. The construction of the Canal was opposed by Great Britain, then maritime leader of the world, which considered its own economic and political control to be threatened by the scheme for a short cut to the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, the venture was fervently supported by France and other Western European nations who saw in the Canal a resurgence of the possibilities of power for Western Europe, since the smaller merchant fleets could profit considerably from the shorter route to important trade centers. Finally pressured into accepting an eventual accomplishment of the Canal in spite of opposition, Great Britain did the next best thing from the English point of view and undertook to gain control of the new

Suez waterway. In effecting this, use was made of an old agreement with the Ottoman Empire granting Great Britain informal control in the southern Middle East, and another, in 1882, which permitted formal occupation of Egypt. Much of the history of the Suez Canal and of twentieth-century Egypt centers in Britain's political, economic, and military maneuvers designed to seize and maintain control of this vitally important waterway.

When Egypt became a British protectorate at the close of World War I (see Doc. 2) Britain, with informal international approval, assumed guardianship of the Canal—a responsibility continually complicated by increasing tension between Egypt and Great Britain over Egyptian independence and by the increasing international importance of the Canal in the modern world.

The culmination of the power struggle between Great Britain and Egypt came with Egypt's nationalization of the Canal in 1956. In order to examine Egypt's justifications for such action we must look further into the beginning of the Canal and the organization of the Suez Canal Company.

The inclusion of Egypt in the affairs of the Suez Canal Company was a recent development in the management of the Canal. Egypt had supplied almost half of the original cost capital and for ten years supplied four-fifths of the construction labor for the project. Although in addition it also maintained the Sweet Water Canal which was necessary to the function of the Suez, Egypt did not realize any return from its investment.

In debt as a result of these economic drains and domestic mismanagement, Ismail, the Khedive, was forced to sell Egypt's shareholdings in the Canal Company which amounted to 44 per cent. These shares were purchased in 1875 by the British government in a brilliant move by Disraeli. Even the 15 per cent of the net profits allotted to Egypt under terms of the original agreement were transferred to France in part satisfaction of other debts.

While Egypt was removed from any control over Canal operations and left to suffer substantial financial loss, the operation of the Canal itself further threatened the Egyptian economy. Previous overland trade took to the waterway for transit. Even the new Cairo-Suez Railway had to be abandoned. The construction and operation of the Canal left Egypt in a state of bankruptcy and dependence upon Britain, from which she is only now recovering.

In 1922, Egyptian pressure for independence resulted in the establishment of an independent monarchy in Egypt; but the price of independence was to reserve to Britain almost the same rights and influence it had

exerted under the protectorate—a defense of Egypt and the Canal and the security of the British government and British military installations in Egypt. Egypt's increasing resentment of British control, and Egyptian pressure for a voice in the operation of the Canal led to bitter disputes which were temporarily eased by the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, decreasing British control over Egypt but continuing British protection of the Canal. Britain managed, indeed, to maintain substantial control of Egyptian affairs until the disruptions caused by World War II. The exigencies of the war and some pro-Axis sentiment in Egypt again strained Anglo-Egyptian relations.

At the close of World War II attempts by Great Britain to bring the government of Egypt again securely under its control were met by violent anti-British demonstrations. Egypt demanded removal of all British forces and military installations (almost a billion dollars in military installations and some 84,000 troops), union with the Sudan, and control of the Canal. From 1944 until the last British troops left Egypt in 1956 relations between the two countries gradually deteriorated. Though they were close to agreement at times, political changes in Egypt or Great Britain would again result in further breaches. Throughout this period, however, Egypt continued to win concessions. Some British troops were evacuated and military bases consolidated in the Suez area, and in 1949 extensive concessions were made to Egypt by the Suez Canal Company, admitting more Egyptians to management of the Canal and providing further sharing of profit from the operation of the Canal.

In spite of such concessions Egypt's nationalistic determination increased, while Britain was unwilling to concede complete defeat in Egypt. The controversy was debated before the Security Council without resolution. Egypt even appealed, without success, to the United States to replace Great Britain in Egypt. Under pressure from complications such as the Arab-Israeli war, the Egyptian blockade of Israeli shipping, and the heightened significance of Suez in the Cold War, and with the encouragement of other Arab nations, Egypt repudiated all political ties with the West. Further, it abrogated all Anglo-Egyptian treaties. Refusing to recognize the abrogation, Great Britain, with the support of the United States, took steps to defend its remaining strength in Egypt. Egypt interfered with British canal shipping, and Britain replied with military strength. Violent clashes took place between British troops and Egyptian demonstrators. There was considerable property destruction and loss of life on both sides The 1952 coup by which the Egyptian army took control of the government and ousted King Farouk quieted hostilities

temporarily, but it soon became clear that the new government would consolidate by utilizing and emphasizing nationalistic tensions. Further demonstrations and bitterness finally resulted in an agreement on the withdrawal of British troops (see Doc. 15). The last British troops left Suez in June of 1956.

Egyptian claims of economic deprivation as a result of the Canal were in large part true, even though increased Egyptian authority in the Suez Canal Company since the late 1940's had begun to produce financial return.

Egypt's claim to national security as further justification for the nationalization of the Canal is intimately bound up with its struggles against Great Britain for self-realization as a nation. Foreign control of the Canal brought continual foreign intervention in the national life of the country. Egypt learned in its struggles with Great Britain that it was virtually helpless as long as foreign military vessels could line the Suez against it. Egypt went to war with Israel in 1948, confident of a quick and easy victory, only to be pushed back until Israel was within striking distance of the Canal. Great Britain came to the defense of Egypt by suggesting that a threat to the Canal would bring military intervention on the part of Great Britain.

With the failure of its armies, Egypt utilized its last resource against Israel—it denied Israel's right to the use of the Canal and together with Saudi Arabia closed off Israel's only other southern sea exit through the Gulf of Aqaba. Although Article I of the Suez Canal Convention clearly states that the Canal shall be open to all ships of all nations in peace or war, Egypt defended her action on the basis of Article X, which provides that the terms of the convention shall not hinder Egypt in measures necessary to her self-defense (see Doc. 1).

It is in the American tradition to sympathize with peoples struggling against foreign domination for full realization of political rights. We can be sympathetic with Egyptian goals so long as Egypt does not, in the pursuit of its national rights, violate the security of other nations. It becomes a more involved question when, in view of Cold War politics, free transit of the Suez is necessary to defend Western democracy. Nor can we count on the reliability of a government based upon dictatorship.

A great deal of Egypt's resources in recent years has gone into the purchase of arms from the West and from the Soviet Union, but Egypt's poor economic situation prior to the nationalization of the Canal was not altogether due to intensive military mobilization. Egypt had a simple agrarian economy for centuries. Prior to British control, the economy was one of primary subsistence, capable of supporting only a small, stable

population. British control and British capital established for Egypt a one-crop economy. That one crop was cotton. Desirous of greatly increased crop yields for purposes of export, Britain regulated the Nile waters through dams and irrigation projects. Although the uncontrolled annual Nile floods were not a reliable method for crop irrigation, each flood left behind it a deposit of rich silt that continually replenished the soil exhausted from the year's planting. British dams and irrigation provided instead a regular water supply that temporarily increased crop yields profitably. Because of these very dams, however, the land, no longer replenished by annual deposits of rich silt from Nile flood waters, grew poor and unyielding. As might be expected, during the period of increased crop yields, Egypt also developed one of the highest rates of population increase in the world The fellaheen, the Egyptian peasant class, were soon overcrowded, but were too poor to buy fertilizers for their now worn-out soil. Egypt's resources, already diminished by the Suez Canal, were inadequate to restore the disrupted economy, so that its fortunes came to depend more and more upon the fluctuations of the world cotton market.

Egypt's economic position remained much the same throughout the early years of the twentieth century. Limited industrialization and utilization of the few natural resources available improved the situation somewhat, but by 1955 the economic position was still a desperate one and President Nasser determined upon a complete restoration of Egyptian economy. Reviving an Egyptian dream of previous centuries, he announced a proposal for the building of a tremendous dam across the Nile at Aswan, a vast irrigation and power project which would cost an estimated $1.3 billion dollars. Nasser appealed to the West for aid and in December of 1955 was offered by Washington and London $70 million in outright grants and $200 million more in loans, with assurance of more to come. In his desire to consolidate the Arab World under his leadership, Nasser, playing upon anticolonial, anti-Western fervor, turned also to Russia for aid with the dam. It was during this period that Egypt contracted with Czechoslovakia to purchase considerable shipments of arms and planes. Finally on July 19, 1956, Egypt announced to the West that it was now ready to accept the West's offer of aid in the matter of the Aswan project.

Washington replied with a refusal, echoed by London, which registered doubt of Egypt's financial ability to undertake the project "in present circumstances." Two days later Russia announced that it too had no intention of offering aid to finance the dam. It was five days after that, on July 26, that Nasser in a violent anti-Western speech proclaimed the nationalization of the Suez Canal (see Docs. 18 and 19).

Some experts judge the Aswan dam project itself to be unsound and are of the opinion that any solution to power and irrigation problems along the Nile would necessitate a series of developments extending back into the Sudan in order to include the sources of the river. This would require certain agreements between Egypt and the Sudan. Moreover, neither the Sudanese, nor the Ethiopians, from whose territories spring the main tributaries of the Nile, had agreed to Egypt's proposal for a division of the Nile waters. The refusal of London and Washington was not based on these criticisms, however. It was a diplomatic stroke designed to undermine Nasser's power.

The Suez Canal was the one asset remaining to an economically unsound Egypt, and Nasser promptly utilized this one remaining advantage. Egypt assumed control of the Canal with promises of complete compensation to shareholders if all the Suez Canal Company assets were surrendered to the Egyptian government. France and Britain's answer was to freeze the assets both of the Suez Canal Company and of Egypt itself. As the issue was brought before the United Nations, Nasser warned that any intervention would bring about the closing of the Canal.

Thus the matter stood until October 29, 1956, when Israel broke the political deadlock by invading Egypt's Sinai Peninsula for the announced purpose of clearing out Egyptian "commando" nests said to be responsible for increasing raids on the Israeli frontier. Within twenty-four hours, Great Britain and France without United Nations sanction, and reportedly without the knowledge of the United States, issued an ultimatum to the contending parties which called for a cease-fire in twelve hours or British and French troops would intervene. Israel accepted. Egypt refused. British and French forces then entered the area along the Suez Canal and bombed Egyptian military installations. In reply to this action Egypt sank hulks to block the Canal and Syria blew up the oil pipelines which crossed its territory from Iraq. Within a week British and French forces succeeded in occupying two-fifths of the Suez Canal area. Israel occupied both the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. A further complication was offered by Russia and Red China who threatened to send "volunteer" troops to Egypt.

In the United Nations, Security Council action was deadlocked by British and French vetoes. The issue, then referred to the General Assembly, was debated in an emergency session called to discuss both the crisis in the Middle East and the Hungarian Civil War. The result was an order requiring both a cease-fire and the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli troops from the Suez area. The order was to be enforced by a

United Nations Emergency Force consisting of troops from small neutral countries, but it was not until December 22 that the British and French completed the removal of their troops. A month later Israel had withdrawn from all but the Gaza Strip, though it was March 4 when finally, under threat of world sanctions, the Israeli forces vacated this violently contested strip of territory and the United Nations forces moved in to safeguard the frontier.

The arguments advanced by the antagonists in the dispute are to be found in Documents 20-28, which consist of speeches before the United Nations both in criticism and in defense of the Anglo-French-Israeli action. Document 29 includes the major United Nations Middle Eastern resolutions offered during this period

If, as many contend, the Anglo-French action was taken merely in defense of the Suez Canal, it resulted not so much in defense as in damage to the Canal and the disruption of oil transmission through major Middle East pipelines. If the action was a measure taken in prevention of a major war, at least this objective was gained since no major war developed from a sequence of events which can surely be termed a major world crisis. But if, as some observers suggest, British-French intervention was a bold move made in collaboration with Israel to destroy Nasser's power, restore Anglo-French control of the Suez, and recoup economic losses in the Middle East, it failed indeed Egypt continues to control the Suez Canal and Nasser emerged in a stronger position than before, while Britain and France suffered world-wide censure. Moreover, anti-Western and anti-Israeli feeling has been increased throughout the Middle East.

The report to the United States Senate from the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, dated February 14, 1957, is illustrative of the gravity with which the United States government viewed this crisis in the Middle East. The following is a selection from that report:

> Soviet bloc economic or technical assistance has been extended to Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen and has been offered to Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia Soviet bloc arms have been furnished to Egypt, Syria, and Yemen, and have been offered to Saudi Arabia and Sudan . .
>
> Concurrently with the burgeoning Soviet political and economic activity in the Middle East, there has been a complete destruction of the British and French position in the area This position was given its final blow by the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt, but it had been in decline long before
>
> The net result of these and other events of recent years is that the situation in the Middle East is very dangerous. Syria has moved much closer to the Soviet bloc. Jordan is faced with chaos Egypt has mortgaged its future

cotton crop to pay for Communist arms, large quantities of which have been lost through capture or destruction Egypt has also lost the revenues of the Suez Canal Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are suffering from the loss of oil revenues brought about by blockage of the Canal.

Bearing in mind this survey of the many tensions and complexities which have contributed to the crisis in the Middle East, let us review briefly the philosophies underlying the response of the United States to these problems.

CHAPTER 7

The Shaping of United States Foreign Policy

Creating a foreign policy for the United States is one of the most difficult tasks which faces any presidential administration. Beginning with President Washington, each Chief Executive has had to meet the dual responsibility of maintaining a foreign policy in keeping with the American ideal as interpreted in his time, while simultaneously placating political opposition within and without his own party. This dual undertaking calls for a constant combination of the proverbial wisdom of Solomon with the patience of Job. With the recrudescence of violent nationalism in every section of the globe and the parallel emergence of a much broader American political leadership, the task has become immeasurably more difficult.

The development of United States foreign policy has taken place within the context of an ideological struggle which has been classified by political scientists as "realism" versus "idealism." Typical of the "idealistic" approach are the following quotations from President Woodrow Wilson and President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

In an address delivered in Mobile, Alabama, on October 27, 1913, President Woodrow Wilson declared:

> We dare not turn from the principle that morality and not expediency is the thing that must guide us, and that we will never condone iniquity because it is most convenient to do so.

In his message to Congress on January 6, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt expressed the now-famous concept of the "four freedoms."

> We are committed to the proposition that principles of morality—and considerations for our own security—will never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers. We know that enduring peace cannot be bought at the cost of other people's freedom . . .
>
> In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon essential human freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression everywhere in the world

> The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way . . . everywhere in the world.
> The third is freedom from want . everywhere in the world.
> The fourth is freedom from fear . . anywhere in the world.
> . . Our support goes to those who struggle to gain those rights or keep them.

Representative of the viewpoint of political "realism" are the following quotations from Alexander Hamilton and the contemporary political analyst, Hans J. Morgenthau. In his *Pacificus Paper* No. 3, July, 1793, Alexander Hamilton asserted:

> Self-preservation is the first duty of a nation . . . . Indeed, the rule of morality in this respect is not precisely the same between nations as between individuals. The duty of making its own welfare the guide of its actions, is much stronger upon the former than upon the latter; in proportion to the greater magnitude and importance of national compared with individual happiness, and to the greater permanency of the effects of national than of individual conduct

Hans J. Morgenthau wrote as follows (see Bibliography):

> The fundamental error which has thwarted American foreign policy in thought and action is the antithesis of national interest and moral principles. The equation of political moralism with morality and of political realism with immorality is itself untenable. The choice is not between moral principles and the national interest devoid of moral dignity, but between one set of moral principles, divorced from political reality, and another set of moral principles derived from political reality. The basic fact of international politics is the absence of a society able to protect the existence, and to promote the interests, of the individual nations. For the individual nations to take care of their own national interests is, then, a political necessity. There can be no moral duty to neglect them; for as the international society is at present constituted, the consistent neglect of the national interest can only lead to national suicide. Yet it can be shown that there exists even a positive moral duty for the individual nation to take care of its national interests.
>
> Self-preservation for the individual as well as for societies is not only a biological and psychological necessity, but in the absence of an overriding moral obligation a moral duty as well. . . .

It becomes obvious that each of these approaches to making foreign policy is based upon a series of tacit assumptions of its own. It becomes further evident that each of these approaches is laden with its own value-judgments. It is necessary, therefore, to examine both the "realistic" and "idealistic" viewpoints in order to determine their basic soundness. At

the outset it would seem that the "realistic" viewpoint advocates dealing with each issue on its own merits and reaching conclusions on the basis of power politics. The "idealistic" view, on the other hand, seems to imply that some formal moral criterion must be established as an *a priori* basis for policy determination. Thus, the latter brings forth Atlantic Charters while the former shies away from "utopian" manifestoes. The "realist" bases his approach upon the acceptance of a prevailing Hobbesian conflict among nations. Strife rather than harmony is seen as, or taken to be, the general rule in international relations. In the absence of an "overawing power" the goal of valid diplomacy and statesmanship is a comparatively limited one. It consists of the limitation of struggles and the restriction of their scope. Hence, the emergence of the "containment" policy under the authorship of Mr. Kennan (see Bibliography). Here, as always, the "realist" seeks not the utopian society which he believes can exist only on a blueprint, but rather the means of attaining a balance of power and an adjustment to existing conditions. There is, therefore, within his approach constant emphasis upon checks and balances, compromise, and maintenance of a flexible bargaining position. There is, in addition, frank acknowledgment that in international diplomacy there often exists a discrepancy between means and ends. Above all, there is the recurrent theme that the struggle for power is permanent and ever present and that the best we can do is try to limit the overconcentration of power and relieve the tensions which make for war. Britain, for example, for over one hundred years maintained peace in Europe through a carefully controlled balance of power.

The political "idealist" on the other hand, starts from the assumption that power politics is not only an abnormal but also a passing phase in mankind's history, and that it is essentially a cynical distortion and corruption of history which is particularly out of place in our shrunken globe where the alternative to "one world" is truly no world. It ascribes all great controversies in history to the clash between incompatible ideals and principles rather than an ubiquitous yearning for power. On the level of practical alternatives to power politics the political "idealist" would usually posit one of several alternatives. These include universal world government, the foreswearing of relations with "bad" countries, or some form of neutralism or isolationism.

Political commentators are pretty much in agreement that regardless of whether one is essentially an "idealist" or a "realist" there exists a certain underlying consensus as to the ends and means of American foreign policy.

There is agreement in other words that both schools adhere to a broad policy which includes the following:

1. the containment of the Soviet Union and its outdistancing in the race for competitive coexistence;
2. establishment of a peaceful world order in which American ideological and material interests are secure;
3. the recognition that a reasonable reconciliation of individual freedom and mass welfare is possible.

There is also general agreement that the means toward these ends must not contradict the general rules of what we consider fair play.

The history of United States foreign relations, for reasons discussed below, has often been under the sway of the "idealistic" rather than the "realistic" approach. Thus, for example, we find the refusal to recognize first the Soviet Union and then Red China on the grounds that they are "evil and corrupt powers."

Thus too, so many of our wars are fought to eliminate and extirpate the "infidels and evildoers." When we go into battle, our terms become "unconditional surrender" and our mottoes become "make the world safe for democracy." The implication is that, once evil men are destroyed, evil too will disappear. It is against this background that two classic documents in American history, each of which has become a guiding principle for generations of "idealists," becomes clear.

President George Washington's Farewell Address on September 17, 1796, advised:

> The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little *political* connection as possible.
>
> . . Why . . . entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice? . . .
>
> It is our policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.

Thomas Jefferson wrote to President James Monroe on October 24, 1823:

> Our first fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic [on this side of the Atlantic] affairs America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She would therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe.

In the development of foreign policy, a democratic nation faces one of its most striking and difficult dilemmas. The executive position must somehow represent or reflect the consensus of the electorate. But the electorate is often contradictory and moody. Certainly the advantages of a foreign policy, fluid enough to reflect these contradictions, are offset by the disadvantages of the resulting uncertainty. With so many involved in the creation of a foreign policy, and so many more affected by its direction, it is sometimes to be wondered that *any* policy can clearly reflect the "will of the people." And yet, if it is to be truly democratic then somehow it must. Thus, for example, we find emerging within the formation of contemporary United States foreign policy an attempt at eclecticism—a combining of both the "realistic" and "idealistic" approach.

Let us examine two statements which reflect this new approach and then proceed to an analysis of the specific obstacles which stand in the way of its fulfillment. The first of these is from an address to the nation by President Dwight D. Eisenhower which was delivered on April 16, 1953. It reads as follows:

> The way chosen by the United States was plainly marked by a few clear precepts, which govern its conduct in world affairs—
>
> First: no people on earth can be held, as a people, to be an enemy, for all humanity shares the common hunger for peace and fellowship and justice
>
> Second: no nation's security and well-being can be lastingly achieved in isolation but only in effective cooperation with fellow nations.
>
> Third: any nation's right to a form of government and an economic system of its own choosing is *inalienable*.
>
> Fourth: any nation's attempt to dictate to other nations their form of government is *indefensible*.
>
> And fifth. a nation's hope of lasting peace cannot be firmly based upon a race in armaments but rather upon just relations and honest understanding with all other nations.

For the second quotation we turn to the words of Mr. George Kennan (see Bibliography):

> It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.
>
> Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the Western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly

> flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.

How then, as a nation are we prepared to meet the demands of such a foreign policy? It is a commonplace among writers on the United States to note that we have taken on very reluctantly the risky role of world leadership. The inevitable remark has also been made that the American rise to the pinnacle has been accompanied by the concomitant rise of a ruthless, amoral, power-hungry Soviet Union. The question therefore naturally arises as to how capable we are of making the necessary decisions which will achieve for us the maximum national security. That these decisions are vital not only to us but to the rest of the world as well is apparent in the relationships between a successful American foreign policy and the well-being, political and economic, of the entire free world. The root of the problem lies in the relationship between the need for incisive and intelligent decision-making on the part an informed leadership and a democratic myth that insists that the people as a whole, in their inherent wisdom, can make the decisions vital to their survival.

Thus we are faced with the question of whether the mass of the American people can judge wisely the complex and often remote problems of contemporary foreign policy. The question is complicated by the traditional pattern of American abstention from foreign "problems" except in periods of great stress. The pattern of American life finds the average American citizen deeply involved in private pursuits. In fact, it is in just this involvement that men like T. V. Smith insist one finds the secret of American freedom. Be that as it may, we nevertheless find that the average American develops views on political matters in a ratio to their direct relationship and effect upon him. As a result, his main interests, politically speaking, lie in such matters as tax laws, social security, and wage and price legislation. It is only on rare occasions that he is aroused to the degree that he forms opinions relative to foreign policy. As a result, we often find a marked instability and a sharp fluctuation characterizing these moods. We come face to face then with the dual problem of how to make the public alert, informed, and active in policy making, and how to make official leadership responsible to the public. No less a problem is posed by the perpetual Executive-Congressional struggle over program direction and leadership which is a normal result of the very structure of our govern-

ment as set up under the Constitution. This struggle has become further complicated over the years by the constant demands of conflicting pressure groups. The average citizen who wants to form an intelligent opinion about foreign policy not only needs to know what the Chief Executive and the Congress are striving to achieve, but also what pressure groups are behind what policy and for what reasons.

We need to take all these points of view into consideration, because we come finally to the realization that as American citizens we are called upon today, perhaps more than ever before in our history, to participate in the making of decisions affecting not only our immediate lives but the fate of Western civilization. Typical of this responsibility is the need for policy formulation in the Middle East.

A reaction to the pressures of world tension resulting from the Middle Eastern crisis was a necessity, but the Eisenhower Doctrine (see Docs. 30-33) certainly was not the only possible reaction to these pressures. Documents 34-36 are examples of alternative American proposals, while Documents 37-43 present Middle Eastern policy statements from other nations.

In the light of the succession of crises following upon the promulgation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, one cannot help but ask whether it served its purpose at all. We need only be reminded that Lebanon alone of the Arab nations requested aid under its terms. The hindsight of the "post mortem" analyst begs the question of what would have been the history of events in the Middle East if a policy other than that which emerged early in 1957 had been in force. In any case, the intervention in Lebanon did occur, as did the re-entry of British troops into Jordan. These are the cold facts. But the big questions remain.

Where would the "idealists" now direct us? What role would the "realists" demand of us? Of what importance and political effect will be the propaganda and votes of the interested pressure groups in this country? Shall we "go it alone" or cast our lot in a policy of collective security? Is our foreign policy as it now stands a valid representation of public opinion? In a world which refuses to remain static, is United States foreign policy flexible enough to cope with emergencies as they arise?

In the American democracy, foreign policy must, in the long run, reflect the viewpoint of the majority. In the words of Paul H. Appleby, "Every expression of opinion on public affairs—in the barber shop or beauty parlor, in a taxicab, at a club meeting, at a party, union meeting, farm organization meeting, or wherever—is a contribution to the climate

of opinion within which the government acts in its constant effort to achieve or maintain consent. Every withholding of expression similarly is a vote."

To the citizen who wishes to inform himself and to make his opinions felt in the shaping of our Middle Eastern policy this analysis and the collection of documents that follows are respectfully dedicated.

PART II | SELECTED DOCUMENTS

SECTION 1

Historical Background

1 Convention on the Free Navigation of the Suez Canal: The European Powers and the Ottoman Empire

October 29, 1888

Austria, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Russia, Spain, Great Britain, France, and the Ottoman Empire

ART I The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag.

Consequently, the High Contracting Parties agree not in any way to interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as in time of peace.

The Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of blockade.

ART. II. The High Contracting Parties, recognizing that the Fresh-Water Canal is indispensable to the Maritime Canal, take note of the engagements of His Highness the Khedive towards the Universal Suez Canal Company as regards the Fresh-Water Canal; which engagements are stipulated in a Convention bearing date the 18th March, 1863, containing an *exposé* and four Articles.

They undertake not to interfere in any way with the security of that Canal and its branches, the working of which shall not be exposed to any attempt at obstruction.

ART. III. The High Contracting Parties likewise undertake to respect the plant, establishments, buildings, and works of the Maritime Canal and of the Fresh-Water Canal.

ART. IV. The Maritime Canal remaining open in time of war as a free passage, even to the ships of war of belligerents, according to the terms of Article I of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties agree that no right of war, no act of hostility, nor any act having for its object to obstruct the free navigation of the Canal, shall be committed in the Canal and its ports of access, as well as within a radius of 3 marine miles from those ports, even though the Ottoman Empire should be one of the belligerent Powers.

Vessels of war of belligerents shall not revictual or take in stores in the Canal and its ports of access, except in so far as may be strictly necessary. The transit of the aforesaid vessels through the Canal shall be effected with the least possible

delay, in accordance with the Regulations in force, and without any other intermission than that resulting from the necessities of the service.

Their stay at Port Saïd and in the roadstead of Suez shall not exceed twenty-four hours, except in case of distress. In such case they shall be bound to leave as soon as possible. An interval of twenty-four hours shall always elapse between the sailing of a belligerent ship from one of the ports of access and the departure of a ship belonging to the hostile Power.

ART. V. In time of war belligerent Powers shall not disembark nor embark within the Canal and its ports of access either troops, munitions, or materials of war. But in case of an accidental hindrance in the Canal, men may be embarked or disembarked at the ports of access by detachments not exceeding 1,000 men, with a corresponding amount of war material.

ART. VI. Prizes shall be subjected, in all respects, to the same rules as the vessels of war of belligerents.

ART. VII. The Powers shall not keep any vessel of war in the waters of the Canal (including Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes).

Nevertheless, they may station vessels of war in the ports of access of Port Saïd and Suez, the number of which shall not exceed two for each Power.

This right shall not be exercised by belligerents.

ART. VIII. The Agents in Egypt of the Signatory Powers of the present Treaty shall be charged to watch over its execution In case of any event threatening the security or the free passage of the Canal, they shall meet on the summons of three of their number under the presidency of their Doyen, in order to proceed to the necessary verifications. They shall inform the Khedivial Government of the danger which they may have perceived, in order that the Government may take proper steps to insure the protection and the free use of the Canal. Under any circumstances, they shall meet once a year to take note of the due execution of the Treaty.

The last-mentioned meetings shall take place under the presidency of a Special Commissioner nominated for that purpose by the Imperial Ottoman Government. A Commissioner of the Khedive may also take part in the meeting, and may preside over it in case of the absence of the Ottoman Commissioner

They shall especially demand the suppression of any work or the dispersion of any assemblage on either bank of the Canal, the object or effect of which might be to interfere with the liberty and the entire security of the navigation.

ART IX. The Egyptian Government shall, within the limits of its powers resulting from the Firmans, and under the conditions provided for in the present Treaty, take the necessary measures for insuring the execution of the said Treaty.

In case the Egyptian Government should not have sufficient means at its disposal, it shall call upon the Imperial Ottoman Government, which shall take the necessary measures to respond to such appeal; shall give notice thereof to the Signatory Powers of the Declaration of London of the 17th March, 1885; and shall, if necessary, concert with them on the subject.

The provisions of Articles IV, V, VII, and VIII shall not interfere with the measures which shall be taken in virtue of the present Article

ART X. Similarly, the provision of Articles IV, V, VII, and VIII shall not interfere with the measures which His Majesty the Sultan and His Highness the Khedive, in the name of His Imperial Majesty, and within the limits of the Fir-

mans granted, might find it necessary to take for securing by their own forces the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order

In case His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, or His Highness the Khedive, should find it necessary to avail themselves of the exceptions for which this Article provides, the Signatory Powers of the Declaration of London shall be notified thereof by the Imperial Ottoman Government.

It is likewise understood that the provisions of the four Articles aforesaid shall in no case occasion any obstacle to the measures which the Imperial Ottoman Government may think it necessary to take in order to insure by its own forces the defence of its other possessions situated on the eastern coast of the Red Sea.

ART. XI. The measures which shall be taken in the cases provided for by Articles IX and X of the present Treaty shall not interfere with the free use of the Canal. In the same cases, the erection of permanent fortifications contrary to the provisions of Article VIII is prohibited

ART XII. The High Contracting Parties, by application of the principle of equality as regards the free use of the Canal, a principle which forms one of the bases of the present Treaty, agree that none of them shall endeavour to obtain with respect to the Canal territorial or commercial advantages or privileges in any international arrangements which may be concluded. Moreover, the rights of Turkey as the territorial Power are reserved.

ART. XIII. With the exception of the obligations expressly provided by the clauses of the present Treaty, the sovereign rights of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, and the rights and immunities of His Highness the Khedive, resulting from the Firmans, are in no way affected

ART XIV The High Contracting Parties agree that the engagements resulting from the present Treaty shall not be limited by the duration of the Acts of Concession of the Universal Suez Canal Company.

ART. XV The stipulations of the present Treaty shall not interfere with the sanitary measures in force in Egypt.

ART. XVI. The High Contracting Parties undertake to bring the present Treaty to the Knowledge of the States which have not signed it, inviting them to accede to it.

2 | Establishment of the British Protectorate Over Egypt

December 18-19, 1914

PROCLAMATION OF PROTECTORATE, 18 DECEMBER 1914

His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gives notice that, in view of the state of war arising out of the action of Turkey, Egypt is placed under the protection of His Majesty and will henceforth constitute a British Protectorate.

The suzerainty of Turkey over Egypt is thus terminated, and His Majesty's Government will adopt all measures necessary for the defence of Egypt, and protect its inhabitants and interests

DEPOSITION OF KHEDIVE ABBAS HILMI II, 19 DECEMBER 1914

His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gives notice that, in view of the action of His Highness Abbas Hilmi Pasha, lately Khedive of Egypt, who has adhered to the King's enemies, His Majesty's Government have seen fit to depose him from the Khedivate, and that high dignity has been offered, with the title of Sultan of Egypt, to His Highness Prince Hussein Kamel Pasha, eldest living Prince of the family of Mohammed Ali, and has been accepted by him

NOTE ON THE PROTECTORATE BY ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER MILNE CHEETHAM TO SULTAN HUSAYN KAMIL, 19 DECEMBER 1914

I am instructed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to bring to the notice of your Highness the circumstances preceding the outbreak of war between His Britannic Majesty and the Sultan of Turkey and the changes which the war entails in the status of Egypt.

In the Ottoman Cabinet there were two parties. On the one side was a moderate party, mindful of the sympathy extended by Great Britain to every effort towards reform in Turkey, who recognized that in the war in which His Majesty was already engaged no Turkish interests were concerned, and welcomed the assurance of His Majesty and his Allies that neither in Egypt nor elsewhere would the war be used as a pretext for any action injurious to Ottoman interests. On the other side a band of unscrupulous military adventurers looked to find in a war of aggression, waged in concert with His Majesty's enemies, the means of retrieving the disasters, military, financial, and economic, into which they had already plunged their country. Hoping to the last that wiser counsels might prevail, His Majesty and his Allies, in spite of repeated violations of their rights, abstained from retaliatory action until compelled thereto by the crossing of the Egyptian frontier by armed bands and by unprovoked attacks on Russian open ports by the Turkish naval forces under German officers.

His Majesty's Government are in possession of ample evidence that ever since the outbreak of war with Germany His Highness Abbas Hilmi Pasha, late Khedive of Egypt, has definitely thrown in his lot with His Majesty's enemies.

From the facts above set out, it results that the rights over Egypt, whether of the Sultan, or of the late Khedive, are forfeit to His Majesty.

His Majesty's Government have already, through the General Officer Commanding His Majesty's Forces in Egypt, accepted exclusive responsibility for the defence of Egypt in the present war It remains to lay down the form of the future Government of the country, freed, as I have stated, from all rights of suzerainty or other rights heretofore claimed by the Ottoman Government.

Of the rights thus accruing to His Majesty, no less than of those exercised in Egypt during the last thirty years of reform, His Majesty's Government regard themselves as trustees for the inhabitants of Egypt. And His Majesty's Government have decided that Great Britain can best fulfil the responsibilities she has incurred toward Egypt by the formal declaration of a British Protectorate, and

by the government of the country under such Protectorate by a Prince of the Khedivial family.

In these circumstances I am instructed by His Majesty's Government to inform your Highness that, by reason of your age and experience, you have been chosen as the Prince of the family of Mehemet Ali most worthy to occupy the Khedivial position, with the title and style of the Sultan of Egypt; and, in inviting your Highness to accept the responsibilities of your high office, I am to give you the formal assurance that Great Britain accepts the fullest responsibility for the defence of the territories under your Highness against all aggression whencesoever coming; and His Majesty's Government authorize me to declare that after the establishment of the British Protectorate now announced all Egyptian subjects wherever they may be will be entitled to receive the protection of His Majesty's Government

With the Ottoman suzerainty there will disappear the restrictions heretofore placed by the Ottoman firmans upon the numbers and organisation of your Highness's army and upon the grant by your Highness of honorific distinctions.

As regards foreign relations, His Majesty's Government deem it most consistent with the new responsibilities assumed by Great Britain that the relations between your Highness's Government and the representatives of foreign Powers should henceforth be conducted through His Majesty's representative in Cairo.

His Majesty's Government have repeatedly placed on record that the system of treaties, known as the Capitulations, by which your Highness's Government is bound, are no longer in harmony with the development of the country; but, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the revision of those treaties may most conveniently be postponed until the end of the present war

In the field of internal administration, I am to remind your Highness that, in consonance with the traditions of British policy, it has been the aim of His Majesty's Government, while working through and in the closest association with the constituted Egyptian authorities, to secure individual liberty, to promote the spread of education, to further the development of the natural resources of the country, and, in such measure as the degree of enlightenment of public opinion may permit, to associate the governed in the task of government. Not only is it the intention of His Majesty's Government to remain faithful to such policy, but they are convinced that the clearer definition of Great Britain's position in the country will accelerate progress towards self-government.

The religious convictions of Egyptian subjects will be scrupulously respected as are those of His Majesty's own subjects, whatever their creed. Nor need I affirm to your Highness that, in declaring Egypt free from any duty of obedience to those who have usurped political power at Constantinople, His Majesty's Government are animated by no hostility towards the Caliphate The past history of Egypt shows, indeed, that the loyalty of Egyptian Mahommedans towards the Caliphate is independent of any political bonds between Egypt and Constantinople.

The strengthening and progress of Mahommedan institutions in Egypt is naturally a matter in which His Majesty's Government take a deep interest and with which your Highness will be specially concerned, and in carrying out such reforms as may be considered necessary, your Highness may count upon the sympathetic support of His Majesty's Government.

I am to add that His Majesty's Government rely with confidence upon the loyalty, the good sense, and self-restraint of Egyptian subjects to facilitate the

task of the General Officer Commanding His Majesty's Forces, who is entrusted with the maintenance of internal order, and with the prevention of the rendering of aid to the enemy.

3 The Husayn-McMahon Correspondence

July 14, 1915—March 10, 1916

FROM SHARIF HUSAYN, 14 JULY 1915

Whereas the whole of the Arab nation without any exception have decided in these last years to live, and to accomplish their freedom, and grasp the reins of their administration both in theory and practice, and whereas they have found and felt that it is to the interest of the Government of Great Britain to support them and aid them to the attainment of their firm and lawful intentions (which are based upon the maintenance of the honour and dignity of their life) without any ulterior motives whatsoever unconnected with this object;

And whereas it is to their (the Arabs') interest also to prefer the assistance of the Government of Great Britain in consideration of their geographical position and economic interests, and also of the attitude of the above-mentioned Government, which is known to both nations and therefore need not be emphasized;

For these reasons the Arab nation see fit to limit themselves, as time is short, to asking the Government of Great Britain, if it should think fit, for the approval, through her deputy or representative, of the following fundamental propositions, leaving out all things considered secondary in comparison with these, so that it may prepare all means necessary for attaining this noble purpose, until such time as it finds occasion for making the actual negotiations.—

Firstly.—England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37° of latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Jezirat (Ibn 'Umar), Amadia, up to the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra, on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina. England to approve of the proclamation of an Arab Khalifate of Islam.

Secondly.—The Arab Government of the Sherif to acknowledge that England shall have the preference in all economic enterprises in the Arab countries whenever conditions of enterprises are otherwise equal.

Thirdly.—For the security of this Arab independence and the certainty of such preference of economic enterprises, both high contracting parties to offer mutual assistance, to the best ability of their military and naval forces, to face any foreign Power which may attack either party. Peace not to be decided without agreement of both parties.

Fourthly.—If one of the parties enters upon an aggressive conflict, the other party to assume a neutral attitude, and in case of such party wishing the other to join forces, both to meet and discuss the conditions.

Fifthly —England to acknowledge the abolition of foreign privileges in the Arab countries, and to assist the Government of the Sherif in an International Convention for confirming such abolition.

Sixthly.—Articles 3 and 4 of this treaty to remain in vigour for fifteen years, and, if either wishes it to be renewed, one year's notice before lapse of treaty to be given.

Consequently, and as the whole of the Arab nation have (praise be to God) agreed and united for the attainment, at all costs and finally, of this noble object, they beg the Government of Great Britain to answer them positively or negatively in a period of thirty days after receiving this intimation; and if this period should lapse before they receive an answer, they reserve to themselves complete freedom of action. Moreover, we (the Sherif's family) will consider ourselves free in word and deed from the bonds of our previous declaration which we made through Ali Effendi

FROM SIR HENRY MCMAHON, 24 OCTOBER 1915

I have received your letter of the 29th Shawal, 1333, with much pleasure and your expressions of friendliness and sincerity have given me the greatest satisfaction

I regret that you should have received from my last letter the impression that I regarded the question of the limits and boundaries with coldness and hesitation; such was not the case, but it appeared to me that the time had not yet come when that question could be discussed in a conclusive manner.

I have realised, however, from your last letter that you regard this question as one of vital and urgent importance. I have, therefore, lost no time in informing the Government of Great Britain of the contents of your letter, and it is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on their behalf the following statement, which I am confident you will receive with satisfaction.—

The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded.

With the above modification, and without prejudice of our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits.

As for those regions lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter:—

(1) Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca.

(2) Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognise their inviolability.

(3) When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those various territories.

(4) On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the

advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British.

(5) With regard to the *vilayets* of Bagdad and Basra, the Arabs will recognise that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special administrative arrangements in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local populations and to safeguard our mutual economic interests.

I am convinced that this declaration will assure you beyond all possible doubt of the sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her friends the Arabs and will result in a firm and lasting alliance, the immediate results of which will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the freeing of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke, which for so many years has pressed heavily upon them.

I have confined myself in this letter to the more vital and important questions, and if there are any other matters dealt with in your letters which I have omitted to mention, we may discuss them at some convenient date in the future.

It was with very great relief and satisfaction that I heard of the safe arrival of the Holy Carpet and the accompanying offerings which, thanks to the clearness of your directions and the excellence of your arrangements, were landed without trouble or mishap in spite of the dangers and difficulties occasioned by the present sad war May God soon bring a lasting peace and freedom to all peoples!

I am sending this letter by the hand of your trusted and excellent messenger, Sheikh Mohammed Ibn Arif Ibn Uraifan, and he will inform you of the various matters of interest, but of less vital importance, which I have not mentioned in this letter.

FROM SHARIF HUSAYN, 1 JANUARY 1916

We received from the bearer your letter, dated the 9th Safar(the 14th December, 1915), with great respect and honour, and I have understood its contents, which caused me the greatest pleasure and satisfaction, as it removed that which had made me uneasy.

Your honour will have realised, after the arrival of Mohammed (Faroki) Sherif and his interview with you, that all our procedure up to the present was of no personal inclination or the like, which would have been wholly unintelligible, but that everything was the result of the decisions and desires of our peoples, and that we are but transmitters and executants of such decisions and desires in the position they (our people) have pressed upon us.

These truths are, in my opinion, very important and deserve your honour's special attention and consideration.

With regard to what had been stated in your honoured communication concerning El Iraq as to the matter of compensation for the period of occupation, we, in order to strengthen the confidence of Great Britain in our attitude and in our words and actions, really and veritably, and in order to give her evidence of our certainty and assurance in trusting her glorious Government, leave the determination of the amount to the perception of her wisdom and justice.

As regards the northern parts and their coasts, we have already stated in our previous letter what were the utmost possible modifications, and all this was only done so to fulfil those aspirations whose attainment is desired by the will of the

Blessed and Supreme God It is this same feeling and desire which impelled us to avoid what may possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France and the agreement made between them during the present wars and calamities; yet we find it our duty that the eminent minister should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this war is finished, we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from to-day) for what we now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts

I do not find it necessary to draw your attention to the fact that our plan is of greater security to the interests and protection of the rights of Great Britain than it is to us, and will necessarily be so whatever may happen, so that Great Britain may finally see her friends in that contentment and advancement which she is endeavouring to establish for them now, especially as her Allies being neighbours to us will be the germ of difficulties and discussion with which there will be no peaceful conditions In addition to which the citizens of Beirut will decidedly never accept such dismemberment, and they may oblige us to undertake new measures which may exercise Great Britain, certainly not less than her present troubles, because of our belief and certainty in the reciprocity and indeed the identity of our interests, which is the only cause that caused us never to care to negotiate with any other Power but you. Consequently, it is impossible to allow any derogation that gives France, or any other Power, a span of land in those regions.

I declare this, and I have a strong belief, which the living will inherit from the dead, in the declarations which you gave in the conclusion of your honoured letter Therefore, the honourable and eminent Minister should believe and be sure, together with Great Britain, that we still remain firm to our resolution which Storrs learnt from us two years ago, for which we await the opportunity suitable to our situation, especially in view of that action the time of which has now come near and which destiny drives towards us with great haste and clearness, so that we and those who are of our opinion may have reasons for such action against any criticisms or responsibilities imposed upon us in future.

Your expression "we do not want to push you to any hasty action which might jeopardise the success of your aim" does not need any more explanation except what we may ask for, when necessary, such as arms, ammunition, &c

I deem this sufficient, as I have occupied much of your Honour's time. I beg to offer you my great veneration and respect.

FROM SIR HENRY MCMAHON, 25 JANUARY 1916

We have received with great pleasure and satisfaction your letter of the 25th Safar (the 1st January) at the hands of your trusty messenger, who has also transmitted to us your verbal messages.

We fully realise and entirely appreciate the motives which guide you in this important question, and we know well that you are acting entirely in the interests of the Arab peoples and with no thought beyond their welfare

We take note of your remarks concerning the *vilayet* of Bagdad, and will take the question into careful consideration when the enemy has been defeated and the time for peaceful settlement arrives.

As regards the northern parts, we note with satisfaction your desire to avoid anything which might possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France. It is, as you know, our fixed determination that nothing shall be permitted to interfere in the slightest degree with our united prosecution of this war to a victorious con-

clusion. Moreover, when the victory has been won, the friendship of Great Britain and France will become yet more firm and enduring, cemented by the blood of Englishmen and Frenchmen who have died side by side fighting for the cause of right and liberty

In this great cause Arabia is now associated, and God grant that the result of our mutual efforts and co-operation will bind us in a lasting friendship to the mutual welfare and happiness of us all.

We are greatly pleased to hear of the action you are taking to win all the Arabs over to our joint cause, and to dissuade them from giving any assistance to our enemies, and we leave it to your discretion to seize the most favourable moment for further and more decided measures

You will doubtless inform us by the bearer of this letter of any manner in which we can assist you and your requests will always receive our immediate consideration.

You will have heard how El Sayed Ahmed el Sherif el Senussi has been beguiled by evil advice into hostile action, and it will be a great grief to you to know that he has been so far forgetful of the interests of the Arabs as to throw in his lot with our enemies Misfortune has now overtaken him, and we trust that this will show him his error and lead him to peace for the sake of his poor misguided followers

We are sending this letter by the hand of your good messenger, who will also bring to you all our news.

4 The British Balfour Declaration and Allied Statements

June 4—November, 1917

CAMBON LETTER TO SOKOLOW, 4 JUNE 1919

You were good enough to present the project to which you are devoting your efforts, which has for its object the development of Jewish colonization in Palestine You consider that, circumstances permitting, and the independence of the Holy Places being safeguarded on the other hand, it would be a deed of justice and of reparation to assist, by the protection of the Allied Powers, in the renaissance of the Jewish nationality in that Land from which the people of *Israel* were exiled so many centuries ago.

The French Government, which entered this present war to defend a people wrongfully attacked, and which continues the struggle to assure victory of right over might, can but feel sympathy for your cause, the triumph of which is bound up with that of the Allies.

I am happy to give you herewith such assurance

OFFICIAL ZIONIST FORMULA, 18 JULY 1917

H M Government, after considering the aims of the Zionist Organisation, accepts the principle of recognising Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish

people and the right of the Jewish people to build up its National life in Palestine under a protection to be established at the conclusion of Peace, following upon the successful issue of the war

H.M. Government regards as essential for the realisation of this principle the grant of internal autonomy to the Jewish nationality in Palestine, freedom of immigration for Jews, and the establishment of a Jewish National Colonising Corporation for the re-settlement and economic development of the country.

The conditions and forms of the internal autonomy and a charter for the Jewish National Colonising Corporation should, in the view of H M Government, be elaborated in detail and determined with the representatives of the Zionist Organisation.

THE BALFOUR DECLARATION, 2 NOVEMBER 1917

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of his Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet:—

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation

5 | Tentative Recommendations for President Wilson: Intelligence Section, American Delegation to the Peace Conference

January 21, 1919

MESOPOTAMIA

(1) It is recommended that there be established a Mesopotamian state.

The Mesopotamian area, as defined on map 20, is a racial unit. There is Arab linguistic unity south of a line drawn from Alexandretta to the Persian border Above this line live Arabs, Armenians, Turks, Kurds and Assyrians, each group speaking a distinct language. Below this line there is comparatively a much higher degree of unity It is essential to the development of the great irrigation projects below Baghdad that the headwaters of the Tigris River, and as much of the Euphrates as possible, should be under a single administration. The welfare of the foothills of Kurdistan and of the great steppe region of Mesopotamia is bound up with the irrigable lowlands of the Tigris and Euphrates basin.

To separate the headwater area of the Tigris and Euphrates drainage basins from the irrigated valley floors and lowlands further down-stream would be to create

sources of dispute and render doubly difficult the task of establishing a suitable government

The southern border of the area lies at the edge of the Arabian desert, where new relationships come in and different political treatment

(2) It is recommended that there be applied to the Mesopotamian state the mandatory principle, but no recommendation is made as to the Power to be selected to carry out this principle.

(3) It is recommended that no solution be adopted which would preclude the incorporation of this state in an Arab confederation, if a desire for such incorporation should take actual form in Mesopotamia

Nothing should be done to preclude the possibility of the future development of an Arab confederation, including Mesopotamia, as an alternate solution which would be desirable

SYRIA

(1) It is recommended that there be established a Syrian state

While Syria belongs to the Arab-speaking world, it has an unusually large European population, close commercial and cultural relations with Europe, a strong Christian element and a sedentary mode of life It should therefore be separated at the outset from the nomad Arab area.

Its eastern boundary has been drawn with these considerations in mind, and runs just beyond the border of the sown land, so as to include all of the grain-growing regions, of which the Hauran, below Damascus, is the richest. The northern boundary of Syria is quite artificial, and indeed this boundary could not be drawn on racial lines

The new state would have a population of about 400,000, and would about equal in area the state of Bulgaria.

(2) It is recommended that there be applied to the Syrian state the mandatory principle, but no recommendation is made as to the Power to be selected to carry out this principle.

(3) It is recommended that no obstacle be interposed against the final incorporation of the Syrian state in an Arab confederation, if the tendency toward this solution should develop in the country.

There is a possibility of the future development of an Arab confederation which will include all of the Arab-speaking portions of the former Turkish Empire The present strength of this Arab movement is hard to gauge. It would be the best solution from the standpoint of the welfare and development of the Arab states

PALESTINE

(1) It is recommended that there be established a separate state of Palestine

The separation of the Palestinian area from Syria finds justification in the religious experience of mankind The Jewish and Christian churches were born in Palestine, and Jerusalem was for long years, at different periods, the capital of each And while the relation of the Mohammedans to Palestine is not so intimate, from the beginning they have regarded Jerusalem as a holy place. Only by establishing Palestine as a separate state can justice be done to these great facts.

As drawn upon the map, the new state would control its own source of water power and irrigation, on Mount Hermon in the east to the Jordan; a feature of

great importance since the success of the new state would depend upon the possibilities of agricultural development.

(2) It is recommended that this state be placed under Great Britain as a mandatory of the League of Nations.

Palestine would obviously need wise and firm guidance Its population is without political experience, is racially composite, and could easily become distracted by fanaticism and bitter religious differences

The success of Great Britain in dealing with similar situations, her relation to Egypt, and her administrative achievements since General Allenby freed Palestine from the Turk, all indicate her as the logical mandatory.

(3) It is recommended that the Jews be invited to return to Palestine and settle there, being assured by the Conference of all proper assistance in so doing that may be consistent with the protection of the personal (especially the religious) and the property rights of the non-Jewish population, and being further assured that it will be the policy of the League of Nations to recognize Palestine as a Jewish state as sooon as it is a Jewish state in fact

It is right that Palestine should become a Jewish state, if the Jews, being given the full opportunity, make it such. It was the cradle and home of their vital race, which has made large spiritual contributions to mankind, and is the only land in which they can hope to find a home of their own; they being in this last respect unique among significant peoples

At present, however, the Jews form barely a sixth of the total population of 700,000 in Palestine, and whether they are to form a majority, or even a plurality, of the population in the future state remains uncertain. Palestine, in short, is far from being a Jewish country now England, as mandatory, can be relied on to give the Jews the privileged position they should have without sacrificing the rights of non-Jews.

(4) It is recommended that the holy places and religious rights of all creeds in Palestine be placed under the protection of the League of Nations and its mandatory.

The basis for this recommendation is self-evident.

ARABIA

(1) It is recommended that the desert portion of the Arabian peninsula, exclusive of the agricultural areas of Syria and of the Euphrates and Tigris valleys, be treated as a separate block.

In regard to this large desert area of Arabia, it is unwise to take decisive action at present. The Kingdom of Hedjaz under the Cherif of Mecca is at the present time the strongest in the group of Arabian tribal states; nevertheless it is not so powerful that a successful single Arab confederation can be built around it It is only this week that the Hedjaz forces have been able to recapture their own city of Medina.

(2) It is recommended that in regard to the present tribal states, numbering over twenty, which exist in the peninsula, no definite action be taken.

The chieftains of the inner desert tribes, especially Ibn Saud, are absolutely opposed to extension on the part of the king of Hedjaz. The sheikhs of Asir and Yemen would look with equal hostility on the consolidation of his power.

(3) It is recommended that the area with regard to which no definite action

shall be taken be that bounded on the north by the Euphrates River from the bend where it turns southeast to a point just below the town of Hit, and from that point onward by a line which stretches out into the desert, ending at the Persian Gulf below Koweit, and on the west by the Red Sea, the eastern boundary of Palestine, and a line through the desert delimiting the agricultural portions of Syria

The boundaries of this Arab bloc, in which no definite action can be taken, are so drawn as to distinguish the desert tribal civilization from the civilization of the sedentary Arabs of the irrigable lands of the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, below Baghdad, and of the fertile and very productive lands of the Syrian Arabs, from Aleppo down to a point below Damascus. In the north the desert tribes must be given access to the Euphrates river from Hit to the northward bend of the river, for the purpose of watering their flocks

(4) It is recommended that the policing of the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf Coasts of Arabia, and the border lands behind these, be left to the British Empire

The Power which understands best how to handle the Arabs is the British Empire By controlling the coastal areas and the markets along the edge of the desert at which the desert tribes must trade, the British Indian Office has been able to exercise some influence over the inland tribes.

(5) It is recommended that in spite of the political prominence of the King of the Hedjaz, he be not aided to establish an artificial and unwelcomed dominion over tribes unwilling to accept his rule

The King of the Hedjaz and his sons should not receive support in an attempt to establish an artificial domination over tribes of about similar strength. If, however, it can be shown that the movement for Arab unity is natural and real, and that such unity can be developed without the use of force, the movement should be given encouragement and support

The proposal of the delegates of the King of the Hedjaz that a mixed commission be sent to Syria to learn the actual desires of the Syrians and report to the peace conference, is entirely fair and should receive support.

6 The 1919 Weizmann and Feisal Agreement: Discussed by Dr. Chaim Weizmann

June 10, 1936

The present disturbances in Palestine have given renewed currency to the story that the promise to set up a National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine was inconsistent with promises made to the Arabs during the War. I desire here to refer to one aspect only of this matter—namely, the attitude adopted at the Peace Conference by the Arab Delegation itself towards the establishment of the Jewish National Home in Palestine

The leading figure among the Arab representatives was Emir Feisal, later King of Iraq Working with T. E Lawrence, he appeared before the Supreme Council

of the Conference, to whom he submitted the Arab claims to an independent national existence I had myself met him in June, 1918, at Amman, and on many subsequent occasions I had conversations with him and with Lawrence on the subject of Zionism and Palestine—conversations which led to the friendship which lasted many years between King Feisal and myself.

When Feisal came to Europe in 1919 we submitted to him our plans. Both Feisal and Lawrence approved of them, and early in 1919 these conversations culminated in the Treaty of Friendship, a copy of which is appended. The text of that Treaty was approved by Lawrence, who discussed it with Feisal.

The agreement, the original of which is in my possession, opens as follows·

> His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal, representing and acting on behalf of the Arab Kingdom of Kedjaz, and Dr Chaim Weizmann, representing and acting on behalf of the Zionist Organization, mindful of the racial kinship and ancient bonds existing between the Arabs and the Jewish people, and realizing that the surest means of working out the consummation of their national aspirations is through the closest possible collaboration in the development of the Arab State and Palestine, and being desirous further of confirming the good understanding which exists between them, have agreed upon the following articles:—
>
> The Articles (some of which have been summarized) were,—
>
> Article I. The Arab State and Palestine in all their relations and undertakings shall be controlled by the most cordial good will and understanding, and to this end Arab and Jewish duly accredited agents shall be established and maintained in the respective territories
>
> Article II provided for the determination of the boundaries between the Arab State and Palestine
>
> Article III In the establishment of the Constitution and Administration of Palestine all such measures shall be adopted as will afford the fullest guarantees for carrying into effect the British Government's Declaration of November 2, 1917.
>
> Article IV All necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale, and as quickly as possible to settle Jewish immigrants on the land through closer settlement and intensive cultivation of the soil. In taking such measures the Arab peasant and tenant farmers shall be protected in their rights, and shall be assisted in forwarding their economic development
>
> Article V provided for full religious freedom
>
> Article VI The Mohamedan Holy Places shall be under Mohamedan control.
>
> In Article VII the Zionist Organization undertook to assist the Arab State with the advice of its economic experts They agreed in Article VIII to act in accord on the matters embraced in the Pact before the Peace Congress, and in Article IX to submit any dispute to the British Government's arbitration.

Feisal signed the pact in London on January 3, 1919, with a reservation in Arabic (a translation of which was attached in Lawrence's own handwriting and is given below in facsimile) making his obligations under the pact dependent on

the fulfillment by the British Government of the demands put forward in the Arab Memorandum of June 4, 1919 It is significant, too, that when, on January 29, 1919, Feisal addressed the Supreme Council of the Conference on the subject of the Arab claims, and asked for the independence of all Arabic-speaking peoples in Asia, with regard to Palestine he made an exception in the following terms·

> On account of its universal character, I shall leave Palestine on one side for the mutual consideration of all parties interested With this exception, I ask for the independence of the Arabic areas enumerated in the Memorandum

I may add that in a letter addressed to Professor Felix Frankfurter and dated March 1, 1919, the Emir Feisal expressed the deepest sympathy with the Zionist movement

7 The Mandate for Palestine

July 24, 1922

The Council of the League of Nations.

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them, and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine; and

Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval, and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions; and

Whereas by the afore-mentioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that

the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations;

Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows:

ART. 1. The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.

ART. 2. The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

ART. 3. The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

ART. 4 An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.

The Zionist organisation, so long as its organisation and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home

ART 5. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of, the Government of any Foreign Power.

ART 6. The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

ART 7. The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

ART 8. The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine.

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the afore-mentioned privileges and immunities on August 1st, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their reestablishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application for a specified period, these privileges, and immunities shall, at the expiration of the mandate, be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

ART. 9. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Palestine shall assure to foreigners, as well as to natives, a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed In particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

ART 10. Pending the making of special extradition agreements relating to Palestine, the extradition treaties in force between the Mandatory and other foreign Powers shall apply to Palestine

ART 11. The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land

The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilised by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration.

ART. 12. The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Palestine and the right to issue exequaturs to consuls appointed by foreign Powers He shall also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of Palestine when outside its territorial limits.

ART. 13 All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights and of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected herewith, provided that nothing in this article shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrangements as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this article into effect, and provided also that nothing in this mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.

ART 14. A special Commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to study, define and determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of this Commission shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the Commission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without the approval of the Council

ART 15 The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public

order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

ART 16 The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality.

ART 17 The Administration of Palestine may organise on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defence of the country, subject, however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine.

Nothing in this article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory in Palestine

The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies

ART. 18. The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area.

Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this mandate, the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory, impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population It may also, on the advice of the Mandatory, conclude a special customs agreement with any State the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.

ART. 19. The Mandatory shall adhere on behalf of the Administration of Palestine to any general international conventions already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, respecting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation and postal, telegraphic and wireless communication or literary, artistic or industrial property

ART 20. The Mandatory shall co-operate on behalf of the Administration of

Palestine, so far as religious, social and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

ART 21. The Mandatory shall secure the enactment within twelve months from this date, and shall ensure the execution of a Law of Antiquities based on the following rules This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archæological research to the nations of all States Members of the League of Nations.

(1) "Antiquity" means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year A D 1700

(2) The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat

Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorisation referred to in paragraph 5, reports the same to an official of the competent Department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery

(3) No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent Department, unless this Department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.

No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from the said Department

(4) Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.

(5) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorised by the competent Department

(6) Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archæological interest.

(7) Authorisation to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archæological experience. The Administration of Palestine shall not, in granting these authorisations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.

(8) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent Department in a proportion fixed by that Department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.

ART. 22. English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew, and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.

ART. 23 The Administration of Palestine shall recognise the holy days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such communities.

ART 24. The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the report.

ART. 25. In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application

of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.

ART 26 The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

ART. 27. The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

ART 28 In the event of the termination of the mandate hereby conferred upon the Mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the rights secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall use its influence for securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities.

8 | British Policy on Palestine

May 17, 1939

In the Statement of Palestine, issued on 9th November, 1938, His Majesty's Government announced their intention to invite representatives of the Arabs of Palestine, of certain neighbouring countries and of the Jewish Agency to confer with them in London regarding future policy It was their sincere hope that, as a result of full, free and frank discussion, some understanding might be reached. Conferences recently took place with Arab and Jewish delegations, lasting for a period of several weeks, and served the purpose of a complete exchange of views between British Ministers and the Arab and Jewish representatives. In the light of the discussions as well as of the situation in Palestine and of the Reports of the Royal Commission and the Partition Commission, certain proposals were formulated by His Majesty's Government and were laid before the Arab and Jewish delegations as the basis of an agreed settlement. Neither the Arab nor the Jewish delegations felt able to accept these proposals, and the conferences therefore did not result in an agreement. Accordingly His Majesty's Government are free to formulate their own policy, and after careful consideration they have decided to adhere generally to the proposals which were finally submitted to, and discussed with, the Arab and Jewish delegations.

2. The Mandate for Palestine, the terms of which were confirmed by the Council

of the League of Nations in 1922, has governed the policy of successive British Governments for nearly 20 years. It embodies the Balfour Declaration and imposes on the Mandatory four main obligations. These obligations are set out in Articles 2, 6 and 13 of the Mandate There is no dispute regarding the interpretation of one of these obligations, that touching the protection of and access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites. The other three main obligations are generally as follows —

(i) To place the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, to facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions, and to encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish Agency, close settlement by Jews on the land

(ii) To safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine irrespective of race and religion, and, whilst facilitating Jewish immigration and settlement, to ensure that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced

(iii) To place the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the development of self-governing institutions

3 The Royal Commission and previous Commissions of Enquiry have drawn attention to the ambiguity of certain expressions in the Mandate, such as the expression "a national home for the Jewish people," and they have found in this ambiguity and the resulting uncertainty as to the objectives of policy a fundamental cause of unrest and hostility between Arabs and Jews His Majesty's Government are convinced that in the interests of the peace and well-being of the whole people of Palestine a clear definition of policy and objectives is essential The proposal of partition recommended by the Royal Commission would have afforded such clarity, but the establishment of self-supporting independent Arab and Jewish States within Palestine has been found to be impracticable It has therefore been necessary for His Majesty's Government to devise an alternative policy which will, consistently with their obligations to Arabs and Jews, meet the needs of the situation in Palestine Their views and proposals are set forth below under the three heads, (I) The Constitution, (II) Immigration, and (III) Land.

I THE CONSTITUTION

4. It has been urged that the expression "a national home for the Jewish people" offered a prospect that Palestine might in due course become a Jewish State or Commonwealth. His Majesty's Government do not wish to contest the view, which was expressed by the Royal Commission, that the Zionist leaders at the time of the issue of the Balfour Declaration recognized that an ultimate Jewish State was not precluded by the terms of the Declaration But, with the Royal Commission, His Majesty's Government believe that the framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country. That Palestine was not to be converted into a Jewish State might be held to be implied in the passage from the Command Paper of 1922 which reads as follows:—

"Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that

'Palestine is to become as Jewish as England is English.' His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated . . the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the (Balfour) Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded *in Palestine.*"

But this statement has not removed doubts, and His Majesty's Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State. They would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, as well as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State against their will.

5. The nature of the Jewish National Home in Palestine was further described in the Command Paper of 1922 as follows:

"During the last two or three generations the Jews have recreated in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one-fourth are farmers or workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs, an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organisation for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious and social organisations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has in fact 'national' characteristics. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection."

6. His Majesty's Government adhere to this interpretation of the Declaration of 1917 and regard it as an authoritative and comprehensive description of the character of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. It envisaged the further development of the existing Jewish community with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world Evidence that His Majesty's Government have been carrying out their obligation in this respect is to be found in the facts that, since the statement of 1922 was published, more than 300,000 Jews have immigrated to Palestine, and that the population of the National Home has risen to some 450,000, or approaching a third of the entire population of the country. Nor has the Jewish community failed to take full advantage of the opportunities given to it The growth of the

Jewish National Home and its achievements in many fields are a remarkable constructive effort which must command the admiration of the world and must be, in particular, a source of pride to the Jewish people

7 In the recent discussions the Arab delegations have repeated the contention that Palestine was included within the area in which Sir Henry McMahon, on behalf of the British Government, in October, 1915, undertook to recognise and support Arab independence The validity of this claim, based on the terms of the correspondence which passed between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca, was thoroughly and carefully investigated by British and Arab representatives during the recent conferences in London Their Report, which has been published, states that both the Arab and the British representatives endeavoured to understand the point of view of the other party but that they were unable to reach agreement upon an interpretation of the correspondence There is no need to summarize here the arguments presented by each side. His Majesty's Government regret the misunderstandings which have arisen as regards some of the phrases used For their part they can only adhere, for the reasons given by their representatives in the Report, to the view that the whole of Palestine west of Jordan was excluded from Sir Henry McMahon's pledge, and they therefore cannot agree that the McMahon correspondence forms a just basis for the claim that Palestine should be converted into an Arab State

8 His Majesty's Government are charged as the Mandatory authority "to secure the development of self-governing institutions" in Palestine Apart from this specific obligation, they would regard it as contrary to the whole spirit of the Mandate system that the population of Palestine should remain for ever under Mandatory tutelage It is proper that the people of the country should as early as possible enjoy the rights of self-government which are exercised by the people of neighbouring countries His Majesty's Government are unable at present to foresee the exact constitutional forms which government in Palestine will eventually take, but their objective is self-government, and they desire to see established ultimately an independent Palestine State. It should be a State in which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in government in such a way that the essential interests of each are secured.

9 The establishment of an independent State and the complete relinquishment of Mandatory control in Palestine would require such relations between the Arabs and the Jews as would make good government possible. Moreover, the growth of self-governing institutions in Palestine, as in other countries, must be an evolutionary process. A transitional period will be required before independence is achieved, throughout which ultimate responsibility for the Government of the country will be retained by his Majesty's Government as the Mandatory authority, while the people of the country are taking an increasing share in the Government, and understanding and co-operation amongst them are growing. It will be the constant endeavour of His Majesty's Government to promote good relations between the Arabs and the Jews.

10. In the light of these considerations His Majesty's Government make the following declaration of their intentions regarding the future government of Palestine —

(1) The objective of His Majesty's Government is the establishment within

ten years of an independent Palestine State in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future This proposal for the establishment of the independent State would involve consultation with the Council of the League of Nations with a view to the termination of the Mandate.

(2) The independent State should be one in which Arabs and Jews share in government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded.

(3) The establishment of the independent State will be preceded by a transitional period throughout which His Majesty's Government will retain responsibility for the government of the country During the transitional period the people of Palestine will be given an increasing part in the government of their country Both sections of the population will have an opportunity to participate in the machinery of government, and the process will be carried on whether or not they both avail themselves of it

(4) As soon as peace and order have been sufficiently restored in Palestine steps will be taken to carry out this policy of giving the people of Palestine an increasing part in the government of their country, the objective being to place Palestinians in charge of all the Departments of Government, with the assistance of British advisers and subject to the control of the High Commissioner. With this object in view His Majesty's Government will be prepared immediately to arrange that Palestinians shall be placed in charge of certain Departments, with British advisers. The Palestinian heads of Departments will sit on the Executive Council, which advises the High Commissioner. Arab and Jewish representatives will be invited to serve as heads of Departments approximately in proportion to their respective populations The number of Palestinians in charge of Departments will be increased as circumstances permit until all heads of Departments are Palestinians, exercising the administrative and advisory functions which are at present performed by British officials. When that stage is reached consideration will be given to the question of converting the Executive Council into a Council of Ministers with a consequential change in the status and functions of the Palestinian heads of Departments.

(5) His Majesty's Government make no proposals at this stage regarding the establishment of an elective legislature Nevertheless they would regard this as an appropriate constitutional development, and, should public opinion in Palestine hereafter show itself in favour of such a development, they will be prepared, provided that local conditions permit, to establish the necessary machinery

(6) At the end of five years from the restoration of peace and order, an appropriate body representative of the people of Palestine and of His Majesty's Government will be set up to review the working of the constitutional arrangements during the transitional period and to consider and make recommendations regarding the constitution of the independent Palestine State

(7) His Majesty's Government will require to be satisfied that in the treaty contemplated by sub-paragraph (1) or in the constitution contemplated by sub-paragraph (6) adequate provision has been made for:—

(*a*) the security of, and freedom of access to, the Holy Places, and the protection of the interests and property of the various religious bodies.

(*b*) the protection of the different communities in Palestine in accordance with the obligations of His Majesty's Government to both Arabs and Jews and for the special position in Palestine of the Jewish National Home

(*c*) such requirements to meet the strategic situation as may be regarded as necessary by His Majesty's Government in the light of the circumstances then existing

His Majesty's Government will also require to be satisfied that the interests of certain foreign countries in Palestine, for the preservation of which they are at present responsible, are adequately safeguarded.

(8) His Majesty's Government will do everything in their power to create conditions which will enable the independent Palestine State to come into being within ten years. If, at the end of ten years, it appears to His Majesty's Government that, contrary to their hope, circumstances require the postponement of the establishment of the independent State, they will consult with representatives of the people of Palestine, the Council of the League of Nations and the neighbouring Arab States before deciding on such a postponement If His Majesty's Government come to the conclusion that postponement is unavoidable, they will invite the co-operation of these parties in framing plans for the future with a view to achieving the desired objective at the earliest possible date.

11. During the transitional period steps will be taken to increase the powers and responsibilities of municipal corporations and local councils

II IMMIGRATION

12. Under Article 6 of the Mandate, the Administration of Palestine, "while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced," is required to "facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions." Beyond this, the extent to which Jewish immigration into Palestine is to be permitted is nowhere defined in the Mandate But in the Command Paper of 1922 it was laid down that for the fulfilment of the policy of establishing a Jewish National Home:

"It is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment."

In practice, from that date onwards until recent times, the economic absorptive capacity of the country has been treated as the sole limiting factor, and in the letter which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, as Prime Minister, sent to Dr Weizmann in February 1931 it was laid down as a matter of policy that economic absorptive capacity was the sole criterion. This interpretation has been supported by resolutions of the Permanent Mandates Commission. But His Majesty's Government do not read either the Statement of Policy of 1922 or the letter of 1931 as implying that the Mandate requires them, for all time and in all circumstances, to facilitate the immigration of Jews into Palestine subject only to consideration of the country's economic absorptive capacity. Nor do they find anything in the Mandate or in subsequent Statements of Policy to support the view that the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine cannot be effected unless immigration is

allowed to continue indefinitely If immigration has an adverse effect on the economic position in the country, it should clearly be restricted; and equally, if it has a seriously damaging effect on the political position in the country, that is a factor that should not be ignored Although it is not difficult to contend that the large number of Jewish immigrants who have been admitted so far have been absorbed economically, the fear of the Arabs that this influx will continue indefinitely until the Jewish population is in a position to dominate them has produced consequences which are extremely grave for Jews and Arabs alike and for the peace and prosperity of Palestine The lamentable disturbances of the past three years are only the latest and most sustained manifestation of this intense Arab apprehension The methods employed by Arab terrorists against fellow-Arabs and Jews alike must receive unqualified condemnation But it cannot be denied that fear of indefinite Jewish immigration is widespread amongst the Arab population and that this fear has made possible disturbances which have given a serious setback to economic progress, depleted the Palestine exchequer, rendered life and property insecure, and produced a bitterness between the Arab and Jewish populations which is deplorable between citizens of the same country. If in these circumstances immigration is continued up to the economic absorptive capacity of the country, regardless of all other considerations, a fatal enmity between the two peoples will be perpetuated, and the situation in Palestine may become a permanent source of friction amongst all peoples in the Near and Middle East. His Majesty's Government cannot take the view that either their obligations under the Mandate, or considerations of common sense and justice, require that they should ignore these circumstances in framing immigration policy.

13. In the view of the Royal Commission, the association of the policy of the Balfour Declaration with the Mandate system implied the belief that Arab hostility to the former would sooner or later be overcome. It has been the hope of British Governments ever since the Balfour Declaration was issued that in time the Arab population, recognizing the advantages to be derived from Jewish settlement and development in Palestine, would become reconciled to the further growth of the Jewish National Home. This hope has not been fulfilled. The alternatives before His Majesty's Government are either (i) to seek to expand the Jewish National Home indefinitely by immigration, against the strongly expressed will of the Arab people of the country, or (ii) to permit further expansion of the Jewish National Home by immigration only if the Arabs are prepared to acquiesce in it. The former policy means rule by force. Apart from other considerations, such a policy seems to His Majesty's Government to be contrary to the whole spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as to their specific obligations to the Arabs in the Palestine Mandate. Moreover, the relations between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine must be based sooner or later on mutual tolerance and goodwill; the peace, security and progress of the Jewish National Home itself require this. Therefore His Majesty's Government, after earnest consideration, and taking into account the extent to which the growth of the Jewish National Home has been facilitated over the last twenty years, have decided that the time has come to adopt in principle the second of the alternatives referred to above.

14. It has been urged that all further Jewish immigration into Palestine should be stopped forthwith. His Majesty's Government cannot accept such a proposal.

It would damage the whole of the financial and economic system of Palestine and thus affect adversely the interests of Arabs and Jews alike Moreover, in the view of His Majesty's Government, abruptly to stop further immigration would be unjust to the Jewish National Home But, above all, His Majesty's Government are conscious of the present unhappy plight of large numbers of Jews who seek a refuge from certain European countries, and they believe that Palestine can and should make a further contribution to the solution of this pressing world problem In all these circumstances, they believe that they will be acting consistently with their Mandatory obligations to both Arabs and Jews, and in the manner best calculated to serve the interests of the whole people of Palestine, by adopting the following proposals regarding immigration —

(1) Jewish immigration during the next five years will be at a rate which, if economic absorptive capacity permits, will bring the Jewish population up to approximately one-third of the total population of the country Taking into account the expected natural increase of the Arab and Jewish populations, and the number of illegal Jewish immigrants now in the country, this would allow of the admission, as from the beginning of April this year, of some 75,000 immigrants over the next five years. These immigrants would, subject to the criterion of economic absorptive capacity, be admitted as follows.—

(*a*) For each of the next five years a quota of 10 000 Jewish immigrants will be allowed, on the understanding that a shortage in any one year may be added to the quotas for subsequent years, within the five-year period, if economic absorptive capacity permits

(*b*) In addition, as a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem, 25,000 refugees will be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner is satisfied that adequate provision for their maintenance is ensured, special consideration being given to refugee children and dependants

(2) The existing machinery for ascertaining economic absorptive capacity will be retained, and the High Commissioner will have the ultimate responsibility for deciding the limits of economic capacity Before each periodic decision is taken, Jewish and Arab representatives will be consulted

(3) After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.

(4) His Majesty's Government are determined to check illegal immigration, and further preventive measures are being adopted. The numbers of any Jewish illegal immigrants who, despite these measures, may succeed in coming into the country and cannot be deported will be deducted from the yearly quotas

15. His Majesty's Government are satisfied that, when the immigration over five years which is now contemplated has taken place, they will not be justified in facilitating, nor will they be under any obligation to facilitate, the further development of the Jewish National Home by immigration regardless of the wishes of the Arab population.

III.—LAND

16 The Administration of Palestine is required, under Article 6 of the Mandate, "while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced," to encourage "close settlement by Jews on the land," and no restriction has been imposed hitherto on the transfer of land from Arabs to Jews.

The Reports of several expert Commissions have indicated that, owing to the natural growth of the Arab population and the steady sale in recent years of Arab land to Jews, there is now in certain areas no room for further transfers of Arab land whilst in some other areas such transfers of land must be restricted if Arab cultivators are to maintain their existing standard of life and a considerable landless Arab population is not soon to be created. In these circumstances, the High Commissioner will be given general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land. These powers will date from the publication of this statement of policy and the High Commissioner will retain them throughout the transitional period.

17 The policy of the Government will be directed towards the development of the land and the improvement, where possible, of methods of cultivation In the light of such development it will be open to the High Commissioner, should he be satisfied that the "rights and position" of the Arab population will be duly preserved, to review and modify any orders passed relating to the prohibition or restriction of the transfer of land.

18 In framing these proposals His Majesty's Government have sincerely endeavoured to act in strict accordance with their obligations under the Mandate to both the Arabs and the Jews. The vagueness of the phrases employed in some instances to describe these obligations has led to controversy and has made the task of interpretation difficult. His Majesty's Government cannot hope to satisfy the partisans of one party or the other in such controversy as the Mandate has aroused Their purpose is to be just as between the two peoples in Palestine whose destinies in that country have been affected by the great events of recent years, and who, since they live side by side, must learn to practise mutual tolerance, goodwill and co-operation. In looking to the future, His Majesty's Government are not blind to the fact that some events of the past make the task of creating these relations difficult; but they are encouraged by the knowledge that at many times and in many places in Palestine during recent years the Arab and Jewish inhabitants have lived in friendship together Each community has much to contribute to the welfare of their common land, and each must earnestly desire peace in which to assist in increasing the well-being of the whole people of the country. The responsibility which falls on them, no less than upon His Majesty's Government, to co-operate together to ensure peace is all the more solemn because their country is revered by many millions of Moslems, Jews and Christians throughout the world who pray for peace in Palestine and for the happiness of her people.

⑨ Pact of the League of Arab States

March 22, 1945

His Excellency the President of the Syrian Republic;
His Royal Highness the Amir of Trans-Jordan;
His Majesty the King of Iraq;
His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia,
His Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic;
His Majesty the King of Egypt;
His Majesty the King of the Yemen;

Who, after having exchanged their plenary powers, which were found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions·

ART 1. The League of Arab States is composed of the independent Arab States which have signed this Pact

Any independent Arab State has the right to become a member of the League. If it desires to do so, it shall submit a request which will be deposited with the Permanent Secretariat General and submitted to the Council at the first meeting held after submission of the request

ART 2 The League has as its purpose the strengthening of the relations between the member states; the coordination of their policies in order to achieve cooperation between them and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty; and a general concern with the affairs and interests of the Arab countries It has also as its purpose the close cooperation of the member states, with due regard to the organization and circumstances of each state, on the following matters

A. Economic and financial affairs, including commercial relations, customs, currency, and questions of agriculture and industry

B Communications, this includes railroads, roads, aviation, navigation, telegraphs, and posts.

C. Cultural affairs.

D Nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgments, and extradition of criminals.

E Social affairs.

F. Health problems.

ART 3. The League shall possess a Council composed of the representatives of the member states of the League; each state shall have a single vote, irrespective of the number of its representatives.

It shall be the task of the Council to achieve the realization of the objectives of the League and to supervise the execution of agreements which the member states have concluded on the questions enumerated in the preceding article, or on any other questions

It likewise shall be the Council's task to decide upon the means by which the

League is to cooperate with the international bodies to be created in the future in order to guarantee security and peace and regulate economic and social relations.

ART 4 For each of the questions listed in Article 2 there shall be set up a special committee in which the member states of the League shall be represented. These committees shall be charged with the task of laying down the principles and extent of cooperation. Such principles shall be formulated as draft agreements, to be presented to the Council for examination preparatory to their submission to the aforesaid states

Representatives of the other Arab countries may take part in the work of the aforesaid committees.The Council shall determine the conditions under which these representatives may be permitted to participate and the rules governing such representation.

ART 5. Any resort to force in order to resolve disputes arising between two or more member states of the League is prohibited If there should arise among them a difference which does not concern a state's independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity, and if the parties to the dispute have recourse to the Council for the settlement of this difference, the decision of the Council shall then be enforceable and obligatory.

In such a case, the states between whom the difference has arisen shall not participate in the deliberations and decisions of the Council.

The Council shall mediate in all differences which threaten to lead to war between two member states, or a member state and a third state, with a view to bringing about their reconciliation.

Decisions of arbitration and mediation shall be taken by majority vote.

ART. 6. In case of aggression or threat of aggression by one state against a member state, the state which has been attacked or threatened with aggression may demand the immediate convocation of the Council

The Council shall by unanimous decision determine the measures necessary to repulse the aggression If the aggressor is a member state, his vote shall not be counted in determining unanimity.

If, as a result of the attack, the government of the state attacked finds itself unable to communicate with the Council, that state's representative in the Council shall have the right to request the convocation of the Council for the purpose indicated in the foregoing paragraph. In the event that this representative is unable to communicate with the Council, any member state of the League shall have the right to request the convocation of the Council.

ART 7. Unanimous decisions of the Council shall be binding upon all member states of the League; majority decisions shall be binding only upon those states which have accepted them.

In either case the decisions of the Council shall be enforced in each member state according to its respective basic laws.

ART. 8. Each member state shall respect the systems of government established in the other member states and regard them as exclusive concerns of those states. Each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government.

ART 9. States of the League which desire to establish closer cooperation and stronger bonds than are provided by this Pact may conclude agreements to that end.

Treaties and agreements already concluded or to be concluded in the future

between a member state and another state shall not be binding or restrictive upon other members

ART. 10. The permanent seat of the League of Arab States is established in Cairo. The Council may, however, assemble at any other place it may designate.

ART. 11 The Council of the League shall convene in ordinary session twice a year, in March and in October It shall convene in extraordinary session upon the request of two member states of the League whenever the need arises

ART 12 The League shall have a permanent Secretariat-General which shall consist of a Secretary-General, Assistant Secretaries, and an appropiate number of officials.

The Council of the League shall establish an administrative regulation for the of two-thirds of the states of the League The Secretary-General, with the approval of the Council shall appoint the Assistant Secretaries and the principal officials of the League.

The Council of the League shall appoint the Secretary-General by a majority for the functions of the Secretariat-General and matters relating to the Staff.

The Secretary-General shall have the rank of Ambassador and the Assistant Secretaries that of Ministers Plenipotentiary

The first Secretary-General of the League is named in an Annex to this Pact.

ART 13 The Secretary-General shall prepare the draft of the budget of the League and shall submit it to the Council for approval before the beginning of each fiscal year.

The Council shall fix the share of the expenses to be borne by each state of the League. This share may be reconsidered if necessary.

ART. 14. The members of the Council of the League as well as the members of the committees and the officials who are to be designated in the administrative regulation shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunity when engaged in the exercise of their functions

The buildings occupied by the organs of the League shall be inviolable.

ART. 15. The first meeting of the Council shall be convened at the invitation of the head of the Egyptian Government Thereafter it shall be convened at the invitation of the Secretary-General.

The representatives of the member states of the League shall alternately assume the presidency of the Council at each of its ordinary sessions.

ART. 16. Except in cases specifically indicated in this Pact, a majority vote of the Council shall be sufficient to make enforceable decisions on the following matters:

A. Matters relating to personnel.

B. Adoption of the budget of the League.

C. Establishment of the administrative regulations for the Council, the committees, and the Secretariat General.

D. Decisions to adjourn the sessions.

ART. 17. Each member state of the League shall deposit with the Secretariat-General one copy of every treaty or agreement concluded or to be concluded in the future between itself and another member state of the League or a third state.

ART 18 If a member state contemplates withdrawal from the League, it shall inform the Council of its intention one year before such withdrawal is to go into effect.

The Council of the League may consider any state which fails to fulfill its obligations under this Pact as having become separated from the League, this to go into effect upon a unanimous decision of the states, not counting the state concerned.

ART 19. This Pact may be amended with the consent of two-thirds of the states belonging to the League, especially in order to make firmer and stronger the ties between the member states, to create an Arab Tribunal of Arbitration, and to regulate the relations of the League with any international bodies to be created in the future to guarantee security and peace.

Final action on an amendment cannot be taken prior to the session following the session in which the motion was initiated.

If a state does not accept such an amendment it may withdraw at such time as the amendment goes into effect, without being bound by the provisions of the preceding article.

ART. 20. This Pact and its Annexes shall be ratified according to the basic laws in force among the High Contracting Parties.

The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretariat-General of the Council and the Pact shall become operative as regards each ratifying state fifteen days after the Secretary-General has received the instruments of ratification from four states.

This Pact has been drawn up in Cairo in the Arabic language on this 8th day of Rabi' II, thirteen hundred and sixty-four (March 22, 1945), in one copy which shall be deposited in the safe keeping of the Secretariat-General.

An identical copy shall be delivered to each state of the League.

[Here follow the signatures]

(1) Annex Regarding Palestine

Since the termination of the last great war the rule of the Ottoman Empire over the Arab countries, among them Palestine, which had become detached from that Empire, has come to an end. She has come to be autonomous, not subordinate to any other state.

The Treaty of Lausanne proclaimed that her future was to be settled by the parties concerned.

However, even though she was as yet unable to control her own affairs, the Covenant of the League (of Nations) in 1919 made provision for a regime based upon recognition of her independence.

Her international existence and independence in the legal sense cannot, therefore, be questioned, any more than could the independence of the other Arab countries.

Although the outward manifestations of this independence have remained obscured for reasons beyond her control, this should not be allowed to interfere with her participation in the work of the Council of the League.

The States signatory to the Pact of the Arab League are therefore of the opinion that, considering the special circumstances of Palestine and until that country can effectively exercise its independence, the Council of the League should take charge of the selection of an Arab representative from Palestine to take part in its work.

(2) Annex Regarding Cooperation With Countries Which Are Not Members of the Council of the League

Whereas the member states of the League will have to deal in the Council as well as in the committees with matters which will benefit and affect the Arab world at large;

And whereas the Council has to take into account the aspirations of the Arab countries which are not members of the Council and has to work toward their realization;

Now therefore, it particularly behooves the states signatory to the Pact of the Arab League to enjoin the Council of the League, when considering the admission of those countries to participation in the committees referred to in the Pact, that it should do its utmost to cooperate with them, and furthermore, that it should spare no effort to learn their needs and understand their aspirations and hopes; and that it should work thenceforth for their best interests and the safeguarding of their future with all the political means at its disposal

(3) Annex Regarding the Appointment of a Secretary-General of the League

The states signatory to this Pact have agreed to appoint His Excellency Abd-ul-Rahman 'Assam Bey, to be the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States.

This appointment is made for two years The Council of the League shall hereafter determine the new regulations for the Secretariat-General.

10 Resolution on the Partition of Palestine: United Nations General Assembly

November 29, 1947

The General Assembly,

Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a special committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future government of Palestine at the second regular session;

Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the solution of the problem, and

Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee (document A/364) including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition with economic union approved by the majority of the Special Committee,

Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations;

Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948;

Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below;

Requests that

(*a*) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation;

(*b*) The Security Council consider if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution;

(*c*) The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;

(*d*) The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for it in this plan;

Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect;

Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations. . . .

PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION

PART I. FUTURE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

A. TERMINATION OF MANDATE, PARTITION AND INDEPENDENCE

1. The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.

2. The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressively withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.

The mandatory Power shall advise the Commission, as far in advance as possible, of its intention to terminate the Mandate and to evacuate each area.

The mandatory Power shall use its best endeavours to ensure that an area situated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948.

3. Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in part III of this plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described in parts II and III below.

4. The period between the adoption by the General Assembly of its recommendation on the question of Palestine and the establishment of the independence of the Arab and Jewish States shall be a transitional period.

B. STEPS PREPARATORY TO INDEPENDENCE

1. A Commission shall be set up consisting of one representative of each of five Member States. The Members represented on the Commission shall be elected

by the General Assembly on as broad a basis, geographically and otherwise, as possible

2. The administration of Palestine shall, as the mandatory Power withdraws its armed forces, be progressively turned over to the Commission, which shall act in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly, under the guidance of the Security Council The mandatory Power shall to the fullest possible extent cordinate its plans for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to take over and administer areas which have been evacuated

In the discharge of this administrative responsibility the Commission shall have authority to issue necessary regulations and take other measures as required

The mandatory Power shall not take any action to prevent, obstruct or delay the implementation by the Commission of the measures recommended by the General Assembly

3. On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to carry out measures for the establishment of the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the recommendations of the General Assembly on the partition of Palestine Nevertheless, the boundaries as described in part II of this plan are to be modified in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary.

4 The Commission, after consultation with the democratic parties and other public organizations of the Arab and Jewish States, shall select and establish in each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government The activities of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils of Government shall be carried out under the general direction of the Commission

If by 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government cannot be selected for either of the States, or, if selected, cannot carry out its functions, the Commission shall communicate that fact to the Security Council for such action with respect to that State as the Security Council may deem proper, and to the Secretary-General for the communication to the Members of the United Nations.

5. Subject to the provisions of these recommendations, during the transitional period the Provisional Councils of Government, acting under the Commission, shall have full authority in the areas under their control, including authority over matters of immigration and land regulation.

6. The Provisional Council of Government of each State, acting under the Commission, shall progressively receive from the Commission full responsibility for the administration of that State in the period between the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the State's independence.

7. The Commission shall instruct the Provisional Councils of Government of both the Arab and Jewish States, after their formation, to proceed to the establishment of administrative organs of government, central and local

8 The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, within the shortest time possible, recruit an armed militia from the residents of that State, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes

This armed militia in each State shall, for operational purposes, be under the command of Jewish or Arab officers resident in that State, but general political and military control, including the choice of the militia's High Command, shall be exercised by the Commission.

9 The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, not later than two months after the withrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, hold elections to the Constituent Assembly which shall be conducted on democratic lines.

The election regulations in each State shall be drawn up by the Provisional Council of Government and approved by the Commission Qualified voters for each State for this election shall be persons over eighteen years of age who are. (*a*) Palestinian citizens residing in that State and (*b*) Arabs and Jews residing in the State, although not Palestinian citizens, who, before voting, have signed a notice of intention to become citizens of such State

Arabs and Jews residing in the City of Jerusalem who have signed a notice of intention to become citizens, the Arabs of the Arab State and the Jews of the Jewish State, shall be entitled to vote in the Arab and Jewish States respectively.

Women may vote and be elected to the Constituent Assemblies.

During the transitional period no Jew shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Arab State, and no Arab shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Jewish State, except by special leave of the Commission

10. The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission The constitutions of the States shall embody chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration provided for in section C below and include *inter alia* provisions for.

(*a*) Establishing in each State a legislative body elected by universal suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation, and an executive body responsible to the legislature;

(*b*) Settling all international disputes in which the State may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;

(*c*) Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United nations;

(*d*) Guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, languages, speech and publication education, assembly and association;

(*e*) Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizens of the other State in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem, subject to considerations of national security, provided that each State shall control residence within its borders.

11. The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic commission of three members to make whatever arrangements are possible for economic co-operation, with a view to establishing, as soon as practicable, the Economic Union and the Joint Economic Board, as provided in section D below.

12. During the period between the adoption of the recommendations on the question of Palestine by the General Assembly and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power in Palestine shall maintain full responsibility for administration in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed forces. The

Commission shall assist the mandatory Power in the carrying out of these functions Similarly the mandatory Power shall co-operate with the Commission in the execution of its functions

13. With a view to ensuring that there shall be continuity in the functioning of administrative services and that, on the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, the whole administration shall be in the charge of the Provisional Councils and the Joint Economic Board, respectively, acting under the Commission; there shall be a progressive transfer, from the mandatory Power to the Commission, of responsibility for all the functions of government, including that of maintaining law and order in the areas from which the forces of the mandatory Power have been withdrawn

14. The Commission shall be guided in its activities by the recommendations of the General Assembly and by such instructions as the Security Council may consider necessary to issue

The measures taken by the Commission, within the recommendations of the General Assembly, shall become immediately effective unless the Commission has previously received contrary instructions from the Security Council

The Commission shall render periodic monthly progress reports, or more frequently if desirable, to the Security Council

15 The Commission shall make its final report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to the Security Council simultaneously

C DECLARATION

A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the provisional government of each proposed State before independence It shall contain *inter alia* the following clauses:

General provision

The stipulations contained in the declaration are recognized as fundamental laws of the State and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them

Chapter 1

Holy Places, religious buildings and sites

1 Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.

2. In so far as Holy Places are concerned, the liberty of access, visit and transit shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizens of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality, subject to requirements of national security, public order and decorum.

Similarly, freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in conformity with existing rights, subject to the maintenance of public order and decorum

3 Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Government that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Government may call upon the community or com-

munities concerned to carry out such repair The Government may carry it out itself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.

4. No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the State

No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations

5 The Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall have the right to determine whether the provisions of the Constitution of the State in relation to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within the borders of the State and the religious rights appertaining thereto, are being properly applied and respected, and to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community with respect to such places, buildings and sites. He shall receive full co-operation and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of his functions in the State.

Chapter 2

Religious and minority rights

1 Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, shall be ensured to all

2. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the ground of race, religion, language or sex

3. All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.

4. The family law and personal status of the various minorities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected

5. Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.

6. The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish minority respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, which conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the State may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.

7 No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any citizen of the state of any language in private intercourse, in commerce in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.[1]

[1] The following stipulation shall be added to the declaration concerning the Jewish State: "In the Jewish State adequate facilities shall be given to Arabic-speaking citizens for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, in the legislature, before the Courts and in the administration."

8 No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish State (by a Jew in the Arab State) [2] shall be allowed except for public purposes In all cases of expropriation full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be paid previous to dispossession.

Chapter 3

Citizenship, international conventions and financial obligations

1. *Citizenship* Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full civil and political rights. Persons over the age of eighteen years may opt within one year from the date of recognition of independence of the State in which they reside for citizenship of the other State, providing that no Arab residing in the area of the proposed Arab State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Jewish State and no Jew residing in the proposed Jewish State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Arab State The exercise of this right of option will be taken to include the wives and children under eighteen years of age of persons so opting.

Arabs residing in the area of the proposed Jewish State and Jews residing in the area of the proposed Arab State who have signed a notice of intention to opt for citizenship of the other State shall be eligible to vote in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of that State, but not in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the State in which they reside.

2 *International conventions* (*a*) The State shall be bound by all the international agreements and conventions, both general and special, to which Palestine has become a party Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements and conventions shall be respected by the State throughout the period for which they were concluded.

(*b*) Any dispute about the applicability and continued validity of international conventions or treaties signed or adhered to by the mandatory Power on behalf of Palestine shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

3. *Financial obligations*. (a) The State shall respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on behalf of Palestine by the mandatory Power during the exercise of the Mandate and recognized by the State. This provision includes the right of public servants to pensions, compensation or gratuities.

(*b*) These obligations shall be fulfilled through participation in the Joint Economic Board in respect of those obligations applicable to Palestine as a whole, and individually in respect of those applicable to, and fairly apportionable between, the States.

(*c*) A Court of Claims, affiliated with the Joint Economic Board, and composed of one member appointed by the United Nations, one representative of the United

[2] In the declaration concerning the Arab State, the words "by an Arab in the Jewish State" should be replaced by the words "by a Jew in the Arab State."

Kingdom and one representative of the State concerned, should be established Any dispute between the United Kingdom and the State respecting claims not recognized by the latter should be referred to that Court

(*d*) Commercial concessions granted in respect of any part of Palestine prior to the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly shall continue to be valid according to their terms, unless modified by agreement between the concession-holder and the State.

B BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY

The City of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethelehem, the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern Shu'fat, as indicated on the attached sketch-map (annex B).

C. STATUTE OF THE CITY

The Trusteeship Council shall, within five months of the approval of the present plan, elaborate and approve a detailed Statute of the City which shall contain *inter alia* the substance of the following provisions.

1. *Government machinery; special objectives* The Administering Authority in discharging its administrative obligations shall pursue the following special objectives:

(*a*) To protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and religious interests located in the city of the three great monotheistic faiths throughout the world, Christian, Jewish and Moslem; to this end to ensure that order and peace, and especially religious peace, reign in Jerusalem.

(*b*) To foster co-operation among all the inhabitants of the city in their own interests as well as in order to encourage and support the peaceful development of the mutual relations between the two Palestinian peoples throughout the Holy Land; to promote the security, well-being and any constructive measures of development of the residents, having regard to the special circumstances and customs of the various peoples and communities

2. *Governor and administrative staff.* A Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and shall be responsible to it. He shall be selected on the basis of special qualifications and without regard to nationality He shall not, however, be a citizen of either State in Palestine.

The Governor shall represent the United Nations in the City and shall exercise on their behalf all powers of administration, including the conduct of external affairs. He shall be assisted by an administrative staff classed as international officers in the meaning of Article 100 of the Charter and chosen whenever practicable from the residents of the city and of the rest of Palestine on a non-discriminatory basis. A detailed plan for the organization of the administration of the city shall be submitted by the Governor to the Trusteeship Council and duly approved by it.

3. *Local autonomy.* (*a*) The existing local autonomous units in the territory of the city (villages, townships and municipalities) shall enjoy wide powers of local government and administration.

(*b*) The Governor shall study and submit for the consideration and decision of

the Trusteeship Council a plan for the establishment of special town units consisting, respectively, of the Jewish and Arab sections of new Jerusalem The new town units shall continue to form part of the present municipality of Jerusalem

4 *Security measures* (*a*) The City of Jerusalem shall be demilitarized; its neutrality shall be declared and preserved, and no para-military formations, exercises or activities shall be permitted within its borders

(*b*) Should the administration of the City of Jerusalem be seriously obstructed or prevented by the non-co-operation or interference of one or more sections of the population, the Governor shall have authority to take such measures as may be necessary to restore the effective functioning of the administration

(*c*) To assist in the maintenance of internal law and order and especially for the protection of the Holy Places and religious buildings and sites in the city, the Governor shall organize a special police force of adequate strength, the members of which shall be recruited outside of Palestine The Governor shall be empowered to direct such budgetary provision as may be necessary for the maintenance of this force

5 *Legislative organization* A Legislative Council, elected by adult residents of the city irrespective of nationality on the basis of universal and secret suffrage and proportional representation, shall have powers of legislation and taxation No legislative measures shall, however, conflict or interfere with the provisions which will be set forth in the Statute of the City, nor shall any law, regulation, or official action prevail over them The Statute shall grant to the Governor a right of vetoing bills inconsistent with the provisions referred to in the preceding sentence. It shall also empower him to promulgate temporary ordinances in case the Council fails to adopt in time a bill deemed essential to the normal functioning of the administration.

6 *Administration of justice* The Statute shall provide for the establishment of an independent judiciary system, including a court of appeal All the inhabitants of the City shall be subject to it

7 *Economic union and economic regime.* The City of Jerusalem shall be included in the Economic Union of Palestine and be bound by all stipulations of the undertaking and of any treaties issued therefrom, as well as by the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The headquarters of the Economic Board shall be established in the territory of the City.

The Statute shall provide for the regulation of economic matters not falling within the regime of the Economic Union, on the basis of equal treatment and non-discrimination for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals.

8 *Freedom of transit and visit; control of residents* Subject to considerations of security, and of economic welfare as determined by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council, freedom of entry into, and residence within, the borders of the City shall be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab and Jewish States Immigration into, and residence within, the borders of the city for nationals of other States shall be controlled by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council.

9. *Relations with the Arab and Jewish States* Representatives of the Arab and Jewish States shall be accredited to the Governor of the City and charged with the protection of the interests of their States and nationals in connexion with the international administration of the City

10 *Official languages.* Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of the

city. This will not preclude the adoption of one or more additional working languages, as may be required

11. *Citizenship* All the residents shall become *ipso facto* citizens of the City of Jerusalem unless they opt for citizenship of the State of which they have been citizens or, if Arabs or Jews, have filed notice of intention to become citizens of the Arab or Jewish State respectively, according to part I, section B, paragraph 9, of this plan.

The Trusteeship Council shall make arrangements for consular protection of the citizens of the City outside its territory.

12 *Freedoms of citizens.* (*a*) Subject only to the requirements of public order and morals, the inhabitants of the City shall be ensured the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, religion and worship, language, education, speech and Press, assembly and association, and petition.

(*b*) No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the grounds of race, religion, language or sex.

(*c*) All persons within the City shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.

(*d*) The family law and personal status of the various persons and communities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.

(*e*) Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measures shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality

(*f*) The City shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish communities respectively, in their own languages and in accordance with their cultural traditions.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the City may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights

(*g*) No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any inhabitant of the City of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

13. *Holy Places.* (*a*) Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired

(*b*) Free access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and the free exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to the requirements of public order and decorum

(*c*) Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character If at any time it appears to the Governor that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Governor may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repairs. The Governor may carry it out himself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.

(*d*) No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the City. No

change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations

14 *Special powers of the Governor in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in the City and in any part of Palestine* (*a*) The protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites located in the City of Jerusalem shall be a special concern of the Governor

(*b*) With relation to such places, buildings and sites in Palestine outside the city, the Governor shall determine on the ground of powers granted to him by the Constitutions of both States whether the provisions of the Constitutions of the Arab and Jewish States in Palestine dealing therewith and the religious rights appertaining thereto are being properly applied and respected

(*c*) The Governor shall also be empowered to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rights of a religious community in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in any part of Palestine

In this task he may be assisted by a consultative council of representatives of different denominations acting in an advisory capacity

D. DURATION OF THE SPECIAL REGIME

The Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council on the aforementioned principles shall come into force not later than 1 October 1948 It shall remain in force in the first instance for a period of ten years, unless the Trusteeship Council finds it necessary to undertake a re-examination of these provisions at an earlier date. After the expiration of this period the whole scheme shall be subject to re-examination by the Trusteeship Council in the light of the experience acquired with its functioning. The residents of the City shall be then free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to possible modifications of the regime of the City

PART IV. CAPITULATIONS

States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Palestine the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection, as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are invited to renounce any right pertaining to them to the reestablishment of such privileges and immunities in the proposed Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem.

Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement

February 24, 1949

PREAMBLE

The Parties to the present Agreement, responding to the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948 calling upon them, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations and in order to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, to negotiate an Armistice; having decided to enter into negotiations under United Nations Chairmanship concerning the implementation of the Security Council resolutions of 4 and 16 November 1948; and having appointed representatives empowered to negotiate and conclude an Armistice Agreement;

The undersigned representatives, in the full authority entrusted to them by their respective Governments, have agreed upon the following provisions:

ART. I. With a view to promoting the return to permanent peace in Palestine and in recognition of the importance in this regard of mutual assurances concerning the future military operations of the Parties, the following principles, which shall be fully observed by both Parties during the Armistice, are hereby affirmed:

1. The injunction of the Security Council against resort to military force in the settlement of the Palestine question shall henceforth be scrupulously respected by both Parties

2. No aggressive action by the armed forces—land, sea, or air—of either Party shall be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other; it being understood that the use of the term "planned" in this context has no bearing on normal staff planning as generally practiced in military organizations.

3. The right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected.

4. The establishment of an armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties is accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine.

ART II. 1. In pursuance of the foregoing principles and of the resolutions of the Security Council of 4 and 16 November 1948, a general armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties—land, sea and air—is hereby established.

2. No element of the land, sea or air military or para-military forces of either Party, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of the other Party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that Party; or shall advance beyond or pass over for any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Line set forth in Article VI of this Agreement except as provided in Article III of this Agreement; and elsewhere shall not violate the international frontier; or enter into or pass through the air

space of the other Party or through the waters within three miles of the coastline of the other Party

ART III 1 In pursuance of the Security Council's resolution of 4 November 1948, and with a view to the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of 16 November 1948, the Egyptian Military Forces in the AL FALUJA area shall be withdrawn.

2 This withdrawal shall begin on the day after that which follows the signing of this Agreement, at 0500 hours, GMT, and shall be beyond the Egypt-Palestine frontier

3. The withdrawal shall be under the supervision of the United Nations and in accordance with the Plan of Withdrawal set forth in Annex I to this Agreement.

ART. IV With specific reference to the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council of 4 and 16 November 1948, the following principles and purposes are affirmed.

1 The principle that no military or political advantage should be gained under the truce ordered by the Security Council is recognized

2. It is also recognized that the basic purposes and spirit of the Armistice would not be served by the restoration of previously held military positions, changes from those now held other than as specifically provided for in this Agreement, or by the advance of the military forces of either side beyond positions held at the time this Armistice Agreement is signed

3. It is further recognized that rights, claims or interests of a non-military character in the area of Palestine covered by this Agreement may be asserted by either Party, and that these, by mutual agreement being excluded from the Armistice negotiations, shall be, at the discretion of the Parties, the subject of later settlement. It is emphasized that it is not the purpose of this Agreement to establish, to recognize, to strengthen, or to weaken or nullify, in any way, any territorial, custodial or other rights, claims or interests which may be asserted by either Party in the area of Palestine or any part or locality thereof covered by this Agreement, whether such asserted rights, claims or interests derive from Security Council resolutions, including the resolution of 4 November 1948 and the Memorandum of 13 November 1948 for its implementation, or from any other source The provisions of this Agreement are dictated exclusively by military considerations and are valid only for the period of the Armistice.

ART. V. 1. The line described in Article VI of this Agreement shall be designated as the Armistice Demarcation Line and is delineated in pursuance of the purpose and intent of the resolutions of the Security Council of 4 and 16 November 1948

2 The Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary, and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of either Party to the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine question

3. The basic purpose of the Armistice Demarcation Line is to delineate the line beyond which the armed forces of the respective Parties shall not move except as provided in Article III of this Agreement

4. Rules and regulations of the armed forces of the Parties, which prohibit civilians from crossing the fighting lines or entering the area between the lines, shall remain in effect after the signing of this Agreement with application to the Armistice Demarcation Line defined in Article VI.

ART. VI. 1. In the GAZA-RAFAH area the Armistice Demarcation Line shall be as delineated in paragraph 2 B (1) of the Memorandum of 13 November 1948 on the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 4 November 1948, namely by a line from the coast at the mouth of the Wadi Hasi in an easterly direction through Deir Suneid and across the Gaza-Al Majdal Highway to a point 3 kilometres east of the Highway, then in a southerly direction parallel to the Gaza-Al Madjal Highway, and continuing thus to the Egyptian frontier

2. Within this line Egyptian forces shall nowhere advance beyond their present positions, and this shall include Beit Hanun and its surrounding area from which Israeli forces shall be withdrawn to north of the Armistice Demarcation Line, and any other positions within the line delineated in paragraph 1 shall be evacuated by Israeli forces as set forth in paragraph 3.

3 Israeli outposts, each limited to platoon strength, may be maintained in this area at the following points: Deir Suneid, on the north side of the Wadi (MR 10751090); 700 SW of Sa'ad (MR 10500982); Sulphur Quarries (MR 09870924 Tall-Jamma (MR 09720887); and KH AL Ma'in (MR 09320821). The Israeli outpost maintained at the Cemetery (MR 08160723) shall be evacuated on the day after that which follows the signing of this Agreement The Israeli outpost at Hill 79 (MR 10451017) shall be evacuated not later than four weeks following the day on which this Agreement is signed Following the evacuation of the above outposts. new Israeli outpost may be established at MR 08360700, and at a point due east of Hill 79 east of the Armistice Demarcation Line

4. In the BETHLEHEM-HEBRON area, wherever positions are held by Egyptian forces, the provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the forces of both Parties in each locality, except that the demarcation of the Armistice Line and reciprocal arrangements for withdrawal and reduction of forces shall be undertaken in such manner as may be decided by the Parties, at such time as an Armistice Agreement may be concluded covering military forces in that area other than those of the Parties to this Agreement, or sooner at the will of the Parties

ART. VII. 1 It is recognized by the Parties to this Agreement that in certain sectors of the total area involved, the proximity of the forces of a third party not covered by this Agreement makes impractical the full application of all provisions of the Agreement to such sectors. For this reason alone, therefore, and pending the conclusion of an Armistice Agreement in place of the existing truce with that third party, the provisions of this Agreement relating to reciprocal reduction and withdrawal of forces shall apply only to the western front and not to the eastern front.

2. The areas comprising the western and eastern fronts shall be as defined by the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, on the basis of the deployment of forces against each other and past military activity or the future possibility thereof in the area This definition of the western and eastern fronts is set forth in Annex II of this Agreement.

3. In the area of the western front under Egyptian control, Egyptian defensive forces only may be maintained. All other Egyptian forces shall be withdrawn from this area to a point or points no further east than El Arish-Abou Aoueigila.

4. In the area of the western front under Israeli control, Israeli defensive forces only, which shall be based on the settlements, may be maintained. All other Israeli forces shall be withdrawn from this area to a point or points north of the line de-

lineated in paragraph 2 A of the Memorandum of 13 November 1948 on the implementation of the resolution of the Security Council of 4 November 1948

5 The defensive forces referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 above shall be as defined in Annex III to this Agreement

ART VIII 1 The area comprising the village of El Auja and vicinity, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, shall be demilitarized, and both Egyptian and Israeli armed forces shall be totally excluded therefrom The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission established in Article X of this Agreement and United Nations Observers attached to the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring the full implementation of this provision

2 The area thus demilitarized shall be as follows From a point on the Egypt-Palestine frontier five (5) kilometres northwest of the intersection of the Rafah-El Auja road and the frontier (MR 08750468), south-east to Khashm El Mamdud (MR 09650414), thence south-east to Hill 405 (MR 10780285), thence south-west to a point on the Egypt-Palestine frontier five (5) kilometres south-east of the intersection of the old railway tracks and the frontier (MR 09950145), thence returning north-west along the Egypt-Palestine frontier to the point of origin

3. On the Egyptian side of the frontier, facing the El Auja area, no Egyptian defensive positions shall be closer to El Auja than El Qouseima and Abou Aoueigila.

4 The road Taba-Qouseima-Auja shall not be employed by any military forces whatsoever for the purpose of entering Palestine

5 The movement of armed forces of either Party to this Agreement into any part of the area defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, for any purpose, or failure by either Party to respect or fulfil any of the other provisions of this Article, when confirmed by the United Nations representatives, shall constitute a flagrant violation of this Agreement

ART. IX All prisoners of war detained by either Party to this Agreement and belonging to the armed forces, regular or irregular, of the other Party shall be exchanged as follows

1. The exchange of prisoners of war shall be under United Nations supervision and control throughout The exchange shall begin within ten days after the signing of this Agreement and shall be completed not later than twenty-one days following. Upon the signing of this Agreement, the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission established in Article X of this Agreement, in consultation with the appropriate military authorities of the Parties, shall formulate a plan for the exchange of prisoners of war within the above period, defining the date and places of exchange and all other relevant details

2. Prisoners of war against whom a penal prosecution may be pending, as well as those sentenced for crime or other offence, shall be included in this exchange of prisoners

3. All articles of personal use, valuables, letters, documents, identification marks, and other personal affects of whatever nature, belonging to prisoners of war who are being exchanged, shall be returned to them, or, if they have escaped or died, to the Party to whose armed forces they belonged.

4. All matters not specifically regulated in this Agreement shall be decided in accordance with the principles laid down in the International Convention relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva on 27 July 1929.

5. The Mixed Armistice Commission established in Article X of this Agreement

shall assume responsibility for locating missing persons, whether military or civilian, within the areas controlled by each Party, to facilitate their expeditious exchange. Each Party undertakes to extend to the Commission full co-operation and assistance in the discharge of this function

ART X 1. The execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission composed of seven members, of whom each Party to this Agreement shall designate three, and whose Chairman shall be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior officer from the Observer personnel of that Organization designed by him following consultation with both Parties to this Agreement

2 The Mixed Armistice Commission shall maintain its headquarters at El Auja, and shall hold its meetings at such places and at such times as it may deem necessary for the effective conduct of its work

3 The Mixed Armistice Commission shall be convened in its first meeting by the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization not later than one week following the signing of this Agreement.

4 Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible, shall be based on the principle of unanimity. In the absence of unanimity, decisions shall be taken by a majority vote of the members of the Commission present and voting. On questions of principle, appeal shall lie to a Special Committee, composed of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization and one member each of the Egyptian and Israeli Delegations to the Armistice Conference at Rhodes or some other senior officer, whose decisions on all such questions shall be final. If no appeal against a decision of the Commission is filed within one week from the date of said decision, that decision shall be taken as final. Appeals to the Special Committee shall be presented to the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, who shall convene the Committee at the earliest possible date.

5. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall formulate its own rules of procedure. Meetings shall be held only after due notice to the members by the Chairman. The quorum for its meetings shall be a majority of its members

6. The Commission shall be empowered to employ Observers, who may be from among the military organizations of the Parties or from the military personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, or from both, in such numbers as may be considered essential to the performance of its functions. In the event United Nations Observers should be so employed, they shall remain under the command of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. Assignments of a general or special nature given to United Nations Observers attached to the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be subject to approval by the United Nations Chief of Staff or his designated representative on the Commission, whichever is serving as Chairman.

7. Claims or complaints presented by either Party relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred immediately to the Mixed Armistice Commission through its Chairman. The Commission shall take such action on all such claims or complaints by means of its observation and investigation machinery as it may deem appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement.

8. Where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of this Agreement is at issue, the Commission's interpretation shall prevail, subject to the right

of appeal as provided in paragraph 4. The Commission, in its discretion and as the need arises, may from time to time recommend to the Parties modifications in the provisions of this Agreement.

9 The Mixed Armistice Commission shall submit to both Parties reports on its activities as frequently as it may consider necessary A copy of each such report shall be presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the appropriate organ or agency of the United Nations.

10. Members of the Commission and its Observers shall be accorded such freedom of movement and access in the areas covered by this Agreement as the Commission may determine to be necessary, provided that when such decisions of the Commission are reached by a majority vote United Nations Observers only shall be employed.

11. The expenses of the Commission, other than those relating to United Nations Observers, shall be apportioned in equal shares between the two Parties to this Agreement

ART XI. No provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question.

ART XII The present Agreement is not subject to ratification and shall come into force immediately upon being signed.

2 This Agreement, having been negotiated and concluded in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948 calling for the establishment of an armistice in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the parties is achieved, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this Article.

3 The Parties to this Agreement may, by mutual consent, revise this Agreement or any of its provisions, or may suspend its application, other than Articles I and II, at any time In the absence of mutual agreement and after this Agreement has been in effect for one year from the date of its signing, either of the Parties may call upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convoke a conference of representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising or suspending any of the provisions of this Agreement other than Articles I and II. Participation in such conference shall be obligatory upon the Parties

4. If the conference provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article does not result in an agreed solution of a point in dispute, either Party may bring the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations for the relief sought on the grounds that this Agreement has been concluded in pursuance of Security action toward the end of achieving peace in Palestine

5 This Agreement supersedes the Egyptian-Israeli General Cease-Fire Agreement entered into by the Parties on 24 January 1949

6. This Agreement is signed in quintuplicate, of which one copy shall be retained by each Party, two copies communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the Security Council and to the United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine, and one copy to the Acting Mediator on Palestine

12 | Treaty Between the States of the Arab League

April 13, 1950

The Governments of:
The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan
The Syrian Republic
The Kingdom of Iraq
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
The Lebanese Republic
The Kingdom of Egypt
The Motawakilite Kingdom of Yemen

In view of the desire of the above-mentioned Governments to consolidate relations between the States of the Arab League; to maintain their independence and their mutual heritage, in accordance with the desire of their peoples, to cooperate for the realization of mutual defense and the maintenance of security and peace according to the principles of both the Arab League Pact and the United Nations Charter together with the aims of the said Pacts; and to consolidate stability and security and provide means of welfare and development in the countries.

The following government delegates of . . . , having been duly accredited and fully authorized by their respective governments, approve the following:

ART. 1. The Contracting States, in an effort to maintain and stabilize peace and security, hereby confirm their desire to settle their international disputes by peaceful means, whether such disputes concern relations among themselves or with other Powers.

ART. 2 The Contracting States consider any (act of) armed aggression made against any one or more of them or their armed forces, to be directed against them all. Therefore, in accordance with the right of self-defense, individually and collectively they undertake to go without delay to the aid of the State or States against which such an act of aggression is made, and immediately to take, individually and collectively, all steps available, including the use of armed force, to repel the aggression and restore security and peace In conformity with Article 6 of the Arab League Pact and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Arab League Council and U N. Security Council shall be notified of such act of aggression and the means and procedure taken to check it.

ART 3 At the invitation of any one of the signatories of this Treaty the Contracting States shall hold consultations whenever there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the territorial integrity, independence, or security of any one of the parties is threatened. In the event of the threat of war or the existence of an international emergency, the Contracting States shall immediately proceed to unify their plans and defensive measures, as the situation may demand

ART. 4. The Contracting States, desiring to implement fully the above obliga-

tions and effectively carry them out, shall cooperate in consolidating and coordinating their armed forces, and shall participate according to their resources and needs in preparing individual and collective means of defense to repulse the said armed aggression

ART 5 A Permanent Military Commission composed of representatives of the General Staffs of the armies of the Contracting States shall be formed to draw up plans of joint defense and their implementation. The duties of the Permanent Military Commission which are set forth in an Annex attached to this Treaty, include the drafting of necessary reports on the method of cooperation and participation mentioned in Article 4 The Permanent Military Commission shall submit to the Joint Defense Council, provided hereunder in Article 6, reports dealing with questions within its province

ART 6 A Joint Defense Council under the supervision of the Arab League Council shall be formed to deal with all matters concerning the implementations of the provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this Treaty It shall be assisted in the performance of its task by the Permanent Military Commission referred to in Article 5 The Joint Defense Council shall consist of the Foreign Ministers and the Defense Ministers of the Contracting States or their representatives Decisions taken by a two-thirds majority shall be binding on all the Contracting States

ART. 7 The Contracting States, in order to fulfill the aims of this Treaty, and to bring about security and prosperity in the Arab countries, and in an effort to raise the standard of living in them, undertake to cooperate in the development of their economies and the exploitation of their natural resources; to facilitate the exchange of their respective agricultural and industrial products; and generally to organize and coordinate their economic activities and to conclude the necessary inter-Arab agreements to realize such aims.

ART. 8 An Economic Council consisting of the Ministers in charge of economic affairs, or their representatives if necessary, shall be formed by the Contracting States to submit recommendations for the realization of all such aims as are set forth in the previous article The Council may, in the performance of its duties, seek the cooperation of the Committee for Financial and Economic Affairs referred to in Article 4 of the Arab League Pact.

ART. 9 The Annex to this Treaty shall be considered an integral and indivisible part of it.

ART. 10 The Contracting States undertake to conclude no international agreements which may be contradictory to the provisions of this Treaty, nor to act, in their international relations, in a way which may be contrary to the aims of this Treaty.

ART. 11 No provision of this Treaty shall in any way affect, or is intended to affect any of the rights or obligations devolving upon the Contracting States from the United Nations Charter or the responsibilities borne by the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ART. 12 After a lapse of 10 years from the date of the ratification of this Treaty any one of the Contracting States may withdraw from it, providing 12 months' notice is previously given to the Secretariat-General of the Arab League. The Secretariat-General of the League shall inform the other Contracting States of such notice.

ART. 13. This Treaty shall be ratified by each Contracting State according to

the constitutional procedure of its own government The Treaty shall come into force for the ratifying States 15 days after the receipt by the Secretariat-General of the instruments of ratification from at least four States. This Treaty is drafted in Arabic in Cairo on April 13, 1950 One signed copy shall be deposited with the Secretariat-General of the Arab League; equally authentic copies shall be transmitted to each of the Contracting States.

MILITARY ANNEX

1. The Permanent Military Commission provided for in Article 5 of the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty between the States of the Arab League, shall undertake the following:

(a) in cooperation with the Joint Defense Council, to prepare plans to deal with all inticipated dangers or armed aggression that may be launched against one or more of the Contracting States or their armed forces, such plans to be based on the principles determined by the Joint Defense Council;
(b) to submit proposals for the organization of the forces of the Contracting States, stipulating the minimum force for each in accordance with military exigencies and the potentialities of each State;
(c) to submit proposals for increasing the effectiveness of the forces of the Contracting States in so far as their equipment, organization, and training are concerned; so that they may keep pace with modern military methods and development; and for the unification and coordination of all such forces;
(d) to submit proposals for the exploitation of natural, agricultural, industrial, and other resources of all Contracting States in favor of the Inter-Arab military effort and joint defense;
(e) to organize the exchange of training missions between the Contracting States for the preparation of plans, participation in military exercises and maneuvers and the study of their results, recommendations for the improvement of methods to ensure close cooperation in the field, and for the general improvement of the forces of all the Contracting States;
(f) to prepare the necessary data on the resources and military potentialities of each of the Contracting States and the part to be played by the forces of each in the joint military effort;
(g) to discuss the facilities and various contributions which each of the Contracting States, in conformity with the provisions of this Treaty, might be asked to provide, during a state of war, on behalf of the armies of such other Contracting States as might be operating on its territory.

2 The Permanent Military Commission may form temporary or permanent subcommittees from among its own members to deal with any of the matters falling within its jurisdiction It may also seek the advice of any experts whose views on certain questions are deemed necessary.
3 The Permanent Military Commission shall submit detailed reports on the results of its activities and studies to the Joint Defense Council provided for in Article 6 of this Treaty, as well as an annual report giving full particulars of its work and studies during the year.
4. The Permanent Military Commission shall establish its headquarters in Cairo

but may hold meetings in any other place the Commission may specify. The Commission shall elect its Chairman for two years, he may be reelected Candidates for the Chairmanship shall hold at least the rank of a high commanding officer Each member of the Commission must have as his original nationality that of the Contracting State he represents

5 In the event of war, the supreme command of the joint forces shall be entrusted to the Contracting State possessing the largest military force taking actual part in field operations, unless, by unanimous agreement, the Commander-in-Chief shall be assisted in directing military operations by a Joint Staff

13 The Tripartite Declaration: France, United Kingdom, United States

May 25, 1950

"1. The three Governments recognize that the Arab States and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defence and to permit them to play their part in the defence of the area as a whole All applications for arms or war material for these countries will be considered in the light of these principles In this connection the three Governments wish to recall and reaffirm the terms of the statements made by their representatives on the Security Council on 4th August, 1949, in which they declared their opposition to the development of an arms race between the Arab States and Israel

2 The three Governments declare that assurances have been received from all the States in question to which they permit arms to be supplied from their countries that the purchasing State does not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other State Similar assurances will be requested from any other States in the area to which they permit arms to be supplied in the future.

3. The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area, and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the States in that area The three Governments, should they find that any of these States was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation."

Assurances in the terms of paragraph 2 of the statement were received by the United Kingdom from Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia; by the United States from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Syria, and by France from Syria and the Lebanon.

14 | Law Nationalizing the Oil Industry in Iran

May 1, 1951

ART. 1 With a view to arranging the enforcement of the law of 24th and 29th Esfand, 1329 (15th and 20th March, 1951), concerning the nationalisation of the oil industry throughout Persia, a mixed board composed of five Senators and five Deputies elected by either of the two Houses and of the Minister of Finance or his Deputy shall be formed

ART. 2. The Government is bound to dispossess at once the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company under the supervision of the mixed board If the Company refuses to hand over at once on the grounds of existing claims on the Government, the Government can, by mutual agreement, deposit in the Bank Milli Iran or in any other bank up to 25 per cent of current revenue from the oil after deduction of exploitation expenses in order to meet the probable claims of the Company

ART. 3 The Government is bound to examine the rightful claims of the Government as well as the rightful claims of the Company under the supervision of the mixed board and to submit its suggestions to the two Houses of Parliament in order that the same may be implemented after approval by the two Houses

ART 4 Inasmuch as the nationalisation of the oil industry was also approved by the Senate on 29th Esfand (20th March, 1951) and inasmuch as all income from oil and oil products are the established property of the Persian nation the Government is bound to audit the Company's accounts under the supervision of the mixed board which must also closely supervise exploitation as from the date of the implementation of this law until the appointment of an executive body.

ART 5. The mixed board must draw up, as soon as possible, the statute of the National Oil Company in which provision is to be made for the setting up of an executive body and a supervisory body of experts, and must submit the same to the two Houses for approval.

ART. 6. For the gradual replacement of foreign experts by Persian experts the mixed board is bound to draw up regulations for sending, after competitive examinations, a number of students each year to foreign countries to undertake study in the various branches of required knowledge and gain experience in oil industries, the said regulations to be carried out by the Ministry of Education after the approval of the Council of Ministers The expenses connected with the study of such students shall be met out of oil revenues.

ART. 7. All purchasers of products derived from the wells taken back from the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company can in future buy annually the same quantity of oil they used to buy annually from the Company from the beginning of the Christian year 1948 up to 29th Esfand, 1329 (20th March, 1951), at a reasonable international price. For any surplus quantity they shall have priority in the event of equal terms of purchase being offered.

ART. 8 All proposals formulated by the mixed board for the approval of the Majlis and submission to the Majlis must be sent to the Oil Commission

ART 9 The mixed board must finish its work within three months as from the date of approval of this law and must submit the report of its activities to the Majlis in accordance with Article 8 In the event of requiring an extension it must apply, giving valid reasons, for such extension Whilst, however, the extension is before the two Houses for approval the mixed board can continue its functions.

15 From Agreement on Suez Canal Base: United Kingdom and Egypt

October 19, 1954

ART 1. Her Majesty's Forces shall be completely withdrawn from Egyptian Territory in accordance with the Schedule set forth in Part A of Annex 1 within a period of twenty months from the date of signature of the present Agreement.

ART. 2 The Government of the United Kingdom declare that the Treaty of Alliance signed in London on 26th August, 1936, with the Agreed Minute, Exchanged Notes, Convention concerning the immunities and privileges enjoyed by the British Forces in Egypt and all other subsidiary agreements, is terminated.

ART 3. Parts of the present Suez Canal Base, which are listed in Appendix A to Annex II, shall be kept in efficient working order and capable of immediate use in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the present Agreement To this end they shall be organized in accordance with the provisions of Annex II.

ART. 4 In the event of an armed attack by an outside Power on any country which at the date of signature of the present Agreement is a party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States, signed in Cairo on 13th April, 1950, or on Turkey, Egypt shall afford to the United Kingdom such facilities as may be necessary in order to place the Base on a war footing and to operate it effectively. These facilities shall include the use of Egyptian ports within the limits of what is strictly indispensable for the above-mentioned purposes.

ART 5 In the event of the return of British Forces to the Suez Canal Base area in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, these forces shall withdraw immediately upon the cessation of the hostilities referred to in that Article.

ART. 6 In the event of a threat of an armed attack by an outside power on any country which at the date of signature of the present Agreement is a party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States, or on Turkey, there shall be immediate consultation between Egypt and the United Kingdom.

ART. 7. The Government of the Republic of Egypt shall afford over-flying, landing and servicing facilities for notified flights of aircraft under Royal Air Force control For the clearance of any flights of such aircraft, the Government of the Republic of Egypt shall accord treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the aircraft of any other foreign country with the exception of States parties to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States. The landing

and servicing facilities mentioned above shall be afforded at Egyptian airfields in the Suez Canal Base area.

ART. 8. The two Contracting Governments recognize that the Suez Maritime Canal, which is an integral part of Egypt, is a waterway economically, commercially and strategically of international importance, and express the determination to uphold the Convention guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the Canal signed at Constantinople on 29th October, 1888.

ART. 9. (a) The United Kingdom is accorded the right to move any British equipment into or out of the Base at its discretion.

(b) There shall be no increase above the level of supplies as agreed upon in Part C of Annex II without the consent of the Government of the Republic of Egypt.

ART. 10. The present Agreement does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

ART. 11 The Annexes and Appendices to the present Agreement shall be considered as an integral part of it.

ART. 12 (a) The present Agreement shall remain in force for the period of seven years from the date of its signature.

(b) During the last twelve months of that period the two Contracting Governments shall consult together to decide on such arrangements as may be necessary upon the termination of the Agreement.

(c) Unless both the Contracting Governments agree upon any extension of the Agreement it shall terminate seven years after the date of signature and the Government of the United Kingdom shall take away or dispose of their property then remaining in the Base.

ART. 13 The present Agreement shall have effect as though it had come into force on the date of signature. Instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Cairo as soon as possible.

16 From "The Baghdad Pact": Iraq and Turkey

February 24, 1955

ART. 1. Consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the high contracting parties will co-operate for their security and defence Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject of special agreements with each other.

ART. 2. In order to ensure the realization and effect application of the co-operation provided for in Article 1 above, the competent authorities of the high contracting parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the high contracting parties.

ART 3 The high contracting parties undertake to refrain from any interference whatsoever in each others' affairs They will settle any disputes between themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations Charter

ART 4 The high contracting parties declare that the dispositions of the present pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted by either of them with any third State or States They do not derogate from, and cannot be interpreted as derogating from, the said international obligations. The high contracting parties undertake not to enter into any international obligation incompatible with the present pact

ART. 5 This pact shall be open for accession to any member State of the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognized by both of the high contracting parties Accession shall come into force from the date on which the instrument of accession of the State concerned is deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq Any acceding State party to the present pact may conclude special agreements in accordance with Article 1, with one or more States parties to the present pact The competent authorities of any acceding State may determine measures in accordance with Article 2 These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the parties concerned

ART 6. A permanent council at ministerial level will be set up to function within the framework of the purposes of this pact when at least four Powers become parties to the pact The council will draw up its own rules of procedure

ART 7. This pact remains in force for a period of five years renewable for other five-year periods Any contracting party may withdraw from the pact by notifying the other parties in writing of its desire to do so, six months before the expiration of any of the above mentioned periods, in which case the pact remains valid for the other parties

[In an exchange of letters, the Parties placed on record their understanding that "this pact will enable our two countries to co-operate in resisting any aggression directed against either of them and that, in order to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region, we have agreed to work in close co-operation for effecting the carrying out of the United Nations resolutions concerning Palestine Great Britain, Pakistan, and Iran joined the Pact under Article 5 "]

17 Egyptian Agreement with Czechoslovakia for the Purchase of Arms: Prime Minister Gamal Abdul Nasser

September 27, 1955

My Brothers,

I am glad today to see this exhibition which the armed forces have set up to show the extent of progress and development which the army has made

I am glad also to speak to you today for I now recall my last talk to the men of the armed forces some months ago I remember also that I spoke then to thou-

sands of officers. Now I see them amongst us I see them carrying out their duty on the frontiers of our homeland for the safety of our country and for the glory of our country.

When I speak to you now, my brothers, I speak to all the men of the armed forces, I speak to all the men of the fatherland, I speak to Egypt—Egypt which revolted on July 23, 1952—Egypt which placed its faith in the goals of this Revolution; Egypt which was determined to achieve these goals—Egypt which finally threw off the occupation and threw off slavery When I speak to you today, I speak to all Egypt.

My brothers, this is my feeling when I look at the battlefield, and I see the men of the armed forces on guard along the frontiers; when I look at the frontiers of Egypt and see the men of the armed forces standing staunch and firm and faithful, exerting every effort for the safety of this country and its sons

The fifth goal of your Revolution was to set up a strong national army From the beginning of the Revolution you have all exerted every effort to achieve this goal and we have worked with you with all our might and with every means at our disposal. We have worked with you to achieve this goal because to achieve it means liberty; to achieve it means glory; to achieve it means dignity.

My brothers, we met the greatest obstacles—we met many difficulties in achieving our aim. We did everything we could to set up military factories; we did everything we could to provide the army with the heavy armaments it needed; and we did everything we could so that Egypt's army might be a strong national army.

Yes, my brothers, we did a lot.

But there were the greatest difficulties in our way We believed that if we wanted to create such an army for Egypt we had to preserve our freedom We believed that if we wanted to achieve this strong national army for Egypt, we had to become free in our internal and our foreign policies

My brothers, we will never agree that this army be formed at the expense of this country's freedom, or at the expense of this country's glory, or at the expense of this country's dignity. We have always been determined that the formation of this strong national army should go hand in hand with true liberty and with real glory

We have proclaimed Egypt's policy on many occasions We declared that Egypt after the Revolution of July 23 would go forward with its independent policy; it would go forward having rid itself of imperialism; it would go forward having rid itself of domination; and it would go forward having rid itself of foreign influence These were our hopes and these were your hopes We did everything we could to preserve these hopes We did everything we could, my brothers, to preserve these goals—and we were confronted by many obstacles.

You know that heavy weapons are controlled by the big powers. You know that the big powers have never agreed to supply our army with heavy weapons except with conditions and except with stipulations You know that we refused these conditions and these stipulations because we are jealous of our true freedom and we are jealous of our independent policy. We are anxious that Egypt have a strong independent policy so that we may make of Egypt a new independent personality which will really rid itself of imperialism, will really rid itself of occupation, will really rid itself of foreign domination in all its aspects We have been making progress along this path.

Today, my brothers, we hear an outcry from London, we hear an outcry from Washington about the arming of Egypt's troops But I would like to tell you that throughout the last three years we have tried to get heavy weapons for the army by every means, not for aggressive purposes, not to attack, not to make war, but for defense, for security, for peace

We wanted to strengthen our army so as to provide security for ourselves, to provide security for our nation, to provide security for our "Arabism " We wanted to get weapons for the army so that we could always feel secure, safe, and tranquil We never intended to strengthen our army for aggressive purposes. We never intended to strengthen the army for wars But the army which is the defender and protector of our homeland must always stand prepared to defend the borders and the country's honor. Such is our purpose and this is our goal We have always declared this throughout the last three years. We do not want arms for aggression. We want arms so that we can be tranquil, so that we feel at peace and not threatened.

Today, my brothers, I sense an outcry here and I sense an outcry there. I sense these outcries now that we have been able to obtain for the army the weapons of which it is in need, without conditions and without restrictions, so as to achieve the goal which this Revolution undertook—that Egypt should have a strong national army to defend its true independence and protect its true freedom.

On this occasion I would like to tell you, my brothers, the story of the arming of our troops When the Revolution took place we went to each of the states, we went to every quarter to get weapons for the army. We went to Britain; we went to France; we went to America; we went to the rest of the states to get weapons for the army in the interest of peace and defense. What did we get? We got only demands They wanted to arm the troops after we had signed a document or after we had signed a pact. We declared that even though we had wanted and had decided to arm our troops, we would never sign a document We were arming our troops in the interest of our freedom, of our independent personality, of our Revolution, of the glory of our country, of Egypt's dignity We declared that we would not arm our troops at the expense of our freedom

We requested arms but what was the result? The result, my brothers, is a long and bitter story. I remember now, I remember as I talk to you that we sometimes humiliated ourselves but we never abandoned our principles. We humiliated ourselves when we requested arms—we begged for arms—but at the same time we were determined to hold to our principles and we were determined to preserve our high ideals. And what was the result? Never, my brothers, could we achieve our goal, the greatest goal for which this Revolution was undertaken, the creation of a strong national army.

France always bargained with us. She bargained with us over North Africa She says to us, "We will give you arms on the condition that you should not criticize our position in North Africa, and on condition that you relinquish your 'Arabism,' that you relinquish your humanitarianism and on condition that you should keep silent and close your eyes when you see the massacres in North Africa."

We said to her, "How can we relinquish our 'Arabism'? How can we give up our humanitarianism? We never can."

France's arms offer to us was always like a sword above our necks. We were always being threatened, my brothers, with the cutting off of arms. We were always

being threatened, my brothers, with the supply of arms to Israel and the cutting off of arms for Egypt. This is the story of France and now I'll tell you the story of America.

From the time of the Revolution we asked for arms and we were promised arms. And what was the result?

The promise was a promise circumscribed with conditions. We would get arms if we signed a mutual security pact. We would get arms if we would sign some form of alliance We refused to sign a mutual security pact. We refused to sign any form of alliance And, my brothers, we could never get a single weapon from America.

What was the story of England. England told us that she was ready to supply us arms. We accepted gratefully. What was the result? England provided us with a quantity of arms which was not sufficient to achieve the goals of this Revolution

What was the result of all this, my brothers? The army opposing us is obtaining arms from various parts of the world Israel's army has been able to obtain arms from England, France, Belgium, Canada, Italy and from various other states It can always find someone to supply it arms, while we read in the foreign press—in the British, American or French newspapers—that Israel's army can defeat all the Arab armies combined. It was only last month, my brothers, that I read many articles in that sense, that the Israeli army could defeat Egypt, that the Israeli army could beat the Arabs, that the Israeli army was superior in armament, that the Israeli army was superior in equipment.

This is what they have said in their press and I said to them, since you feel like this why do you prevent us from obtaining arms? I asked them this, and what was the result? France complained about our feelings toward North Africa, and prevented us from obtaining arms.

When we saw this, when we saw this domination, when we saw this influence which was being used against us, we decided to ask all the states of the world to supply us arms without conditions. I told them these arms would not be used for aggression, that they would be used for defense, that we had no aggressive intent, that our intentions were peaceful, that we wanted to have a strong independent army to defend our country and help it to achieve its free and independent goals, that we want to have a strong army not for aggression but for defense.

I said this, my brothers, in the name of Egypt to America, to England to France, to Russia, to Czechoslovakia and to the rest of the states and I waited for their answers. I waited, and what was the result? I got answers from some of them that I could get arms with conditions. I refused, for I have already told you that although we are ready to humiliate ourselves by asking for arms, we will never abandon our principles.

We received a reply from Czechoslovakia saying that she was prepared to supply arms in accordance with our needs and those of Egypt's army on a commercial basis, the transaction to be considered like any other commercial transaction. We agreed and last week Egypt signed a commercial agreement with Czechoslovakia to supply us arms. This agreement permits Egypt to pay in Egyptian products such as cotton and rice. This offer we gratefully accepted. In this way, my brothers, we achieve one of the goals of the Revolution, the formation of a strong national army.

Today, my brothers, as I talk to you I sense the outcry raised here and there—an outcry in London, an outcry in Washington These outcries seek to continue to control us, to continue to influence us.

We will fight to destroy this control We will fight to destroy this influence. We will fight to achieve the goals of the Revolution and we will fight to create a strong national army able to achieve the greatest goals of the Revolution, able to obtain peace Yes, my brothers, peace—that peace which we proclaimed at Bandung, the peace which we have proclaimed on many occasions

This army which we create is for the sake of peace. We create it so that we can be secure in our lot, we create it so that Egypt will not be a state of refugees We create it against aggression, we create it against any territorial designs against our nation's soil.

When I hear someone say that this opens the way for Russian influence or foreign influence in Egypt or the Middle East, I think of the remote past and I say that this commercial agreement without conditions does not open the way for Russian or foreign influence, but, my brothers, it means the eradication of the foreign influence which so long oppressed and dominated us

My brothers, when we are able to equip our army with the necessary arms without conditions or restrictions, we destroy foreign control—that control which I have felt and which you have felt in the guise of equipping our army and in the guise of providing it with arms Those who talk to us about foreign influence know that they themselves have no intention of seeing foreign influence wiped out.

We intend to destroy foreign influence Egypt—independent Egypt, revolutionary Egypt, strong Egypt—will never allow foreign influence in her land They know we will never accept their influence, and their control. They know that Egypt after the Revolution of July 23 has determined to destroy forever foreign influence, foreign oppression and foreign control and to go forward as a free independent power with her own foreign policy, motivated by her own interests and not by the interest of any of the foreign camps.

They know this when they talk of influence for they think that it is their influence which has come to an end in this country—that it is their influence which has gone away forever.

Today we are a free and independent nation We will fight for our liberty and we will fight for our independence and may God be with us all.

18 Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company: Presidential Decree

July 26, 1956

President of the Republic Order concerning the issuance of Law No. 285 of 1956 on the Nationalization of the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal.

In the Name of the Nation

The President of the Republic,

Considering the two firmans issued on November 30, 1854 and January 5, 1856 (respectively) concerning the preferential rights related to the administration of

the Suez Canal Transit Service and the establishment of an Egyptian joint-stock company to operate it;

and Law No. 129 of 1947 concerning public utility concessions;

and Law No. 317 of 1952 concerning individual labor contracts;

and Law No. 26 of 1954 concerning joint-stock companies, limited partnerships by shares and limited liability companies;

with the advice of the State Council;

has issued the following law:

ART. 1 The Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal (Egyptian joint-stock Company) is hereby nationalized. All its assets, rights and obligations are transferred to the Nation and all the organizations and committees that now operate its management are hereby dissolved

Stockholders and holders of founders shares shall be compensated for the ordinary or founders shares they own in accordance with the value of the shares shown in the closing quotations of the Paris Stock Exchange on the day preceding the effective date of the present law.

The payment of said indemnity shall be effected after the Nation has taken delivery of all the assets and properties of the nationalized company.

ART. 2. An independent organization endowed with juristic personality and annexed to the Ministry of Commerce, shall take over the management of the Suez Canal Transit Service. The composition of the organization and the remuneration of its members shall be fixed in an order of the President of the Republic. In so far as managing the Transit Service is concerned the organization shall have all the necessary powers required for the purpose without being restricted by Government regulations and procedures.

Without prejudice to the auditing of its final accounts by the State Audit Department, the organization shall have an independent budget prepared in accordance with the rules in force for commercial concerns Its financial year shall begin on July 1, and end on June 30 each year. The budget and final accounts shall be approved by an order of the President of the Republic. The first financial year shall begin on the effective date of the present law and end with June 30, 1957.

The organization may delegate one or several of its members to implement its decisions or to discharge any duty assigned to these members.

It may also set up from among its own members of from among other people, a technical committee to assist it in its own research work and studies.

The chairman of the organization shall represent it before the courts, government agencies, and other places, and in its dealings with third parties.

ART. 3. The assets and rights of the nationalized company in the Republic of Egypt and abroad, are hereby frozen. Without specific permission obtained in advance from the organization provided for in Article 2 above, banks, organizations and private persons are hereby prohibited from disposing of those assets or making any payment requested them or due by them.

ART. 4. The organization shall retain all the present officials, employees, and laborers of the nationalized company at their posts; they shall have to continue with the discharge of their duties; no one will be allowed to leave his work or vacate his post in any manner and for any reason whatsoever except with the permission of the organization provided for in Article 2

ART. 5. All violations of the provisions of Article 3 above shall be punished

by imprisonment and a fine equal to three times the value of the amount involved in the offense All violations of the provisions of Article 4 shall be punished by imprisonment in addition to the forfeiture by the offender of all right to compensation, pension or indemnity

ART 6 The present order shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall have the force of law It shall come into force on the date of its publication. The Minister of Commerce shall issue the necessary administrative orders for its implementation

It shall bear the Seal of the State and be implemented as one of the State laws.

Given this 18th day of Zul Heggah, 1375 A H (July 26, 1956)

Gamal Abdul Nasser

19 Nationalization Speech: Gamal Abdul Nasser

July 26, 1956

This speech makes reference to a meeting with Mr. Eugene R. Black, president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with which Egypt had been negotiating for a loan to help finance the construction of a high dam on the Nile at Aswan (translation made from tape recording).

I began to look at Mr Black sitting in his chair imagining that I was sitting before Ferdinand de Lesseps.

I recalled the words which we used to read. In 1854, Ferdinand de Lesseps arrived in Egypt He went to Mohammed Said Pasha, the Khedive He sat beside him and told him, "We want to dig the Suez Canal. This project will greatly benefit you It is a great project and will bring excellent returns to Egypt."

While Black was speaking to me, I felt the complexes which his words revived. I was again carried back to Ferdinand de Lesseps.

I told him we have complexes from such matters, and we do not want to see another Cromer governing us again. Loans and interests on these loans have ended in the occupation of our country. I requested him to take this into consideration. We have complexes from de Lesseps and from Cromer, and from political occupation through economic occupation.

That was the picture I had in mind, the picture of De Lesseps who arrived on November 7, 1854. He arrived in Alexandria and began to work cautiously and treacherously. On November 30, 1854, he had already contacted the Khedive and obtained the Concession for the Canal from him The Concession said. "Our friend De Lesseps has drawn our attention to the benefits which will accrue to Egypt by joining the Mediterranean and the Red Sea by a waterway for the passage of ships He informed us of the possibility of forming a company for this purpose to comprise the investors of capital. We have approved the idea and have authorised him

to form and to operate a company for the digging of the Suez Canal and to exploit it between the two seas."

This was in 1854. In 1856, a hundred years ago, a Firman was issued whereby the company was formed Egypt got 44 per cent of the shares and bound herself with certain obligations to De Lesseps The De Lesseps company is a private company! It has nothing to do with governments, domination, occupation or imperialism! De Lesseps told the Khedive, "I am your friend, I have come to benefit you and to dig a canal between the two seas for your advantage "

The Suez Canal Company was formed, and Egypt got 44 per cent of the shares Egypt undertook to supply labour to dig the Canal by corvee, of whom 120,000 died without getting paid We also paid De Lesseps in order that he might give up some concession. We gave up the 15 per cent of the profits which we were supposed to get over and above the profits of our 44 per cent of the shares Thus, contrary to the statements made by De Lesseps to the Khedive in which he said that the Canal was dug for Egypt, Egypt has become the property of the Canal.

Article 16 of the agreement concluded on February 22, 1866, stipulated that in view of the fact that the Suez Canal Company is an Egyptian company, it is subject to the country's laws. [But it has been] subject neither to the country's laws nor its regulations. It considers itself a state within a state. The disputes which arise between Egypt and the Company or between individuals of any nationality are to come before Egyptian courts in accordance with the regulations set forth by the laws of the country Egyptian courts are competent in giving their verdict with regard to disputes which may come up between the Egyptian government and the company according to Egyptian laws

The result of the words of De Lesseps in 1856, the result of friendship and loans, was the occupation of Egypt in 1882

Egypt then borrowed money What happened? Egypt was obliged, during the reign of Ismail, to sell its 44 per cent of the shares in the company. Immediately, England sent out to purchase the shares It bought them for 4 million pounds. Then, Ismail gave up his 5 per cent of the company's profits against the ceding of some concessions by the Company which were granted to it.

Then Ismail was obliged to pay to Britain the 5 per cent profit which he had relinquished This amounted to over 4 million pounds. In other words, Britain got Egypt's 44 per cent of the Company's shares free. This was the history which took place a century ago.

Is history to repeat itself again with treachery and deceit? Will economic independence . . . or economic domination and control be the cause of the destruction of our political independence and freedom?

Brothers, it is impossible that history should repeat itself.

Today, we do not repeat what happened in the past. We are eradicating the traces of the past. We are building our country on strong and sound bases.

Whenever we turn backwards, we aim at the eradication of the past evils which brought about our domination, and the vestiges of the past which took place despite ourselves and which were caused by imperialism through treachery and deceit.

Today, the Suez Canal where 120,000 of our sons had lost their lives in digging it by corvee, and for the foundation of which we paid 8 million pounds, has become a state within the state. It has humiliated ministers and cabinets.

This Canal is an Egyptian canal. It is an Egyptian Joint Stock Company. Britain

has forcibly grabbed our rights, our 44 per cent of its shares Britain still collects the profits of these shares from the time of its inauguration until now All countries and shareholders get their profits. A state within the state, an Egyptian Joint Stock Company.

The income of the Suez Canal Company in 1955 reached 35 million pounds, or 100 million dollars Of this sum, we, who have lost 120,000 persons, who have died in digging the Canal, take only 1 million pounds or 3 million dollars! This is the Suez Canal Company, which, according to the Firman, was dug for the sake of Egypt and its benefit!

Do you know how much assistance America and Britain were going to offer us over five years? 70 million dollars. Do you know who takes the 100 million dollars, the Company's income, every year? They take them of course.

It is no shame that I may be poor and borrow money to build my country It is no shame that I should attempt to get aid for the sake of my country But, it is shameful that I suck peoples' blood and rights

We shall not repeat the past We shall eradicate it by restoring our rights in the Suez Canal This money is ours This Canal is the property of Egypt because it is an Egyptian Joint Stock Company

The Canal was dug by Egypt's sons and 120,000 of them died while working. The Suez Canal Company in Paris is an imposter company It usurped our concessions.

When De Lesseps came over to Egypt, his arrival was the same as Black who came to Egypt to talk with me. The same action.

But history will never repeat itself On the contrary, we shall build the High Dam We shall restore our usurped rights We shall build the High Dam as we want it. We are determined to do it. 35 million pounds the company gets every year; let Egypt take it. 100 million dollars are collected every year by the company which collects them for the benefit of Egypt Let it be so, and Egypt will collect the 100 million dollars for the benefit of Egypt.

Thus, today, citizens, when we build the High Dam, we are actually building the dam to defend our dignity, freedom, and pride, and to eradicate humiliation and submission.

Egypt—the whole of Egypt—one national front—one unified and solid front—announces that it will fight to the last drop of its blood. Everyone of its sons will be like Salah Mustafa and Mustafa Hafez We shall all fight to the last drop of our blood for building our country, for the sake of Egypt. We shall not let war mongers, imperialists or those who trade in human beings dominate us. We shall depend on our hands and on our blood We are rich, but we were careless We shall restore these rights. The battle continues We shall restore these rights step by step We shall realize everything. We shall build a strong and dignified Egypt, the Arab Egypt.

Therefore, I have signed today the following law which has been approved by the Cabinet: [reads text of decree Doc. 18]

Citizens,

We shall not let imperialists or exploiters dominate us. We shall not let history repeat itself once more. We have gone forward to build a strong Egypt. We go forward towards political and economic independence. We go forward towards national economy for the sake of the whole people. We go forward to work. But,

whenever we look behind, we do so to destroy the traces of the past, the traces of slavery, exploitation and domination.

Today, citizens, rights have been restored to their owners. Our right in the Suez Canal have been restored to us after 100 years

Today, we actually achieve true sovereignty, true dignity and true pride The Suez Canal Company was a state within a state It was an Egyptian Joint Stock Company, relying on imperialism and its stooges.

The Suez Canal was built for the sake of Egypt and for its benefit But is was a source of exploitation and the draining of wealth

As I said a short while ago, it is no shame to be poor and to work for the building of my country. But it is shameful to suck blood They used to suck our blood, our rights and take them.

Today, when we regain our rights, I say in the name of the people of Egypt that we shall defend these rights and shall hold fast We shall sacrifice our lives and our blood in defending them. We shall make up for the past.

Today, when we build the edifice of our dignity, freedom and pride, we feel that it will not be completely sound until we eradicate domination, humiliation and submission The Suez Canal constituted an edifice of humiliation.

Today, citizens, the Suez Canal Company has been nationalized This order has been published in the Official Journal. It has become a matter of fact.

Citizens, today we say our wealth has been restored to us

Citizens. Today, the Suez Canal income is estimated at 35 million pounds or 100 million dollars per annum or 500 million dollars in five years. We shall not seek the 70 million dollar American aid.

Today, fellow-countrymen, by our sweat, our tears, the souls of our martyrs and the skulls of those who died in 1856, a hundred years ago during the corvee, we are able to develop this country We shall work, produce and step up production despite all these intrigues and these talks. Whenever I hear talk from Washington, I shall say, "Die of your fury "

We shall build up industry in Egypt and compete with them They do not want us to become an industrial country so that they can promote the sale of their products and market them in Egypt I never saw any American aid directed towards industrialization as this would cause us to compete with them. American aid is everywhere directed towards exploitation

On entering upon the fifth anniversary of the Revolution, as I said at the beginning of my speech, we feel stronger, more resolute and faithful than during the former years

On embarking upon the fifth year of the Revolution, as Farouk was expelled on July 26, 1952, the Suez Canal Company will depart on the very same day. We are conscious of accomplishing glories and achieving true dignity. Sovereignty in Egypt will belong only to her sons.

We shall march forward united . one nation confident in itself, its motherland and its power, one nation relying on itself in work and in the sacred march towards construction, industrialization and creation . one nation . a solid bloc to hold out treason and aggression and resist imperialism and agents of imperialism.

In this manner, we shall accomplish much and feel dignity and pride and feel

that we are building up our country to suit ourselves . . . We build what we want and do what we want with nobody to account to

When we obtain our usurped and stolen rights, we shall turn towards strength. We shall become stronger each year, and, God willing, next year we shall become more powerful with increased production, work and factories

Now, while I am speaking to you, fellow countrymen, brothers of yours are taking over the administration and the management of the Canal Company, the Egyptian Canal Company not the foreign Canal Company They are taking over the Canal Company and its facilities for the direction of navigation in the Canal, the Canal which is situated in the territory of Egypt, cuts through the territory of Egypt, is a part of Egypt and belongs to Egypt. We now perform this task to compensate for the past and build up new edifices for pride and dignity.

May God guide you and peace be with you.

SECTION 2

The Suez Crisis: World Reaction

20 | From Address to the Security Council: Abba Eban

October 30, 1956

The objective of the security measures which the Israel defense forces have felt bound to take in the Sinai Peninsula is the exercise of our country's inherent right of self-defense. The object of these operations is to eliminate the Egyptian Fedayeen bases from which armed Egyptian units, under the special care and authority of Colonel Nasser, invade Israel's territory for the purposes of murder, sabotage and the creation of permanent insecurity to peaceful life. World opinion is naturally asking itself what these Fedayeen units are; what their activities imply for Israel's security, whether their actions in the past and their plans for the future are really full of peril for Israel; and whether this peril is so acute that Israel may reasonably regard its elimination a primary condition of its security and indeed of its existence

The Government of Israel is the representative of a people endowed with a mature understanding of international facts We are not unaware of the limitations of our strength. We fully understand how certain measures might at first sight evoke a lack of comprehension, even in friendly minds. Being a democracy, we work under the natural restraints of a public opinion which might compel us to weigh drastic choices with care and without undue precipitation. It is therefore a Government which governs its actions by a single exclusive aim to insure life and security and opportunities for self-development for the people whom it represents while also safeguarding the honor and trust of millions linked to it by the strongest ties of fraternity. In recent days and months the Government of Israel has had to face a tormenting question: Do its obligations under the United Nations Charter require us to resign ourselves to the existence of uninterrupted activity to the South and North and East of our country, of armed units practising open warfare against us and working from their bases in the Sinai Peninsula and elsewhere for the maintenance of carefully regulated invasions of our home, our lands and our very lives? On the other hand, are we acting with an inherent right of self-defense when, having found no other remedy for over two years, we cross the frontier against those who

have no scruple or hesitation in crossing the frontier against us? Members of the Security Council may be in a better position to evaluate this choice and to identify themselves with this situation if they hear something about the Fedayeen movement, of its place in the total pattern of Egyptian belligerency, of its extension under Egyptian direction, to other Arab countries falling under Nasser's sway, and of what would happen if we made no attempt at this time to resist that movement in its drive towards total conflict.

The system of waging war against Israel by Fedayeen is the product of Colonel Nasser's mind It is one of his contributions to the international life and morality of our times. After intensive preparations during the Spring and Summer of 1955, this new weapon was launched in August of that year, breaking a period of relative tranquillity on the Egyptian front, and indeed coming at a time when Egypt and Israel were engaged in hopeful negotiations with the United Nations Chief of Staff, looking towards integral implementation of the 1949 Armistice Agreement The Government of Egypt made no secret of these activities or of its responsibility for them. It might be convenient, to summarize some of the effects of these actions, if I were to tell the Security Council the entire toll of violence and murder inflicted upon Israel by this phase of Egyptian belligerency During the six years during which this belligerency has operated in violation of the Armistice Agreement, there have occurred 1,843 cases of armed robbery and theft, 1,339 cases of armed clashes with Egyptian armed forces, 435 cases of incursions from Egyptian-controlled territory, 172 cases of sabotage perpetrated by Egyptian military units and Fedayeen in Israel As a result of these actions of Egyptian hostility within Israel 364 Israelis were wounded and 101 killed. In 1956 alone, as a result of this aspect of Egyptian aggression, 28 Israelis were killed and 127 were wounded.

It cannot be seriously suggested that these activities are not the direct responsibility of the Government of Egypt In recent months it has become apparent to us that the Arab Governments, and especially Egypt, have come to regard the Fedayeen weapon as an instrument not for mere harrassment but for Israel's destruction The Commander-in-Chief himself, Colonel Nasser, defined their mission on May 28 when he said·

> The Fedayeen, the Palestine army, which started as a small force of 1,000 men last year, is today greater in number and in training and equipment. I believe in the strength, the ability, the loyalty and the courage of this army. Its soldiers will be responsible for taking revenge for their homeland and people.

On June 19, Colonel Nasser declared, in the context of this Fedayeen movement.

> We are obliged to be strong in order to liberate the entire Arab land from Morocco to Baghdad and in order to retrieve the rights of Palestine's people.

Having concerted his military plans with Syria and Saudi Arabia, the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian army, General Abdel Hakim Amer, spoke as follows:

> Now that the hour is approaching, I, and the members of the Revolutionary Council will be in the front line of battle. In this battle our enemies will be

> convinced of their weakness, and the victories will be yours and that of all the Arab states.

A little later, the same Commander-in-Chief said:

> The Israeli danger no longer exists. Egypt has enough strength to wipe Israel off the map.

The Security Council will observe that this was merely the spearhead of Egyptian belligerency. It was a new device for making war, and for making it with safety. The doctrine was that of unilateral belligerency The Egyptian-Israeli frontier is to be a one-way street; it is to be wide open for these armed Egyptian units to penetrate as deeply as possible into Israel as they like, to accomplish their mission and then return. It is to be closed in their favor against any defensive response

I have spoken of these penetrations into Israel by armed units under the responsibility and control of Colonel Nasser. No one ever called a session of the Security Council to condemn these penetrations or to call for their withdrawal, or to threaten Egypt with the consequences of non-compliance Can Israel be required to reconcile itself with a situation in which any Arab country which chooses to send units into Israel to murder its population, to plunder and destroy, should be able to rely upon a large measure of international apathy?

It is one thing to present resolutions for protecting the Fedayeen against the risks that they might not be safe in their abode It is a fact that there have never been any resolutions adopted by the Security Council designed specifically to protect the Israel civilian population against the encroachments and the depradations of the Fedayeen units The people of Israel are not able to understand the meaning of this distinction They do not know why the shelter of the Charter should not be spread over innocent workers tilling their fields, over women in their homes, over children in the sacred hour of religious observance who were mowed down and killed by Fedayeen encroachments, and why this protection should only apply to those who, across the frontier, organize these penetrations for death and destruction. Would it not be a paradox if these Fedayeen units, the greatest plague to security in the Middle East, were to become inadvertently, the beneficiaries of international protection?

In discussing the Suez Canal case on a previous occasion, I referred to this paradox of unilateral belligerency I ask leave to recall what I said in that context:

> At the root of these tensions lie a theory and practice of belligerency. Egypt considers and proclaims that there is a state of war. In the name of that state of war Egypt asserts a right to perform hostile acts of its own choice against Israel. On the other hand, Egypt claims from the United Nations immunity from any response emanating from Israel. This is the doctrine of unilateral belligerency, and it has no parallel or precedent in the jurisprudence of nations.

The Government of Israel has had ample reason to fear that this activity was to be renewed on a scale unprecedented even during the first wave of Fedayeen invasions in August 1955, or during its recrudescence in the Spring of 1956. Following the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in Amman, we had

stronger reason than ever before to believe that this recrudescence would take place. We duly gave this information to many Governments concerned with the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East The very day after we gave notice of this apprehension, the Fedayeen units began to arrive. Three of these units entered our territory on Sunday (October 21), two of them being captured, the other retreating to one of their bases in the Sinai Peninsula

From a study of official Arab sources it is quite clear that again there was to be a refreshing candor about the renewal of this assault. Here is one official Arab broadcast on October 16, 1956, at 1630 hours·

> The Fedayeen Headquarters in Gaza has issued a communique stating that a group of Fedayeen succeeded on October 13 to cross the southern border of Palestine in order to discover the concentration points and the factories which the Zionists have started to transfer to the coastal region so as to get them out of the firing-range of Egyptian guns which threaten to destroy them. The communique of Fedayeen Headquarters in Gaza states also that all the Fedayeen returned safely to their bases, except two who are believed to have been killed in an encounter which took place between them and the guards of Prime Minister Ben Gurion's home at Sde Boker. Further, it is believed that two other Fedayeen have been wounded and taken to a hospital in Rehovoth. The fifth of the Fedayeen has not yet returned from his mission in occupied Palestine.

This was a broadcast heard in Damascus, giving the text of the communique issued from Fedayeen Headquarters in Gaza.

In these circumstances, both the position and the attitude of the Israel Government are clear. The attitude is based on our fundamental concept of reciprocity. If the frontier between Egypt and Israel is to protect Egyptian territory against Israeli entry, then it must protect Israel territory against Egyptian entry. We hold as a self-evident truth that the lives of Israeli men, women and children are not less worthy of international protection or less sacrosanct than the lives of these hired Fedayeen gangs which are the main instrument of Nasserism in its assault upon the peace and the decencies of Middle Eastern life.

Behind these incidents, grave as they are, we discern issues of even greater moment. World opinion must choose between two candidates for its confidence: on the one hand, farmers and workers, the men, women and children of Israel; on the other hand, these fanatic warriors of the Fedayeen groups Behind this confrontation, there stands the broader alignment between Israel and Nasser. A small people builds its society and culture in its renascent homeland In the early days of its independence it is set on by the armed might of all its neighbors, who attempt to wipe it off the face of the earth.

My memory tells me that it took something like eight weeks for the Security Council to secure the withdrawal of Egyptian and other Arab armies from the sovereign soil of Israel. The effort to secure that withdrawal was, perhaps, not marked by a sufficient urgency or zeal. In the following years of the conflict, Israel's neighbors have continued to assault her with warlike acts of their own choice, to attempt her destruction by armed intervention, by blockade and boycott. They send armed units into her territory to murder and plunder. They strive by

every means to ensure that nowhere in Israel shall there be tranquillity for peaceful pursuit They blare forth the most violent threats for Israel's destruction They accumulate vast armaments for bringing that result about They announce, as they did last week from Cairo, that it is they who will choose the time and the place for the final assault, and that it is for us to wait passively for that selection. They proclaim that a state of war with Israel already exists They seize the greatest of the world's international waterways and convert it into an instrument for unilateral national pressure, while maintaining a constant violation of international maritime law.

Across Africa and Asia, wherever Nasserism spreads its baneful influence, it works actively to subvert all peace and progress to establish an ambitious and insatiable hegemony. Now, having considered that it has humbled the international community and maritime Powers, Nasser's action returns to his first target—Israel—which is to be swamped from three sides with a new wave of Fedayeen violence Accordingly, while studying with attention all proposals for strengthening security in the Middle East, we reject with vehement indignation the charge of aggression launched against us. There is aggression, there is belligerency in the Middle East; but we are its victims and not its authors. That is what I mean when I say that world opinion must decide whom to trust. Shall it be a small, free people establishing its homeland in peace and constructive progress, or shall it be the dictatorship which has bullied and blustered and blackmailed its way across the international life of our times, threatening peace in many continents, openly avowing belligerency, placing its fist on the jugular vein of the world's communications, bringing the Middle East and the world ever nearer to the precipice of conflict; intimidating all those who stand in its path—all except one people, at least, which will not be intimidated, one people which no dictator in history has even intimidated, a people which has risen up against all the tyrants of history, a people which knows that the appeasement of despots yields nothing but an uneasy respite and that a Government which allowed its citizens to be murdered daily in their homes would lose the essential justification for which Governments are instituted among men.

This is the background, and these are the issues which have guided my Government's choice. We have faced them alone, and we made a decision to invoke for this purpose, and no other, our sovereign right of self-defense. Israel is not out to conquer any new territory, but is determined to wipe out the bases in the Sinai wilderness from which murder and death and destruction are launched against it.

We believe, as we have always believed, in our destiny of peace, and for that we are ready now, but it must be a real peace—peace by agreement, peace without boycott or blockade, peace without murdering Fedayeen gangs—peace, in short, within a framework of a reciprocal regard for the ideals and principles of the United Nations Charter. . . .

21 Letter and Statement to the Security Council: United States

October 30, 1956

UNITED STATES LETTER

The Government of the United States has received information to the effect that in violation of the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt, the armed forces of Israel have penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory. This military action commenced Oct. 29 and is continuing in the Sinai area. This situation makes imperative an immediate meeting of the Security Council, charged as it is with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security as well as responsibility for the observance of the Armistice Agreement

I have the honor, therefore, in behalf of my Government to request to convene a meeting of the Security Council as soon as possible to consider "The Palestine Question Steps for the immediate cessation of the military action of Israel in Egypt."

STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES

The United Nations has requested this urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider steps to be taken to bring about the immediate cessation of military action by Israel against Egypt The Security Council has been meeting on the Palestine question within the last few days and repeatedly in recent months to consider actions which the Council unanimously believed constituted a grave danger, and I am therefore sure that there can be no question about the adoption of the agenda.

I therefore request the president to put to the vote the question of the adoption of the agenda, which I am certain each member of the Council will consider appropriate in these grave circumstances, and I am sure that the Council will act with the same unanimity now with which it has acted on the Palestine question in numerous recent meetings. After the adoption of the agenda, I would appreciate the opportunity to speak immediately on the substance of the question.

[The agenda was then adopted]

We have asked for this urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the critical developments which have occurred and which are unfortunately still continuing in the Sinai Peninsula as the result of Israel's invasion of that area yesterday

It comes as a shock to the United States Government that this action should have occurred less than twenty-four hours after President Eisenhower had sent a second earnest personal appeal to the Prime Minister [David Ben-Gurion] of Israel urging Israel not to undertake any action against its Arab neighbors, and

pointing out that we had no reason to believe that those neighbors had taken any steps justifying Israel's action of mobilization.

Certain things are clear. The first is that, by their own admission, Israeli armed forces moved into Sinai in force "to eliminate the Egyptian Fedayeen bases in the Sinai Peninsula" They have admitted the capture of Quseima and Ras el Naqb. Second, reliable reports have placed Israeli armed forces near the Suez Canal Third, Israel has announced that both the Egyptian and Israeli armed forces were in action in the desert battle.

An official announcement in Tel Aviv stated that Egyptian fighter planes strafed Israeli troops We have a report that President [Gamal Abdel] Nasser has called for full mobilization in Egypt today and that the Egyptian Army claims that it has halted the advance of major Israeli forces driving across the Sinai Peninsula The Secretary General [Dag Hammarskjold] may receive more information from General [E L. M. Burns] and the Truce Supervision Organization, and I am sure that we shall continue to be fully informed as we proceed with our deliberations here.

These events make the necessity for the urgent consideration of this item all too plain Failure by the Council to react at this time would be a clear avoidance of its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The United Nations has a clear and unchallengeable responsibility for the maintenance of the Armistice Agreements.

The Government of the United States feels that it is imperative that the Council act in the promptest manner to determine that a breach of the peace has occurred, to order that the military actions undertaken by Israel cease immediately, and to make clear its view that the Israeli armed forces should be immediately withdrawn behind the established armistice lines Nothing else will suffice.

It is also to be noted that the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization [General Burns] has already issued a cease-fire order on his own authority which Israel has so far ignored. Information has reached us also that military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization have been prevented by Israeli authorities from performing their duties

We, as members of the Council, accordingly should call upon all members of the United Nations to render prompt assistance in achieving a withdrawal of Israeli forces All members, specifically, should refrain from giving any assistance which might continue or prolong the hostilities. No one, certainly, should take advantage of this situation for any selfish interest Each of us here, and every member of the United Nations, has a clear-cut responsibility to see that the peace and stability of the Palestine area is restored forthwith. Anything less is an invitation to disaster in this part of the world.

This is an immediate responsibility which derives from the Council's obligations under its cease-fire orders and the Armistice Agreements between the Israelis and the Arab states endorsed by this Security Council It derives, also, of course, from the larger responsibility under the United Nations Charter

On behalf of the United States Government, I give notice that I intend at the afternoon meeting to introduce a draft resolution whereby the Council will call upon Israel to withdraw and will indicate such steps as will assure that it does.

22 From Address to the Security Council: Sir Pierson Dixon

October 31, 1956

I should like at the outset to associate myself with the expression of regard for the Secretary General which have been voiced by various members of the Council We have the highest regard for the integrity and impartiality of Mr Hammarskjold

As members of the Council will be aware, since our meeting yesterday evening it has been announced that the Egyptian Government regrettably has rejected the communication from Her Majesty's Government and from the French Government dated 30 October, and as a consequence Her Majesty's Government and the French Government have intervened in accordance with that communication

I should like to say at once that I have informed myself on the true nature of the press and agency reports which have been quoted around this table in regard to military operations I am authorized to say that the action which is being taken is strictly limited to military targets, primarily air-fields, and I would draw attention to the fact that the civilian population was warned to keep clear of such targets before the operations started.

This intervention, as I hope to show in the course of my remarks, has as its overriding purposes the safeguarding of the Suez Canal and the restoration of peaceful conditions in the Middle East

It is one facet of a highly complex and dangerous situation and it cannot therefore be considered, as the Egyptian representative in his letter contained in Document S/3712 invites us to do, as a separate and isolated development

I do not, of course, for one moment accept the implications and insinuations in that letter. But in so far as this matter relates to an aspect, and a troubling aspect, of the general situation, naturally I am ready to discuss it.

The Soviet representative told us yesterday, and he has repeated it again today, that this intervention was part of a long-prepared plot hatched by the British, French and Israeli Governments, designed to stir up trouble in the Middle East in order to restore old colonial empires, or words to that effect.

I think nobody will take this very seriously. I think we can all understand why the representative of the Soviet Union would wish to invent such stories in view of his own country's troubles in East Europe.

I need only make this simple point It is common knowledge that over the past few months our relations with Israel have been very difficult and even strained. And why? Because of the strenuous efforts made by Her Majesty's Government to reduce the tensions around its borders.

Indeed, my colleagues will recollect that it was only a few days ago that the representative of Israel had some sharp words to say about the sympathy I had expressed for Jordan

We have also heard the argument that, since the Government of Israel has agreed

to keep its troops ten miles away from the Suez Canal, no threat to the canal now exists and the Anglo-French intervention is no longer justified

But I must point out that the Israel Government accepted the terms of the communications of the United Kingdom and French Governments on the assumption that the Egyptian response would be positive. But, as we know, the Egyptian response was unfortunately negative.

From all the information at our disposal, and we can claim, I think, to be reasonably well informed about affairs in the Middle East, we judged that the danger of a major clash between Israel and its Arab neighbors had become more imminent than at any time since the signing of the armistice agreements.

I am not, of course, in a position to reveal the full evidence, and I must ask my colleagues to accept that this judgment was well founded It was in the light of this weighty judgment that Her Majesty's Government and the French Government took the grave decision that their immediate intervention was required to safeguard the Suez Canal and prevent a disastrous conflagration which might spread.

Whether or not our intervention will extinguish the conflict as it is intended to do, is not dependent on us alone. It depends very much on the understanding support of those members of the international community who are also concerned to see peace and order restored in the Middle East.

As there has regrettably been a considerable misunderstanding of the policies of Her Majesty's Government and the French Government in this matter, may I once again formulate what are the objectives behind our intervention. They are, in the first place, to stop all warlike action on land, sea and air as soon as possible; secondly, to enforce a separation of the belligerents; and thirdly, to protect the Suez Canal for the free passage of ships of all nations.

Any prolonged fighting along the banks of the [Suez] Canal would seriously endanger the lives and shipping of many nations of the world. Great Britain and France are the main users of this canal, and our vital interests would be endangered if free passage were interrupted I need not go far back into the past, but I should like to recall that the circumstances in which the canal was seized were circumstances in which violence and resort to illegal methods were employed.

We have a right to defend these vital interests, and we believe, moreover, that in so doing we are also defending the interests of all nations, and there are many, whose economies depend on this great international right-of-way.

But although we have acted to protect our vital interests and those of other nations in this international waterway, our other purpose, as I have made abundantly clear, has been, and remains, to prevent an armed clash between Israel and Egypt leading to a general conflagration.

Our intervention is a temporary measure which we were obliged to take in the absence of any effective collective machinery for restoring peace and order in a matter of such extreme emergency.

Moreover, it is our firm intention to insure that the Israel forces now in the neighborhood of the canal should be withdrawn as soon as possible from Egyptian territory.

Let me state also with emphasis that we do not and could not condone any Israel action aimed at the occupation of positions in Egyptian territory. Let there be no misunderstanding about this. It is our view that Israel should withdraw its forces from their present positions as soon as this can be satisfactorily arranged. As I

stated yesterday, we have no hesitation in regarding Israel's incursion across the Egyptian border as a violation of the armistice agreement

In the misleading version of events contained in the letter from the delegation of Egypt now before us, and in the statement made this afternoon by the representative of Egypt, my Government and the French Government are accused of committing an act of aggression

This is a very serious charge to make in the Security Council, bearing in mind the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter We strongly deny such charges and do not think it will be profitable for the Council to discuss them What does constitute and what does not constitute an act of aggression is, as we all know, a matter of debate

But the matter which the Council should consider today and on which we ask for the Council's understanding support is a temporary intervention by the two Governments that are in a position to restore peace and order effectively and speedily in an area of the world where a major conflagration threatens us. Our intervention is not aimed at the sovereignty of Egypt, still less at the territorial integrity of Egypt

23 Address to the Security Council
Louis de Guiringaud

October 31, 1956

I shall now speak as representative of France It is with regret that the French delegation found itself compelled last night to oppose the adoption of the draft resolutions submitted to the Council. If we did this, it was because we thought that in the present case the Council could not only confine itself merely to the consideration of only one aspect of the problem, and that in our view it was necessary for us to take account of all the elements involved in the situation.

The French Government considered that the tension in the Middle East had become gradually so serious that it was no longer possible not to view the situation as a whole and in every aspect and to act accordingly

We were confronted with an attack carried out by Israel forces in the Suez Canal Zone and in the direction of the Canal. We had every reason to believe that the military developments might go so far as to hinder free transit through the canal The latest news received from Egypt, which referred to the positions of the Israel troops, show how well founded our apprehensions were.

Experience has also taught us that, whatever the moral weight of the Council's decisions, unfortunately, in that part of the world, they had little practical effect, as the United Kingdom representative pointed out yesterday, for lack of force to implement them.

The French and British Governments considered, therefore, that a serious threat existed against the Suez Canal and that if rapid, effective and decisive action were not undertaken immediately, we were running the risk of seriously jeopardizing

traffic through the Canal for an indefinite period of time. Now, free navigation through the Suez Canal is of vital importance to most countries of the world.

The French and British Governments considered it their duty to take all necessary measures, even if these measures would be misunderstood at first by some of their friends, in order to guarantee and prevent any impairment of freedom of navigation through the Canal The French Government considered that the attack carried out by the Israel forces was only an episode in the permanent state of hostilities which exists between Egypt and the state of Israel It seemed to us that the time had come to take measures likely to prevent any repetition of these incidents.

These are the reasons underlying the action taken by the French Government in the Suez Canal area In our view, this action is designed to assure an immediate settlement of the current incidents and to make it possible to find a solution very quickly which would be likely to eliminate the threats to the Canal

The French Government would stress the temporary nature of the presence of its troops in the Canal Zone and would stress also the fact that it in no way intends to infringe upon Egyptian sovereignty

Like the United Kingdom Government, the French Government cannot accept the accusations that it has acted counter to the principles of the Charter The decision was taken only with the desire to insure as effectively as possible the restoration of order in the Canal Zone before it was too late

In these circumstances the French Government is convinced that the purposes which it pursues are the same as those of the majority of members of the Council which we wish to reach, and we ask them to understand the motives which inspired it and to assist it in carrying out the action which, in agreement with the Government of the United Kingdom, the French Government has undertaken in the interests of the international community.

24 | Address to the Security Council: Arkady A. Sobolev

October 31, 1956

May I begin by stating that the Soviet delegation trusts the Secretary General of the United Nations and supports him.

The situation in the Near East has grown sharply worse since yesterday's meeting of the Security Council. According to information just received, an invasion has begun—an invasion of joint United Kingdom—French troops in Egypt. Thus the Governments of the United Kingdom and France, from the threat of armed intervention in the Near East, have proceeded to the implementation of their proclaimed plan of occupation of the Suez Canal Zone

The Soviet delegation expresses its deep sympathy with the people and Government of Egypt confronted with a severe ordeal We have no doubt that the people

of Egypt, which has gone through many trials, in this difficult hour as well will be able to defend its independence and freedom against any attacks from without.

The acts of the United Kingdom and France, which have committed aggression against Egypt, constitute a crude violation of their obligations assumed under the United Nations Charter. The Charter requires members of the United Nations to refrain from the threat of the use of force or the use of force in their relations with other states. France and the United Kingdom, in their acts against Egypt, not only threatened to use force but, at the present time, are carrying out aerial bombardments of Egyptian towns and landing their armed forces on the territory of Egypt, a member of the United Nations. That is to say, in violation of the United Nations Charter they are using force

The responsibility of the Governments of the United Kingdom and France for the extremely dangerous situation created by their acts in the Near East is aggravated by the fact that they did not allow the Security Council to carry out its functions in connection with the maintenance of international peace as defined by the Charter.

The Governments of the United Kingdom and France have assumed the heavy responsibility for a serious aggravation of the international situation, committing armed intervention against Egypt at a time when Egypt was repelling Israel aggression. Attention has already been called to the fact that Israel aggression and the aggression of the United Kingdom and France against Egypt is being carried out according to a single plan prepared in advance. The Israel aggression was calculated to create conditions facilitating the seizure by United Kingdom and French forces of the Suez Canal.

The Governments of the United Kingdom and France are attempting to justify their acts by the statement that they are taking the Suez Canal under their protection and insuring freedom of transit through the canal. However, it is quite clear that this artificial justification is designed only to cover up the aggressive acts of the United Kingdom and France against Egypt.

Indeed, on the one hand, Israel aggression is instigated against Egypt and, on the other hand, the United Kingdom and France are striking a blow against the victim of that aggression, which is Egypt

If the United Kingdom and France really wanted a just settlement of the Suez question, they have at their disposal other, peaceful ways and means. As is known, the Security Council in the past considered the question of the Suez Canal and prepared a plan for the settlement of the Suez question by peaceful means.

Under that plan, it would have been possible to secure a settlement of the Suez question which would have corresponded both to the national interests of the sovereign Egyptian state and to the interests of the users of the canal

However, such a method was not to the liking of the United Kingdom and France. They preferred a forcible solution of this question, and precisely for that purpose they utilized Israel aggression against the Egyptian state.

The representatives of the United Kingdom and France here attempted to justify the aggressive acts by stating that the United Kingdom and France were attempting to put an end to combat and restore peace and quiet in the area. However, the behavior of the United Kingdom and France testifies to the contrary.

At the moment when the Security Council was considering the question of Israel aggression against Egypt and was attempting to find ways and means to reach a

peaceful settlement of the conflict, the United Kingdom and France—bypassing the Security Council and violating the standards of international law and the principles of the United Nations—issued a crude ultimatum

This ultimatum, incompatible with the dignity of a sovereign state, had the purpose of serving as a pretext for the seizure of the Suez Canal by United Kingdom and French troops. In that ultimatum the United Kingdom and France demanded that Egypt withdraw Egyptian troops ten miles from the Suez Canal.

In issuing such an ultimatum, the United Kingdom and France are, on the one hand, attempting to force Egypt to hand over to the Israel troops territory to the east of the Suez Canal and, on the other hand, demanding—in violation of all agreements—that Egypt give up its protection of the Suez Canal

Thus the United Kingdom and France are acting like colonialists used to dictating their will to the peoples of the past. But the time of the domination of this area by colonialists has long since passed. This action can only cause regret on the part of all peace-loving peoples in the world.

The action of the United Kingdom and French Governments constitute a crude violation of the United Nations Charter and of the dignity and sovereign rights of the Egyptian state. It constitutes a denial of the inalienable right of peoples to independence and freedom.

The Security Council cannot remain idle in the face of such a complicated situation. It must adopt immediate measures to put an end to the aggression against the Egyptian state and to restore peace and calm to that area of the world.

Concerned by the situation in the Near East, the Soviet Union delegation considers it necessary for the Security Council to condemn the aggressive acts of the United Kingdom and France, acts which have taken the form of bombing populated Egyptian territory and landing United Kingdom and French forces in Egypt.

We think that the Security Council should request the Governments of the United Kingdom and France immediately to withdraw their armed forces from Egyptian territory. If necessary, the Soviet Union delegation is prepared to submit an appropriate draft resolution to the Security Council.

The Security Council, which bears the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, cannot remain aloof; it must fulfill its direct and immediate responsibility. The peoples all over the world are waiting for the Security Council's decision.

25 | Address to the Security Council: Nasrollah Entezam

November 1, 1956

The only excuse they [Britain and France] had found for their act was a reference to the threats existing at present in the Middle East, and in particular in the Suez Canal area.

But where did those threats come from? If it was Egypt that had created a

menacing situation, then, sir, may I ask, why did not your countries come before the Security Council and explain their case and seek a solution?

Then it would have been for Egypt to find an excuse to explain why she had sent troops and state the views it held in respect of the situation and justify the action it had undertaken. However, I believe that an excuse of that kind, coming from those who had themselves sent troops, is completely unjustified.

The second excuse that might have been invoked was that a threatening situation existed in the canal zone because of the aggressive action undertaken by one state. In that case, what did your countries do to stop that aggression? Your countries, sir, opposed the draft resolution that was submitted yesterday. Today, instead of punishing aggression, you have attacked the victim of that aggression How could it be possible for your countries to find some excuse before world opinion?

My delegation stands for a peaceful settlement of these issues in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, avoiding all armed intervention and respecting the sovereignty of states None of that has been done No heed has been paid to those principles The council must not simply listen to speeches, but must find practical means to bring an end to this unwarranted attack

26 Address to the General Assembly: Omar Loutfi

November 1, 1956

Mr. President:

I sincerely thank the members of the Security Council who yesterday voted in favor of the draft resolution presented by the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia and likewise the member states which were kind enough to advise the Secretary General that they supported that resolution and who today voted in favor of the inclusion of this matter in the agenda.

They have given me the opportunity to address the General Assembly—this world forum—in the cruel ordeal through which my country is now passing.

You are fully alive to the question, I am sure, gentlemen I shall be brief. As I told the Security Council, this is not the time for oration My country has been subjected to bloody aggression. The shedding of blood which is the consequence of aggression is proceeding apace.

During the night of Oct 30 Israel committed the most heinous unprovoked armed aggression since the conclusion of the armistice agreement. This was no mere reprisal raid It was a premeditated, carefully prepared, armed attack whose purpose it is to occupy part of Egyptian territory so as to provoke war in this part of the world

During the day of Oct. 30, 1956, a note from the United Kingdom Government was handed to the Egyptian Ambassador in London. An ultimatum was served

upon the Egyptian Government, asking it to cease all hostilities on land, at sea and in the air, to withdraw all Egyptian armed forces ten miles from the Suez Canal, to accept the occupation of part of Egyptian territory by French and British armed forces, especially the towns of Ismailia, Port Said and Suez.

The ultimatum required an answer before 6:30 Cairo time, October 31, in the absence of which the Governments of the United Kingdom and France would intervene to the extent which they would judge necessary in order to obtain satisfaction of their demands.

Since that time, Anglo-French aviation based on Cyprus against the will of the inhabitants of that island have bombarded Egypt A number of raids took place yesterday, especially against the city of Cairo According to information at my disposal the three raids carried out yesterday by British and French jet bombers at 7 o'clock, 8:25 and 10.25 covered the mosque, the Almaza hospital, a number of Cairo airfields and a number of points near Shubra. Nine human lives were lost.

Throughout last night British and French bombers carried out continuous raids over all Egyptian airfields. French aviation joined with Israeli aircraft in air attacks against Egyptian positions in the Sinai Peninsula. Today twenty-one air raids took place over Egypt, of which nine were in Cairo and the remainder in Ismailia, Port Said and Suez. Installations at Alexandria were destroyed and the number of victims there is not yet known.

Moreover, the Commander-in-Chief of the French-British forces attacking Egypt declared today in Nicosia, Cyprus—and I apologize for quoting him in English—"the bombing will continue until Egypt sees reason. The length of the operation depends on how quickly Egypt accepts our terms. The sooner Egypt sees reason the less damage will accrue. We have considerable strength to deal blows"

This cynical communique calls for no further comment.

Mr. President, Egypt has been subject to combined aggression—premeditated aggression—by Israel, the United Kingdom and France. It is now abundantly clear that the aggressors agreed in advance to perpetrate this act of war to justify the armed aggression which they have committed. The Governments of the United Kingdom and France have presented motives which I find it difficult fairly to describe.

Sir Pierson Dixon said yesterday that he regretted that Egypt had regretted the Anglo-French ultimatum. I am astonished to hear the representative of the United Kingdom say that he expected for one moment that Egypt would accept an ultimatum which asked for the landing against Egypt of Anglo-British forces under conditions where Egypt had been subjected to aggression.

The representative of the United Kingdom said this was designed first of all to safeguard the Suez Canal and restore peaceful conditions in the Middle East.

Now, no danger threatened the Suez Canal prior to the Franco-British intervention. According to our information the aggressors' aircraft sank an Egyptian warship in the canal. This act of war committed by Israel, France and the United Kingdom in the region of the canal is a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and on the other hand it violates the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and the principle of free passage even in time of war, which is guaranteed to all states under the provisions of Article 4 of the Constantinople Convention.

Moreover, who gave the United Kingdom and France the right to intervene in

order to safeguard the canal? The 1888 Convention confers upon Egypt alone the right to take measures for the defense of the canal.

Was there a decision of the United Nations, a decision of the Security Council, which conferred upon the United Kingdom and France the right to resort to force in order, as they allege, to safeguard the canal and insure the freedom of passage and traffic through the canal?

Many other states use the canal No one for a moment thought of using force or joining the Franco-British forces in order to occupy the canal area.

What renders the situation even more bizarre, as stressed by the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia, at the meeting of the Security Council held in the afternoon of Oct. 30 of this year—and I quote—"is that this threat of force is directed in the first instance against the country which is the victim of aggression. Egypt is enjoined to forswear its right of legitimate defense under Article 51 of the charter and Egypt is asked to acquiesce to the occupation of a part of its territory by two foreign powers and a time limit is set in the worst tradition of the policy of ultimatums which we hoped was an obsolete one "

Moreover, Mr. President, the representative of the United Kingdom claimed that one of the objectives of the Franco-British intervention is to put an end as early as possible to any warlike acts on land, at sea and in the air If this were the genuine objective of Franco-British intervention, why is it that the representatives of these two countries exerted the veto right against two resolutions which specifically called for a cessation of hostilities for a cease-fire?

Another point which struck my delegation was an argument by France and the United Kingdom representatives that this was a mere temporary measure. Occupation was a mere temporary measure But history has taught us that the phrase "temporary measure" used by their delegates—used by the representatives of the United Kingdom—is far removed from the ordinary sense of these words.

The occupation of Egypt in 1882 was, according to British leaders at the time, a mere temporary measure It happens to have lasted seventy-four years.

But the ill-faith of the aggressors needs hardly be proved further. It is obvious that the aggressive acts of France and the United Kingdom, which are trying to settle by their own means and in a unilateral manner a question which was before the United Nations, constitutes a most flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter which was utterly unjustified.

We thought that the United Nations Charter had put an end to the reign of force and that the epoch of ultimatums and dictates, which brings to mind sad memories, had come to an end when the United Nations Charter was signed in San Francisco. A resort to force now can only take place in accordance with the principles and provisions of the charter.

France and the United Kingdom, which violated the charter, have assumed a heavy onus of responsibility before the world This act is fraught with incalculable repercussions of which France and the United Kingdom will bear the consequences.

Egypt is being invaded. Its sovereignty is being jeopardized. But one thing comforts us. This is the response to this act of aggression on the part of world public opinion. Two prominent members of the Security Council—the United States of America and the Soviet Union—condemn this resort to force by France and the United Kingdom.

President Eisenhower and the Soviet leaders clearly declared that they were

opposed to the use of force for the settlement of this dispute Numerous other leaders have made similar statements Amongst them the head of the Yugoslav state, Marshal Tito, as well as the Prime Minister of India, Mr Nehru.

I would wish to quote their statements and many others bu. I leave this for the distinguished representatives of the states themselves.

Even in the United Kingdom, members of the opposition party, the Labor party, strongly and vigorously condemn the policy of the British Government. Mr. Gaitskell, the leader of the opposition, stated in a speech yesterday in the House of Commons, and I shall quote him: "All I can say is that in taking this decision, in the view of the Opposition, the Government have committed an act of disastrous folly, whose tragic consequences we shall regret for years "

He went on to say, "I can only say that any impartial observer must recognize that this is a clear breach of the Charter of the United Nations " And he went on to say that "there are millions and millions of British people—as we believe, a majority of the nation—who are deeply shocked by the aggressive policy of the Government and who still believe that it is both wise and right that we should stand by the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the United States alliance."

The implications which are drawn from this are these—that even in the United Kingdom public opinion is far from being at one in approving the policy of the present government.

Mr. President, as I had the honor to tell the Security Council, the Egyptian Government, pending necessary measures by the Security Council and the General Assembly, has no choice but to defend itself and to preserve its rights against this armed unprovoked aggression. And we persevere in that attitude.

This act of war, committed by two members of the Security Council, constitutes a heavy blow to the United Nations Organization, to world peace and to all of mankind. France and the United Kingdom, in exerting their veto rights against resolutions moved in the Security Council, stultified the council's action.

Under the circumstances, the following the adoption of the Yugoslav resolution by the Security Council and in accordance with the provisions of the resolution uniting for peace, it is up to you gentlemen to take the necessary measures in order to prevent and remove threats to peace and to put an end to acts of aggression and breaches of the peace.

It is incumbent on you gentlemen to take grave decisions fraught with heavy consequences for the destiny of our organization and for the principles which govern the world in which we live.

Egypt is defending herself and will continue to do so. The question is in your hands. Condemn the aggressors, gentlemen, put an end to aggression.

27 Statement by Nine Arab Leaders

November 15, 1956

Following an invitation of His Majesty, King Hussein, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a meeting was held in Beirut on the 10th and 11th day of Rabi'al-Thann, 1376, of the Hegira [November 13 and 14, 1956], by His Majesty, King Saud Ibn Abdel Aziz, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; His Excellency, Abdel Fattah Mohammed el-Mughrabi, President of the Sovereignty Council in the Sudan; His Excellency, Shukri al-Kuwatly, President of the Republic of Syria, His Majesty, King Faisal, King of the Kingdom of Iraq, His Excellency, Camille Chamoun, President of the Republic of the Lebanon, His Excellency, Mustafa ben Halim, Premier of Libya on behalf of the King; His Excellency, Abdel Hamid Ghalib, Egyptian Ambassador in Beirut, on behalf of the President of the Republic of Egypt; His Highness, Emir Saif ul-Islam Mohammed al-Badr, Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Yemen, on behalf of the King.

The meeting was held to discuss the position arising from an aggression that had been carried out by Britain, France and Israel against Egypt and the Gaza Strip and also to reach an accord on what should be done to support Egypt in her glorious defense of the safety of her territories and sovereignty

The consideration of the fact that this aggression against Egypt is held to be an aggression directed against all Arab states necessitates the unity of sovereignty and efforts to safeguard joint Arab interests.

The participants have expressed their satisfaction with the measures taken by the General Assembly of the United Nations by virtue of resolutions adopted by an overwhelming majority, Nov. 2, 3 and 7, 1956

They have appreciated the effort made by the peace-loving states that contributed to the adoption of the resolution calling for the cessation of hostilities and an immediate withdrawal of the aggressive forces from the Egyptian territories and their return to behind the armistice lines

The following has been unanimously agreed·

1

The need for the implementation of the previously mentioned resolution of the United Nations should Britain and France refuse to comply with the United Nations resolutions and fail to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from the Egyptian territories

Moreover, should Israel oppose the United Nations resolutions, and fail to withdraw unconditionally her forces to behind the armistice line, and should the attitude of either Britain, France or Israel cause a conspiracy likely to lead to the resumption of hostilities, Britain, France and Israel should be regarded as collectively responsible for collaborating to continue the aggression.

In that event all the states represented at the conference shall act immediately in their own interest and in legal self-defense, in accordance with Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, as well as take effective steps permissible by the utmost capacity in compliance with their commitments under Article 2 of the Arab collective defense agreement.

2

To insure the separation of the Suez Canal question from the circumstances that accompanied the attack on Egypt; to regard this question as being independent and on its own and to promote a solution that would comply with the requisites of Egypt's sovereignty and dignity, namely within the framework of the United Nations, and in negotiations that shall be held with the parties concerned, away from any display of pressure and prejudice and on the basis of the 1888 Convention and the six points laid down by the United Nations on Oct. 16, 1956.

3

To support the demands of the Algerian people in their struggle until the realization of their nationalist aspirations for the attainment of independence and sovereignty

The participants of this conference address true fraternal greetings, their appreciation and admiration to His Excellency, the President of the Republic of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, as well as to the Egyptian armed forces and the people of Egypt for their patriotism and limitless self-sacrifice in the defense of Arab nationalism, the dignity and pride of the Arab people.

28 Address to the Lok Sabha: Jawaharlal Nehru

November 16, 1956

On the 13th September 1956, the last day of the last session of the Lok Sabha, I made a statement in the House about the developments relating to the Suez Canal issue Previous to that, on the 8th August, I had given to the House an account of the developments which followed the action of the Egyptian Government in nationalizing the Suez Canal Company.

Over two months have passed since my last statement on this subject in the Lok Sabba, and much has happened which has been reported in the public press and must be within the knowledge of hon Members The matter was taken up by the Security Council, and there was broad approval of certain basic principles which should govern any agreement in regard to the Suez Canal. It was proposed that the chief parties to the dispute, namely, Egypt, the United Kingdom and France, should meet soon after to discuss this subject further on the basis of those principles.

That meeting did not take place. Instead, on the 29th October, Israel launched

a sudden and premeditated attack on Egypt and large concentrations of Israeli troops made deep penetrations into Egyptian territory. The next day, the Governments of the United Kingdom and France sent an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel to the effect that if they did not stop fighting and withdraw their forces to ten miles on either side of the Suez Canal, British and French forces would intervene to stop the fighting The ultimatum expired on the morning of the 31st October and, soon after, British and French forces commenced aerial bombardment of airfields and military objectives in Cairo and elsewhere in Egypt. This was followed a few days later by landings of airborne troops near Port Said and heavy fighting there.

As the House knows, India had viewed with grave apprehension the policy of the U K and French Governments after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company In particular, the massing of troops and aircraft for the purpose of military operations in Egypt appeared to us to be a reversion to past colonial methods and an attempt to coerce Egypt by show of armed might. Indeed, it was stated by responsible statesmen in the United Kingdom and France that the regime in Egypt must be changed and, in particular, the Head of the State and of the Government of Egypt should be removed We had hoped, however, that after the Security Council resolution, more peaceful methods would be adopted to solve this dispute. The starting of military operations against Egypt by the United Kingdom and France and, more particularly, the bombing of parts of Cairo city and other parts of Egypt came, therefore, as a profound shock not only to people in India but also to large numbers of people in other countries including the United Kingdom This appeared to be a flagrant case of aggression by two strong powers against a weaker country with the purpose of enforcing their will, even to the extent of changing the Government of that country This led to widespread world reactions against the Anglo-French action, and as the Security Council proved ineffective because of the exercise of the veto by the United Kingdom and France, the U N General Assembly, at an emergency session, expressed its disapproval of this action and demanded the stoppage of military operations in Egypt and the withdrawal of the armed forces of Israel, France and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory. An uneasy armistice followed, and it was declared on the part of the United Kingdom, France and Israel that they would withdraw their armed forces, though this was made subject to certain conditions.

These developments gave some hope that peaceful methods would henceforth be employed and I ventured to say a few days ago that the situation had slightly improved Today I am by no means sure that this improvement has taken place There are numerous tendencies which may well lead, unless checked, to a rapid deterioration of the situation and a reversion to warfare If unfortunately military operations begin again, it is possible that they might extend over a much wider area and might even develop into a major war.

Two days ago, the Prime Ministers of Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon and India issued a joint statement which has already been placed on the table of the House That statement gives expression to the views of these Prime Ministers to the recent happenings in Egypt and in Hungary and points out the danger of war inherent in the present grave international situation

In spite of the United Nations General Assembly, sporadic fighting continued and there has been no attempt at withdrawal of forces from Egyptian territory.

It would appear indeed that these forces have established themselves firmly on Egyptian territory and have no present intention of leaving it If these foreign forces continue to remain on Egyptian territory, the situation is likely to deteriorate rapidly and bring the danger of fresh military operations nearer.

The Governments of the United Kingdom and France, though apparently accepting the U N. resolution, have laid down certain conditions which are not consistent with that resolution. The Prime Minister of Israel has continued to insist that he will not evacuate Gaza. If the foreign forces are not wholly removed from Egyptian territory, this will amount to a clear violation of the U. N. resolution.

Meanwhile, India has agreed to send a contingent of her armed forces for the United Nations International Force and this contingent is expected to leave India by air today This United Nations force will not be concerned with the Suez Canal issue as such, which can only be considered separately after peace has been fully established and all foreign forces removed. The main task of the international force is said to be to ensure that Israel remains within the demarcation lines set by the old Armistice Agreement.

The accounts that have appeared in the newspapers have not indicated that the fighting in and around Part Said was severe. We have received some accounts of this fighting and these show that the casualties, chiefly among Egyptian civilians were very heavy, running into many thousands. Conditions in Port Said have been distressing in the extreme. We are taking immediate steps to send a large stock of medicines by special aircraft to Egypt for purposes of relief.

The story of the past three and a half months, ever since the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, is full of tragic drama and events have happened which I would have thought could not possibly occur in this modern age. I find it a little difficult to deal with this record of unabashed aggression and deception. The explanations that have been given from time to time, contradict one another and exhibit an approach which is dangerous to the freedom of Asian and African countries and to world peace itself It has brought misery and disaster, hatred and illwill, with no gain whatever, and, in addition, we live now under the threat of possible world war.

During all the controversies since the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, Egypt has conducted herself with a large measure of propriety and forbearance. Without the least justification, Egypt was attacked not only by Israel but also by the United Kingdom and France Whether there was any previous consultation between the aggressor countries, I do not know. But it is obvious that their plans fitted in, and the Anglo-French attack helped Israel's aggression and was itself helped by it. Egypt, the victim of Israeli aggression, was attacked immediately after by the armed forces of the United Kingdom and France It was only the widespread indignation of peoples not only in Asia and Africa but also in Europe and America and the action taken by the United Nations that put some check on this aggression. But it appears to me that the cease-fire having taken place, there is a tendency to complacency and to allow matters to drift. Indeed, there has even been some attempt made to minimise and justify this utterly unprovoked and brutal attack on Egypt Attention has been diverted to some extent to the grave and distressing occurrences in Hungary.

Even as we were distressed by events in Egypt, we viewed with grave concern

and distress events in Hungary It is possible that what happened in one of these countries produced its reactions in the other and both created a very serious international situation But it is well to remember that though both deserve serious attention, the nature of each differed from the other Neither can be held to justify the other

We are concerned with an attack on freedom anywhere in the world We are concerned also with strong nations dominating, by armed force, weaker countries . .

I am convinced that it is not by war and violence that these problems will be settled or freedom established I am convinced that colonialism, whatever new look it may put on, can revert to its old brutal self and the only remedy is for it to give place to freedom

The world stands facing great danger, and it may be that the little wars we have had, are only a first round and bigger conflicts lie ahead In particular, the ambitions of strong nations imperil weaker countries. The only hope lies in the United Nations, representing the world community, succeeding in putting an end to the law of force and substituting for it a more civilised method of dealing with problems Today, the choice lies between the hydrogen bomb and the Panchsheel

29 Resolutions on the Suez Crisis: United Nations General Assembly

November, 1956

RESOLUTION 997 (ES-I)

The General Assembly,

Noting the disregard on many occasions by parties to the Israel-Arab armistice agreements of 1949 of the terms of such agreements, and that the armed forces of Israel have penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory in violation of the General Armistice agreement between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949,

Noting that armed forces of France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are conducting military operations against Egyptian territory,

Noting that traffic through the Suez Canal is now interrupted to the serious prejudice of many nations,

Expressing its grave concern over these developments,

1. *Urges* as a matter of priority that all parties now involved in hostilities in the area agree to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area;

2. *Urges* the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighboring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements;

3 *Recommends* that all Member States refrain from introducing military goods

in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of the present resolution;

4 *Urges* that, upon the cease-fire being effective, steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation,

5 *Requests* the Secretary-General to observe and report promptly on the compliance with the present resolution to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, for such further action as they may deem appropriate in accordance with the Charter,

6. *Decides* to remain in emergency session pending compliance with the present resolution.

562nd plenary meeting,
2 November 1956

RESOLUTION 998 (ES-I)

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the urgent necessity of facilitating compliance with its resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956,

Requests, as a matter of priority, the Secretary-General to submit to it within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the aforementioned resolution.

563rd plenary meeting,
4 November 1956.

RESOLUTION 999 (ES-I)

The General Assembly,

Noting with regret that not all the parties concerned have yet agreed to comply with the provisions of its resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956,

Noting the special priority given in that resolution to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, to the halting of the movement of military forces and arms into the area,

Noting further that the resolution urged the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighboring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements,

1 *Reaffirms* its resolution 997 (ES-I), and once again calls upon the parties immediately to comply with the provisions of the said resolution

2. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General immediately to arrange with the parties concerned for the implementation of the cease-fire and the halting of the movement of military forces and arms into the area, and requests him to report compliance forthwith and, in any case, not later than twelve hours from the time of adoption of the present resolution;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the Chief of Staff and the members of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, to obtain compliance of the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines;

4. *Decides* to meet again immediately on receipt of the Secretary-General's report referred to in paragraph 2 of the present resolution.

563rd plenary meeting,
4 November 1956.

RESOLUTION 1000 (ES-I)

The General Assembly,

Having requested the Secretary-General, in its resolution 998 (ES-I) of 4 November 1956, to submit to it a plan for an emergency international United Nations Force, for the purposes stated,

Noting with satisfaction the first report of the Secretary-General on the plan, and having in mind particularly paragraph 4 of that report,

1. *Establishes* a United Nations Command for an emergency international Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956;

2. *Appoints,* on an emergency basis, the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, Major-General E L M Burns, as Chief of the Command;

3. *Authorizes* the Chief of the Command immediately to recruit, from the observer corps of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, a limited number of officers who shall be nationals of countries other than those having permanent membership in the Security Council, and further authorizes him, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to undertake the recruitment directly, from various Member States other than the permanent members of the Security Council, of the additional number of officers needed;

4 *Invites* the Secretary-General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

565th plenary meeting,
5 November 1956.

RESOLUTION 1001 (ES-I)

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956 concerning the cease-fire, withdrawal of troops and other matters related to the military operations in Egyptian territory, as well as its resolution 998 (ES-I) of 4 November 1956 concerning the request to the Secretary-General to submit a plan for an emergency international United Nations Force,

Having established by its resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956 a United Nations Command for an emergency international Force, having appointed the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization as Chief of the Command with authorization to him to begin the recruitment of officers for the Command, and having invited the Secretary-General to take the administrative measures necessary for the prompt execution of that resolution,

Noting with appreciation the second and final report of the Secretary-General on the plan for an emergency international United Nations Force as requested in General Assembly resolution 998 (ES-I), and having examined that plan,

1. *Expresses its approval* of the guiding principles for the organization and functioning of the emergency international United Nations Force as expounded in paragraphs 6 to 9 of the Secretary-General's report;

2. *Concurs* in the definition of the functions of the Force as stated in paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's report;

3 *Invites* the Secretary-General to continue discussions with Governments of Member States concerning offers of participation in the Force, toward the objective of its balanced composition;

4 *Requests* the Chief of the Command, in consultation with the Secretary-General as regards size and composition, to proceed forthwith with the full organization of the Force;

5. *Approves provisionally* the basic rule concerning the financing of the Force laid down in paragraph 15 of the Secretary-General's report;

6. *Establishes* an Advisory Committee composed of one representative from each of the following countries; Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway and Pakistan, and requests this Committee, whose Chairman shall be the Secretary-General, to undertake the development of those aspects of the planning for the Force and its operation not already dealt with by the General Assembly and which do not fall within the area of the direct responsibility of the Chief of the Command;

7. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to issue all regulations and instructions which may be essential to the effective functioning of the Force, following consultation with the Committee aforementioned, and to take all other necessary administrative and executive action;

8. *Determines* that, following the fulfilment of the immediate responsibilities defined for it in operative paragraphs 6 and 7 above, the Advisory Committee shall continue to assist the Secretary-General in the responsibilities falling to him under the present and other relevant resolutions;

9. *Decides* that the Advisory Committee, in the performance of its duties, shall be empowered to request, through the usual procedures, the convening of the General Assembly and to report to the Assembly whenever matters arise which, in its opinion, are of such urgency and importance as to require consideration by the General Assembly itself;

10. *Requests* all Member States to afford assistance as necessary to the United Nations Command in the performance of its functions, including arrangements for passage to and from the area involved.

567th plenary meeting,
7 November 1956.

RESOLUTION 1002 (ES-I)

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956, 998 (ES-I) and 999 (ES-I) of 4 November 1956, and 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956, adopted by overwhelming majorities,

Noting in particular that the General Assembly, by its resolution 1000 (ES-I), established a United Nations Command for an emergency international Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of its resolution 997 (ES-I),

1. *Reaffirms* the above-mentioned resolutions;

2 *Calls once again upon* Israel immediately to withdraw all its forces behind the armistice lines established by the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949;

3 *Calls once again upon* the United Kingdom and France immediately to withdraw all their forces from Egyptian territory, consistently with the above-mentioned resolutions;

4 *Urges* the Secretary-General to communicate the present resolution to the parties concerned, and requests him promptly to report to the General Assembly on the compliance with this resolution

567th plenary meeting,
7 November 1956.

RESOLUTION 1003 (ES-I)

The General Assembly,

1. *Decides* to place on the provisional agenda of its eleventh regular session, as a matter of priority, the question on the agenda of its first emergency special session;

2. *Refers* to its eleventh regular session, for consideration, the records of the meetings and the documents of its first emergency special session;

3. *Decides* that, notwithstanding paragraph 1 above, the first emergency special session may continue to consider the question, if necessary, prior to the eleventh regular session of the Assembly

572nd plenary meeting,
10 November 1956

SECTION 3

The Eisenhower Doctrine and Alternatives

30 Broadcast on the Middle East Crisis: Dwight D. Eisenhower

October 31, 1956

My fellow Americans:

Tonight I report to you as your President.

We all realize that the full and free debate of a political campaign surrounds us. But the events and issues I wish to place before you this evening have no connection whatsoever with matters of partisanship. They are concerns of every American—his present and his future.

I wish, therefore, to give you a report of essential facts so that you—whether belonging to either one of our two great parties, or to neither—may give thoughtful and informed consideration to this swiftly changing world scene.

The changes of which I speak have come in two areas of the world—Eastern Europe and the Mideast.

In Eastern Europe there is the dawning of a new day It has not been short or easy in coming.

After World War II the Soviet Union used military force to impose on the nations of Eastern Europe, governments of Soviet choice—servants of Moscow.

It has been consistent United States policy without regard to political party—to seek to end this situation. We have sought to fulfill the wartime pledge of the United Nations that these countries, overrun by wartime armies, would once again know sovereignty and self-government

We could not, of course, carry out this policy by resort to force. Such force would have been contrary both to the best interests of the Eastern European people and to the abiding principles of the United Nations. But we did help to keep alive the hope of these peoples for freedom

Beyond this they needed from us no education in the worth of national independence and personal liberty. For, at the time of the American Revolution, it was many of them who came to our land to aid our cause.

Now, recently the pressure of the will of these peoples for national independence has become more, and more insistent.

A few days ago the people of Poland, with their proud and deathless devotion to freedom, moved to secure a peaceful transition to a new Government And this Government, it seems, will strive genuinely to serve the Polish people.

And more recently, all the world has been watching dramatic events in Hungary, where this brave people, as so often in the past, have offered their very lives for independence from foreign masters.

We cannot yet know if these avowed purposes will be truly carried out.

But two things are clear.

First, the fervor and the sacrifice of the peoples of these countries, in the name of freedom, have themselves brought real promise that the light of liberty soon will shine again in this darkness.

And second, if the Soviet Union indeed faithfully acts upon its announced intention, the world will witness the greatest forward stride toward justice, trust and understanding among nations in our generation

These are the facts. How has your Government responded to them?

Today, it appears, a new Hungary is rising from this struggle; a Hungary which we hope, from our hearts, will know full and free nationhood.

We have rejoiced in all these historic events.

Only yesterday, the Soviet Union issued an important statement on its relations with all the countries of Eastern Europe. This statement recognized the need for review of Soviet policies, and the amendment of these policies to meet the demands of the people for greater national independence and personal freedom.

The Soviet Union declared its readiness to consider the withdrawal of Soviet advisers, who have been, as you know, the effective ruling force in Soviet-occupied countries And also to consider withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland, Hungary and Rumania.

The United States has made clear its readiness to assist economically the new and independent governments of these countries. We have already—some days since—been in contact with the new Government of Poland on this matter. We have also publicly declared that we do not demand of these governments the adoption of any particular form of society as a condition upon our economic assistance. Our one concern is that they be free—for their sake, and for freedom's sake.

We have also—with respect to the Soviet Union—sought clearly to remove any false fears that we would look upon new governments in these Eastern European countries as potential military allies We have no such ulterior purpose. We see these people as friends and we wish simply that they be friends who are free.

It is not a situation that calls for extravagant fear or hysteria but it invites our most serious concern.

I speak, of course, of the Middle East. This ancient crossroads of the world was, as we all know, an area long subject to colonial rule. This rule ended after World War II when all countries there won full independence.

Out of the Palestinian mandated territory was born the new State of Israel.

These historic changes could not, however, instantly banish animosities born of the ages Israel and her Arab neighbors soon found themselves at war with one another And the Arab nations showed continuing anger toward their former rulers, notably France and Great Britain.

The United States, through all the years since the close of World War II, has labored tirelessly to bring peace and stability to this area.

We have considered it a basic matter of United States policy to support the new State of Israel and, at the same time, to strengthen our bonds both with Israel and with the Arab countries. But, unfortunately, through all these years, passion in the area threatened to prevail over peaceful purpose, and, in one form or another, there has been almost continuous fighting.

This situation recently was aggravated by Egyptian policy including rearmament with Communist weapons. We felt this to be a misguided policy on the part of the Government of Egypt. The State of Israel, at the same time, felt increasing anxiety for its safety And Great Britain and France feared more and more that Egyptian policies threatened their life line of the Suez Canal.

These matters came to a crisis on July 26 of this year when the Egyptian Government seized the Universal Suez Canal Company. For ninety years, ever since the inauguration of the canal, that company has operated the canal—largely under British and French technical supervision.

Now, there were some among our allies who urged an immediate reaction to this event by use of force We insistently urged otherwise, and our wish prevailed, through a long succession of conferences and negotiations, for weeks—even months —with participation by the United Nations.

And there, in the United Nations, only a short while ago, on the basis of agreed principles, it seemed that an acceptable accord was within our reach.

But the direct relations of Egypt with both Israel and France kept worsening to a point at which first Israel, then France—and Great Britain also—determined that, in their judgment, there could be no protection of their vital interests without resort to force.

Upon this decision events followed swiftly.

On Sunday, the Israeli Government ordered total mobilization.

On Monday, their armed forces penetrated deeply into Egypt and to the vicinity of the Suez Canal—nearly 100 miles away.

And on Tuesday the British and French Governments delivered a twelve-hour ultimatum to Israel and Egypt, now followed up by armed attack against Egypt.

The United States was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions. Nor were we informed of them in advance.

As it is the manifest right of any of these nations to take such decisions and actions, it is likewise our right if our judgment so dictates, to dissent.

We believe these actions to have been taken in error, for we do not accept the use of force as a wise or proper instrument for the settlement of international disputes.

To say this, in this particular instance, is in no way to minimize our friendship with these nations, nor our determination to maintain those friendships.

And we are fully aware of the grave anxieties of Israel, of Britain and France. We know that they have been subjected to grave and repeated provocations.

The present fact nonetheless seems clear. This action taken can scarcely be reconciled with the principles and purposes of the United Nations to which we have all subscribed. And beyond this we are forced to doubt that resort to force and war will for long serve the permanent interests of the attacking nations.

Now we must look to the future.

In the circumstances I have described, there will be no United States involvement in these present hostilities. I therefore have no plan to call the Congress in

special session. Of course, we shall continue to keep in contact with Congressional leaders of both parties.

I assure you your Government will remain alert to every possibility of this situation and keep in close contact and coordination with the legislative branch of this Government.

At the same time it is—and it will remain—the dedicated purpose of your Government to do all in its power to localize the fighting and to end the conflict.

We took our first measure in this action yesterday. We went to the United Nations with a request that the forces of Israel return to their own line and that hostilities in the area be brought to a close.

This proposal was not adopted because it was vetoed by Great Britain and by France.

It is our hope and intent that this matter will be brought before the United Nations General Assembly. There, with no veto operating, the opinion of the world can be brought to bear in our quest for a just end to this tormenting problem.

In the past the United Nations has proved able to find a way to end bloodshed. We believe it can and that it will do so again.

My fellow citizens, as I review the march of world events in recent years I am ever more deeply convinced that the United Nations represents the soundest hope for peace in the world. For this very reason I believe that the processes of the United Nations need further to be developed and strengthened.

I speak particularly of increasing its ability to secure justice under international law.

In all the recent troubles in the Middle East there have, indeed, been injustices suffered by all nations involved. But I do not believe that another instrument of injustice—war—is a remedy for these wrongs.

There can be no peace without law And there can be no law if we work to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose, and another for our friends

The society of nations has been slow in developing means to apply this truth But the passionate longing for peace on the part of all peoples of the earth compels us to speed our search for new and more effective instruments of justice.

The peace we seek and need means much more than mere absence of war. It means the acceptance of law and the fostering of justice in all the world.

To our principles guiding us in this quest we must stand fast. In so doing, we can honor the hopes of all men for a world in which peace will truly and justly reign.

I thank you, and good night.

31 | Address to Congress: Dwight D. Eisenhower

January 5, 1957

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker and Members of the Congress.

First may I express to you my deep appreciation of your courtesy in giving me, at some real inconvenience to yourselves, this early opportunity of addressing you on a matter I deem to be of grave importance to our country.

In my forthcoming State of the Union Message, I shall review the international situation generally. There are world-wide hopes which we can reasonably entertain and there are world-wide responsibilities which we must carry to make certain that freedom—including our own—may be secure.

There is, however, a special situation in the Middle East which I feel I should, even now, lay before this body.

Before doing so it is well to remind ourselves that our basic national objective in international affairs remains peace—a world peace based on justice. Such a peace must include all areas, all peoples of the world, if it is to be enduring. There is no nation, great or small, with which we would refuse to negotiate, in mutual good faith, with patience and in the determination to secure a better understanding between us Out of such understandings must, and eventually will, grow confidence and trust, indispensable ingredients to a program of peace and to plans for lifting from us all the burdens of these expensive armaments. To promote these objectives our Government works tirelessly, day by day, month by month, year by year. But until a degree of success crowns our efforts that will assure to all nations peaceful existence, we must, in the interests of peace itself, remain vigilant, alert and strong.

The Middle East has abruptly reached a new and critical stage in its long and important history. In past decades many of the countries in that area were not fully self-governing. Other nations exercised considerable authority in the area and the security of the region was largely built around their power. But since the First World War there has been a steady evolution toward self-government and independence. This development the United States has welcomed and has encouraged. Our country supports without reservation the full sovereignty and independence of each and every nation of the Middle East.

Now the evolution of independence has in the main been a peaceful process. But the area has been often troubled. Persistent cross-currents of distrust and fear, with raids back and forth across national boundaries, have brought about a high degree of instability in much of the Mideast. Just recently there have been hostilities involving Western nations that once exercised much influence in the area. Also the relatively large attack by Israel in October has intensified the basic differences between that nation and its Arab neighbors. All this instability has been heightened and, at times, manipulated by international communism

Russia's rulers have long sought to dominate the Middle East. This was true of

the Czars and it is true of the Bolsheviks The reasons are not hard to find Now these reasons do not affect Russia's security, for no one plans to use the Middle East as a base for aggression against Russia. Never for a moment has the United States entertained such a thought.

The Soviet Union has nothing whatsoever to fear from the United States in the Middle East, or anywhere else in the world, so long as its rulers do not themselves first resort to aggression

That statement I make solemnly and emphatically.

Now, neither does Russia's desire to dominate the Middle East spring from its own economic interest in the area Russia does not appreciably use or depend upon the Suez Canal. In 1955, Soviet traffic through the canal represented about three-quarters of one per cent of the total The Soviets have no need for, and could provide no market for, the petroleum resources which constitute the principal natural wealth of this region. Indeed, the Soviet Union is a substantial exporter of petroleum products.

The reason for Russia's interest in the Middle East is solely that of power politics Considering her announced purpose of communizing the world, it is easy to understand her hope of soon dominating the Middle East.

This region has always been the crossroads of the continents of the Eastern Hemisphere The Suez Canal enables the nations of Asia and Europe to carry on the commerce that is essential if these countries are to maintain well-rounded and prosperous economies The Middle East provides a gateway between Eurasia and Africa.

This contains about two-thirds of the presently known oil deposits of the world and it normally supplies the petroleum needs of many nations of Europe, Asia and Africa. Now the nations of Europe are peculiarly dependent upon this supply, and this dependency relates to transportation as well as production. This was vividly demonstrated since the closing of the Suez Canal and some of the pipe-lines. Alternate ways of transportation and, indeed, alternate sources of power, can, if necessary, be developed. But these cannot be considered as early prospects.

But these things stress the immense importance of the Middle East If the nations of that area should lose their independence, if they were dominated by alien forces hostile to freedom, that would be both a tragedy for the area and for many other free nations whose economic life would be subject to near strangulation. Western Europe would be endangered just as though there had been no Marshall Plan, no North Atlantic Treaty Organization The free nations of Asia and Africa, too, would be placed in serious jeopardy. And the countries of the Middle East would lose the markets upon which their economies depend All this would have the most adverse, if not disastrous, effect upon our own nation's economic life and political prospects. . . .

Thus we have these simple and indisputable facts·

The Middle East, which has always been coveted by Russia, would today be prized more than ever by international communism.

The Soviet rulers continue to show that they do not scruple to use any means to gain their ends.

The free nations of the Mideast need, and for the most part want, added strength to assure their continued independence.

Now our thoughts naturally turn to the United Nations as a protector of small

nations. Its charter gives it primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security Our country has given the United Nations its full support in relation to the hostilities in Hungary and in Egypt. Now the United Nations was able to bring about a cease-fire and withdrawal of hostile forces from Egypt because it was dealing with governments and peoples who had a decent respect for the opinions of mankind as reflected in the United Nations General Assembly. But in the case of Hungary, the situation was different. The Soviet Union vetoed action by the Security Council to require the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from Hungary. And it has shown callous indifference to the recommendations, even the censure, of the General Assembly. The United Nations therefore can always be helpful, but it cannot be a wholly dependable protector of freedom when the ambitions of the Soviet Union are involved.

Now, under all the circumstances I have laid before you, a greater responsibility now devolves upon the United States. We have shown, this country has shown, so that none can doubt, our dedication to the principle that force shall not be used internationally for any aggressive purpose and that the integrity and independence of the nations of the Middle East should be inviolate. Seldom in history has a nation's dedication to principle been tested as severely as ours was tested during recent weeks.

There is general recognition in the Middle East, as elsewhere, that the United States does not seek either political or economic domination over any other people Our desire is a world environment of freedom, not servitude. On the other hand many, if not all, of the nations of the Middle East are aware of the danger that stems from international Communism and welcome closer cooperation with the United States to realize for themselves the United Nations goals of independence, economic well-being and spiritual growth.

Now if the Middle East is to continue its geographic role of uniting rather than separating East and West; if its vast economic resources are to serve the well-being of the peoples there, as well as that of others, and if its cultures and religions and their shrines are to be preserved for the uplifting of the spirits of these peoples, then the United States must make more evident its willingness to support the independence of the freedom-loving nations of the area.

Under these circumstances I deem it necessary to seek the cooperation of the Congress. Only with that cooperation can we give the reassurance needed to deter aggression, to give courage and confidence to those who are dedicated to freedom and thus prevent a chain of events which would gravely endanger all of the free world.

Now there have been several Executive declarations made by the United States in relation to the Middle East. There is the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, followed by the Presidential assurance to the King of Saudi Arabia on Oct. 31, 1950. There is the Presidential declaration of April 9, 1956, that the United States will within constitutional means oppose any aggression in the area. There is our declaration of Nov. 29, 1956, that a threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan or Turkey would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity.

Nevertheless, weaknesses in the present situation and the increased danger from international communism convince me that basic United States policy should now find expression in joint action by the Congress and the Executive. Furthermore,

our joint resolve should be so couched as to make it apparent that if need be our words will be backed by action

Now it is nothing new for the President and the Congress to join to recognize that the national integrity of other free nations is directly related to our own security

We have joined to create and support the security system of the United Nations We have reinforced the collective security system of the United Nations by a series of collective defense arrangements Today we have security treaties with forty-two other nations which recognize that their, and our, peace and security are intertwined We have joined to take decisive action in relation to Greece and Turkey and in relation to Taiwan

Thus, the United States through the joint action of the President and the Congress, or, in the case of treaties, with the Senate, has manifested in many endangered areas its purpose to support free and independent governments—and peace—against external menace, notably the menace of international communism Thereby we have helped to maintain peace and security during a period of great danger. It is now essential that the United States should manifest through joint action of the President and the Congress our determination to assist those nations of the Mideast area which may desire that assistance. . .

32 Proposed Resolution on the Middle East: United States

January 5, 1957

To authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence.

Whereas a primary purpose of the United States in its relations with all other nations is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; and

Whereas the peace of the world and the security of the United States are endangered as long as international Communism and the nations it controls seek by threat of military action, use of economic pressure, internal subversion, or other means to attempt to bring under their domination peoples now free and independent; and

Whereas such danger now exists in the general area of the Middle East Therefore be it

SEC. 1. Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence

SEC 2 The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the

Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance Furthermore, he is authorized to employ the armed forces of the United States as he deems necessary to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any such nation or group of nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international Communism; provided, that such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Charter of the United Nations and actions and recommendations of the United Nations, and, as specified in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, measures pursuant thereto shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

SEC 3 The President is hereby authorized, when he determines that such use is important to the security of the United States, to use for the purposes of this joint resolution, without regard to the provisions of any other law or regulation, not to exceed $200,000,000 from any appropriations now available for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended This authorization is in addition to other existing authorizations with respect to the use of such appropriations.

SEC. 4. The President shall within the month of January of each year report to the Congress his action hereunder.

SEC 5. This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise.

33 | Resolution on the Middle East: United States Senate and House of Representatives

Adopted March 5, 1957

Joint resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

That the President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East desiring such assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

SEC. 2. The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines

the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism: Provided that such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United States.

SEC. 3. The President is hereby authorized to use during the balance of fiscal year 1957 for economic and military assistance under this joint resolution not to exceed $200,000,000 from any appropriation now available for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, in accord with the provisions of such act. Provided, that, whenever the President determines it to be important to the security of the United States, such use may be under the authority of section 401(A) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, (except that the provisions of Section 105(A) thereof shall not be waived) and without regard to provisions of Section 105 of the Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1957: Provided further, that obligations incurred in carrying out the purposes of the first sentence of Section 2 of this joint resolution shall be paid only out of appropriations for military assistance, and obligations incurred in carrying out the purposes of the first section of this joint resolution shall be paid only out of appropriations other than those for military assistance.

This authorization is in addition to other existing authorizations with respect to the use of such appropriations. None of the additional authorization contained in this section shall be used until fifteen days after the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives and, when military assistance is involved, the committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives have been furnished a report showing the object of the proposed use, the country for the benefit of which such use is intended, and the particular appropriation or appropriations for carrying out the provisions of the mutual security act of 1954, as amended, from which the funds are proposed to be derived. Provided, that funds available under this section during the balance of fiscal year 1957 shall, in the case of any report submitted during the last fifteen days of the fiscal year, remain available for use under this section for the purposes stated in such report for a period of twenty days following the date of submission of such report. Nothing contained in this joint resolution shall be construed as of itself authorizing the appropriation of additional funds for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the first section or of the first sentence of Section 2 of this joint resolution.

SEC. 4 The President should continue to furnish facilities and military assistance, under the provisions of applicable law and established policies, to the United Nations emergency force in the Middle East, with a view to maintaining the truce in that region.

SEC. 5. The President shall within the months of January and July of each year report to the Congress his actions hereunder.

SEC. 6. This Joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise except that it may be terminated earlier by a concurrent resolution of the two houses of Congress.

34 Alternative Resolution: J. William Fulbright

January 11, 1957

Whereas peace with justice in the defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms require international cooperation through more effective use of the United Nations and otherwise, and

Whereas peace with justice is not now assured in the Middle East,

Therefore, be it resolved That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security in the Middle East, so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest and that the President be advised that the sense of the Senate is that this Government, by Constitutional process, should particularly pursue the following objectives in the Middle East within the United Nations Charter:

1. In furtherance of the traditional policy of the United States to foster international trade and the unobstructed international movement of the world commerce, negotiate arrangements which will assure free passage on equitable terms in war and in peace of the Suez Canal to all nations.

2. In furtherance of the United Nations Charter to strive for a reduction in tensions between Israel and the Arab states, assist as may be possible in the negotiation of mutually acceptment of refugees, the protection of holy places, and the conclusion of treaties of peace; and until these purposes are accomplished, seek the continued intervention of the United Nations police forces between Israel and Egypt.

3. In support of programs developed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and otherwise, contribute its fair share of resources, including technical assistance, to long-range economic development and to the development of independent and progressive social institutions in the Middle East area.

4. Contribute to the maintenance of peace by reaffirming, with particular reference to the Middle East, the determination of the United States to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51, should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.

35 From Middle East Proposal: Harry S. Truman

January 13, 1957

We cannot hesitate, and we dare not falter in what we must do in the Middle East. The peace and economy of the whole world depend upon the resources concentrated in that area. So long as these resources are available to all nations, unhampered by capricious and tyrannical barriers, the chances for peace will be good

We must do all that we can to insure free access of this area to all nations But Russian intrigues and designs to move into the Middle East would deny the world the free access it must have to survive and would inevitably lead to war Let us make no mistake. This is what Russia is after—control of these resources.

The proposals made by the President, when approved by the Congress, will strengthen the position of the free world But I do not think they go far enough.

I suggest that certain further steps need to be taken to undo the Russian encroachments in the Middle East and check new penetrations there. Recurring armed clashes and flare-ups, arising from ancient and special troubles in this area, must be settled soon, or else Russia will continue to exploit these troubles for her own expansionist purposes

These are the steps I have in mind.

First. An embargo ought to be imposed on the shipment of all arms and ammunition by Russia to the Middle East It would be desirable to have an embargo on shipments of all arms to the Middle East by all nations until tensions subside and security pacts and disarmament agreements in the area can be worked out.

Arms and ammunition shipped into the area should go only to the emergency forces of the United Nations stationed in that area I hear the Russians are continuing shipment of arms to Syria, and I expect they will resume shipments to Egypt Russia must be warned that these must stop

When Russia began penetration of the Middle East by sending arms to Egypt more than a year ago we should have warned the Kremlin that we would not stand for this trouble-making maneuver All we had to do was to say "You can't do that" and be ready to back it up All we would have needed to back up this warning was to put a couple of cruisers at the end of the Black Sea Straits and a couple of cruisers and air carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean

Our past experience—as in the case of the Berlin Airlift—showed that the Russians would not dare to risk open war by shooting down our planes, once we had made clear that we intended to maintain that airlift and that we were not bluffing

Second The United Nations emergency forces should be enlarged and strengthened to whatever size events may prove necessary to maintain order until the

Suez Canal problem has been completely resolved and a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt has been concluded.

The Suez Canal is the economic jugular vein of the European economy and one of the vital waterways of the world. A stoppage of traffic through the canal of only a few weeks has paralyzed the European continent and even the Middle East. We have had to ship oil from this country to meet the emergency, although we have been trying to build up our own dwindling oil reserves here to meet future emergencies.

I believe very strongly that all the vital waterways of the world, upon which the peace and economy of the world depend, should be freely opened to all commerce

At the Potsdam conference I tried to get recognition of this problem of open traffic on the waterways of the world. I urged that the Black Sea Straits, the Kiel Canal, the Rhine and Danube rivers, the Suez Canal, Gibraltar and the Panama Canal be made free waterways for merchant shipping.

I suggest that we ought to keep on working to relieve world tensions. And the first practical step we can take along that line is to achieve a permanent settlement of the Suez Canal, for we cannot leave it to the caprices of a military dictator or the political whims of any one nation.

And we must realize that it is naive and fantastic to hope that we can achieve any kind of peace in the Middle East as long as there are bitterness and open clashes between the Arabs and the Jews. The nation of Israel is here to stay.

The United States, as well as the United Nations, should do everything possible to cool the passions of those extremists who want to destroy Israel. The boundary lines between Israel and Egypt must be settled and those boundaries guaranteed. The United Nations Emergency Forces could play a highly constructive role in this.

Third: In our own interests and in the interest of the peace of the world we should never again allow ourselves to become separated from our allies. We cannot be part internationalist, part isolationist, part pacifist and part appeasers.

We fought two world wars to keep Britain, France and Western civilization from being destroyed by an ambitious Kaiser and a madman Hitler. At the end of the second World War we set up a number of important barriers to see that Britain, France and the free world were safe against the threat of international communism. Vacillation, indecision and failure to state clearly our foreign policy during the past few years and neglecting to keep our allies informed of our aims and intentions contributed to the recent tragic events in the Middle East and almost brought us to a third World War.

Perhaps this is no time to remind ourselves that we must assume some responsibility for the panicky military moves of the British, French and Israelis in Egypt. Yet we had better draw a lesson from what happened I would ask what the American people would think we would do if the Panama Canal were seized in violation of treaties and made subject to the will of a dictator. I know what I would do

I feel certain that if we had kept close diplomatic contact with our allies and maintained a frank and forthright understanding of what was involved in the Middle East, we could well have avoided the debacle that followed. I think it is a historic blunder to have found ourselves on the same side with expansionist and

Communist Russia in a move to rebuke and weaken our allies with whom we had to fight jointly two World Wars, because their security and ours are inseparable

During my administration we kept an intimate understanding with the leaders of our allies France and Britain have, for over a century, been with us, and we have managed to get along and cooperate on all major world problems.

It was inevitable that, at times, we would find ourselves disagreeing on certain issues, sometimes with Britain and sometimes with France On some occasions we even found ourselves in sharp contention But we never failed to treat them as free and independent allies

We always got along and worked together for our mutual security and peace We conducted our relations in a free and candid manner. We never failed to tell each other what we intended to do, and we always did exactly what we said we would do.

As President of the world's leading power, I thought it not only essential but proper to keep the doors of the White House open to all our allies at all times with equal treatment for all As President, I welcomed the visits of all heads of state, as well as Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers.

At the end of the Potsdam Conference I informed Stalin that if any further joint conferences of heads were to be held, they would have to take place in Washington, since President Roosevelt and I had already come to meet them in Europe Now that we have a promise of a new foreign policy, I hope that all the Allied leaders will soon again be invited to come to Washington and that invitations for such visits will not be limited to a few men we favor or court.

As we back the President in his announced program for the Middle East, let us also make sure that we restore the strength, dignity and prestige of our allies, without whom we cannot be certain of the maintenance of peace for all the people of the world.

36 Alternative Resolution: Michael Mansfield

January 29, 1957

Whereas the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of the nations of the Middle East is vital to the interests of the United States;

Whereas the welfare of the United States and other nations is related to the prevention of further hostilities in the region of the Middle East, and the resumption of passage of ships of all nations through the Suez Canal;

Whereas the present truce maintained by the United Nations in the Middle East may prove temporary if there is no lasting settlement of the Suez dispute and the Arab-Israeli conflict and if economic instability in the region persists,

Whereas the peace of the world and the security of the United States are endangered as long as international communism and the nations it controls seek by threat of military action, use of economic pressure, internal subversion, or other

means to attempt to bring under their domination peoples now free and independent; and

Whereas such danger now exists in the general area of the Middle East·

Therefore be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled

1. That the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism· Provided, that such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Charter of the United Nations

2. Notwithstanding any limitations in existing law, the President may use appropriations made pursuant to the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, to furnish facilities and military assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may deem appropriate, to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East;

3. The President should call upon the United Nations General Assembly to establish at once a Special Commission on Arms Traffic in the Middle East with a view to recommending measures for regulating the flow of military materiel into that region;

4. The President should recommend to the Congress an economic program of specific nature, amount and duration, which in his judgment will facilitate a settlement of the Suez dispute and the Arab-Israeli conflict and otherwise promote stability in the Middle East and the peaceful progress of the nations of that region.

37 | From a Statement of Turkey's Middle East Policies: Fuat Koprulu

April 5, 1956

The "recent events" in the Middle East to which you allude can neither weaken the Baghdad Pact nor prevent its development, for the clear-cut aim of this Pact is to create an effective system of defense in the Middle East area in conformity with Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter against those who nurture aggressive designs.

Penetration by the Soviets into the Middle East and their attempts to create confusion there dates from long before the Baghdad Pact. If Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria oppose the Pact and have started to move towards the Soviets, we are of the opinion that this indicates that the big and common danger is being inadvertently neglected due to certain considerations of prestige and petty rivalry.

I am of the opinion that the day will come when the emotional and impulsive state of affairs in the Middle East will be replaced by reason and moderation, and

that regional disputes can be resolved, so that the Baghdad Pact may become identified with every state in the area.

I do not believe that there is any need to orient the Baghdad Pact in a new direction in the face of the political and economic penetration of the Middle East by the Soviets. The direction of the Pact is manifest, and it behooves us only to work in that direction.

With respect to the suggested need for increased cooperation in the field of economy, this necessity is already embodied in the Baghdad Pact itself. On the other hand, efforts in this respect cannot be taken as involving any neglect or reduction of political and military endeavors.

Should the United States of America also adhere to the Baghdad Pact in the near future, and remember that this Pact is in complete conformity with the principles of American foreign policy, such a move would undoubtedly constitute an important event from the viewpoint of the growth of the Pact. . . .

It would be appropriate to make a distinction between Turkey's efforts on behalf of the Baghdad Pact on the one hand and Turkish-Israeli relations on the other. As already clarified on different occasions, since the beginning of the Palestine problem the Turkish Government has acted within the framework of the United Nations and in loyalty to the decisions adopted by that body. Not for the sake of peace in the Middle East alone but also for world peace and tranquility as a whole, Turkey hopes that an equitable solution will be found with the least possible delay to this dispute which is still creating tension and in respect to which it is hard to say that it may not lead to war Recent developments in particular have made it clear for all to see that the flames of this dispute are fanned solely by those who nurture hidden aspirations regarding the Middle East Turkey has not abandoned the hope that this dispute may yet be resolved in a conciliatory manner and within the framework of the United Nations. . . .

38 Statement on Egypt's Middle East Policy: Gamal Abdul Nasser

November 21, 1956

The policy of Egypt is a policy of national independence Egypt and Egyptians value this independence more than life itself. I will not become the stooge or satellite or pawn or hireling of anybody. Just as Egypt is determined to have political independence so also Egypt is determined to have and maintain ideological independence from all foreign ideologies such as Marxism, Fascism, Racism, Colonialism, Imperialism and Atheism, all of which incidentally are European in origin. The revolutionary government of Egypt is dedicated to the universal ideals of justice between men and justice between nations, the equality of all men and all nations before the world and individual and personal freedom, and to achieve these ideals the new Egypt will work in accordance with her own special circumstance, in accordance with her own religious teachings and cultural heritage. Dedi-

cated to national independence, Egypt is profoundly aware of the necessity of the cooperation of nations Situated where it is in one of the historic crossroads of the world Egypt could not lack this awareness Egypt desires to cooperate—an honorable cooperation—with other countries. Concretely and specially Egypt stands for international law. I pledge myself to the strict observance of all the international law which now exists. More than that I desire the expansion of international law to meet the needs of the complex modern world. Egypt like all other nations has a special fellow feeling for those nations which share its cultural traditions and for those excolonial nations which are in a similar phase of transition to independent democracy and economic progress. But the idea of trying to create an Arab empire or of attempting to dominate such an empire is repugnant to Egypt and to me. Just as European nations work toward European union and just as the twenty-one sovereign nations of North and South America have developed a Pan American Union so the Arab countries work toward an ideal of fruitful cooperation. But each Arab nation cherishes its integrity just as Egypt does. The concept of Arab imperialism is foreign fiction or foreign propaganda based on ignorance or worse. The primary and basic objective of the revolutionary government of Egypt is the radical improvement of the economic and social conditions of the Egyptian people as a free and independent nation. It is to this purpose that I desire to concentrate the energies of my government. But that cannot be the case until certain highly inflammable problems are solved. I call upon all the governments of the world and upon every man and woman of good will to join in serious efforts to achieve just and honorable solutions of these problems.

39 | From Address to General Assembly: Abba Eban

November 23, 1956

. . . I should like to tell the General Assembly quite frankly what is the philosophy which underlies our present approach to this problem of the withdrawal of Israel forces in accordance with our undertaking of 8 November. (The General Assembly will recall that in response to the resolution of 2 November and the subsequent resolutions the Government of Israel notified the Secretary-General on 8 November as follows: " . . The Government of Israel will willingly withdraw its forces from Egypt immediately upon the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the United Nations in connection with the emergency international force ") Many representatives have spoken as if, in their view, the only important consideration is when we withdraw. Of far greater moment is the question. How do we withdraw? What situation will the withdrawal create? What comes in its place? Will the withdrawal become an integral stage in the promotion of peaceful conditions? Or will it pave the way to a return to the previous state of siege and of anarchy? This is perhaps the most fateful practical question which the United Nations now faces in the conduct of its work.

There are two possible approaches to this problem of withdrawal. One is a system, which I am certain the General Assembly will instantaneously reject, under which we would carry out the withdrawal without any coordination with the movements of the United Nations Force, without any care for the future and without any guarantee of Egypt's future conduct toward Israel Sinai would then become again a base for Nasser to renew against Israel the deadly menace which I have but briefly described. Once again the peaceful desert would become a source of blood and of peril.

Let me again say that an Egyptian military base in the Sinai Peninsula cannot possibly have any other purpose except to sustain an assault against Israel Armor and weapons would again pour into the peninsula in preparation for the next round. Egypt and Israel would again face each other near Gaza, which Egypt seized by aggression eight years ago. From that position the *fedayeen* commando squads would again roam through the countryside, which has known a blessed tranquillity in the past few weeks. The illicit blockade would again be established on the Gulf of *Aqaba,* for the first time an international waterway open today to the ships of all nations without distinction of flag, and thereby another grotesque situation would have been brought about. The United Nations would have been active in restoring to a state of blockade what had hitherto been an open waterway. Egypt has blocked one waterway, the Suez Canal, contrary to the 1888 Convention

Under this system, which I propose that the General Assembly reject, of a reckless and unplanned withdrawal, the United Nations would find itself inadvertently responsible for bringing Egypt back to block the other waterway, so that the protection of blockade would become an international objective. Thus, belligerency will be restored, acts of war by sea or land will again arise until they provoke the inevitable explosion and who knows how far or how much any such explosion will be localized. This is a startling prospect, but it is exactly what will happen if the method of effecting and implementing the withdrawal of troops is not approached with minimum care and precision. This return to the *status quo* of belligerency is precisely what Nasser wants. It is what some delegations quite inadvertently may be proposing when they urge that the withdrawal take place in disregard of what will ensue and in detachment from the plans now under way for defining the tasks of the United Nations Emergency Force now entering the Canal area. This question of a return to the *status quo* of insecurity was frankly discussed in the General Assembly during the first debates on the establishment of the United Nations Force On that occasion, too, the Canadian representative invited our attention to that problem. He said:

> What then, six months from now? Are we to go through all this again? Are we to return to the *status quo?* Such a return would not be to a position of security, or even to a tolerable position, but would be a return to terror, bloodshed, strife, incidents, charges and counter-charges, and ultimately another explosion. . . .

These, too, are instructive words, except that one might have a reservation whether peace could endure for six months in an atmosphere of renewed belligerency.

It was in order to avoid such a blind procession back to disaster and belligerency that the General Assembly devised machinery in the form of the United Nations Emergency Force.

I have then portrayed one method of effecting a withdrawal which would contain within it the seeds of a future conflict.

But there is another system of withdrawal fully consistent with the resolutions of the General Assembly, but also with the purpose and objectives of the United Nations and its Charter. Let me again stress that the Government of Israel will carry out the undertaking for the withdrawal of its troops from Egypt as defined in its communication of 8 November. We shall do this. But is it essential or wise or permissible that Sinai must again become remilitarized as a base for future assaults? Are there no other alternatives whereby the very emptiness of that historic desert may become a bridge of peace between two countries? There are ways of reconciling Israel's obligation to withdraw with the avoidance of this danger. I will not make detailed proposals at this forum, but we have constructive proposals which would fulfill both of these objectives, the principle of withdrawal and the avoidance of the perils emanating from the re-creation of this base. Similarly, is it essential or wise or permissible that maritime belligerency shall be restored in the Gulf of *Aqaba* in defiance of United Nations decisions against belligerency and of the international law governing narrow waterways? What shall we have achieved if we leave behind a position at the entrance to the Gulf of *Aqaba* in which acts of maritime war can be achieved, evoking in the course of time a natural response and re-creating that vicious circle of violence from which it is our passionate desire to break loose?

There are ways of reconciling the resolutions of 2, 5 and 7 November with the creation of such conditions as will preclude that danger, and we shall make proposals accordingly in the proper contexts.

There are solutions for Gaza other than the renewal of this Egyptian salient in a position which would make Egyptian-Israel peace impossible.

There is the problem of the Suez Canal. This is not affected one way or the other by Israel's policy on the withdrawal of troops from Egypt, but we have a special interest and a special experience. Under the 1888 Convention this waterway was to be opened to the ships of all nations in time of peace and in time of war. Article 4 of the Convention emphasizes that the obligation to keep the Canal open even in time of war rests upon Egypt even when Egypt is a belligerent, and therefore, the present situation in which the Canal is blocked is a violation of that convention.

But even before that violation there was another long-established violation through the discriminatory closing of the Canal to Israel's ships and cargoes. The Canal is now closed to all nations. May we not hope that when it is opened it shall be opened to all nations without distinction of flag in conformity to the Constantinople Convention and the resolutions of the Security Council?

This, then, is the summary of our position We are still convinced of the necessity, the justice, the rectitude of what we had to do for Israel's defense against an open threat to destroy it. This salutary resistance may be written in history as a triumphant assertion that small democracies have a right to live and not only large dictatorships supported by larger Powers.

We shall carry out our 8 November undertaking, but there is a way of carrying it out which might lead to war There is a way of carrying it out which gives a chance of peace We choose, urge and advocate the latter course. These problems must be seriously and constructively and rapidly discussed.

We invite the United Nations authorities concerned with the implementation of these resolutions to consider with us the proposals which we have conceived and might continue to present for carrying out the agreed principle of withdrawal from Egypt in a manner conducive to peaceful conditions in the area to be affected by the withdrawal. In the meantime we would urge the necessity of avoiding any increase of tension, including such increase of tension as arises from false reports

I will again repeat the denial which I gave from this rostrum yesterday of mischievous reports asserting an imminent danger to Syria from troop concentrations in Israel. There is no foundation whatever for those reports which have unfortunately been transmitted not only by Syria but by other representatives here. We have invited United Nations observers to study the scene on the Israel-Syrian frontier. Their report, which entirely disputes the Syrian contention, has now been made available and it is the hope of my delegation that the Secretary-General will find means of making it known to all Members of the General Assembly.

A final consideration brings us back to the crux of our problem. whether the implementation of the General Assembly's resolution is to be succeeded by a state of war. This belligerency, this state of war, is the great paradox of this discussion A nation claims and exercises a state of war against its neighbor and then complains about the absence of peace Egypt behaves to Israel as though there is war. Israel is called upon to behave towards Egypt as though there is peace. Egypt comes in full belligerency to the United Nations and says, "I seek your protection; I am only working for Israel's destruction; I am at war with Israel; I wish to send people to Israel to kill and to plunder; I will seize Israel's ships in international waterways; I will build up armaments for Israel's destruction; I will concert alliances to bring about Israel's downfall I ask the United Nations to protect me while I do all of this."

The complete incongruity of belligerency in the system of the Charter is the shocking and tragic spectacle that we have seen.

In conclusion we seek the understanding and counsel of the General Assembly on the need for carrying out our 8 November undertaking in conditions which will prevent a recurrence of the conflict. We call for this prudence out of the depths of our heart because we know what is here at stake The thousands who fell in our War of Independence, the hundreds slain in homes and fields by Nasser and his fellow potentates, the lives lost in the effort to push disaster away a few weeks ago—these are all vividly before us. We speak out of the deep pathos of a people which more than any other has faced the prospect of physical extinction in its journey across history and which during eight years of its statehood has unreasonably been called upon to live under the dark and dreadful shadow of physical destruction. It is then in the name of that sentiment that we say: Let Sinai become a place of peace and not a base of war. Let the closed waterway of Suez be opened Let the open waterway at the Gulf of *Aqaba* not be closed Let us find means of avoiding that explosive proximity of Egyptian and Israel forces which is fatal for peace.

The danger and opportunity walk here hand in hand It is within our capacity in a matter of days so to arrange affairs that the recent struggle might be the last page in the chapter of Egyptian-Israel conflict.

40 Joint Declaration on Middle East Policy: USSR and Communist China

January 8, 1957

In the course of an all-around exchange of opinion, both sides have recorded complete unanimity of views on the present day international situation and major international problems. Following the Geneva conference of 1954, the four-heads-of-Government conference of 1955 and the Bandung Conference of Asian and African countries, an obvious tendency toward a detente appeared in the international situation, and ideas of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems began to prevail in the minds of the people.

As a result of the armed attack of the imperialist aggressive forces against Egypt and their subversive activities in Hungary, the tendency of easing the international situation has run up against the obstacles and destructive resistance of these forces.

With the support of the Socialist states and the other peaceable states and nations of the world, the peoples of Egypt and Hungary have achieved victory in their heroic and resolute struggle. The conspiracies of the imperialist aggressive circles have suffered utter defeat The imperialists, however, cannot reconcile themselves to this and continue their aggressive subversive activity.

The facts indicate that the development of international events is proceeding along tortuous roads All the peace-loving peoples of the world must be constantly on the alert and prepared to wage a consistent and prolonged struggle against the mechinations of the aggressive imperialist forces.

Both sides emphasize that, unlike the policy of aggression and war preparation pursued by the imperialist camp headed by the monopoly groups of the United States, the countries of the Socialist camp are steadfastly following a policy of upholding and safeguarding world peace.

At the same time, there are many nationally independent states in Asia and Africa, and primarily such a great power as India, which firmly abide by the policy of peace and neutrality.

There are not a few states in Europe and other areas of the world that also come out for peace and neutrality, or are beginning to show a tendency for such a policy. Public forces championing peace and opposed to war are growing with every day on all continents.

Contradictions and disagreements in the camp of imperialism arising from the struggle for raw material sources, markets and spheres of influence are growing more deep and acute with every day.

With the exception of the aggressive forces in a few imperialist states the peoples of all the world yearn for peace and come out against war

The united forces of peace in the Socialist states, the nationally independent and other peaceable countries and nations are far superior to the forces of aggressive imperialist blocs If all the peaceable forces in the international arena unite, join efforts in a resolute struggle, any intrigues of the aggressive imperialist quarters will definitely be frustrated

Both sides note that after Britain, France and Israel had suffered defeat in their aggression against Egypt, American imperialism is trying to make use of the situation so as to take the place of the colonialist powers—Britain and France—in the Near and Middle East, to suppress the movement for national independence and enslave the peoples of these countries, and is also striving to step up the policy of aggression and war preparations in this area.

This is precisely the essence of the so-called Eisenhower doctrine This colonialist policy of the United States in the Near and Middle East creates fresh tensions in this area, recently the arena of hostilities caused by the aggression against Egypt.

The Governments of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China resolutely condemn this policy of the United States and are ready to continue rendering the necessary support of the peoples of the Near and Middle East so as to prevent aggression and interference in the affairs of the countries in this area.

With a view to completely eliminating the consequences of imperialist aggression in Egypt, both Governments hold that it is necessary to satisfy the Egyptian Government's lawful demand for complete compensation by Britain, France and Israel of the damage caused by their aggressive actions

Both Governments resolutely come out against any imperialist machinations aimed at placing the Suez Canal under "international control" and are for the settlement of the question of free passage of shipping through the Suez Canal by way of negotiations between the states concerned on the basis of complete respect for Egyptian sovereignty.

The Governments of the Soviet Union and China wholeheartedly support the countries and nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America in their striving to fight against colonialism, to uphold and consolidate their national independence, sovereignty and freedom, to achieve industrial progress and economic independence.

In the struggle against war, against colonialism and in defense of world peace, the Socialist states and the nationally independent countries can effect all-round cooperation in conformity with the five principles of peaceful coexistence

The facts show that this sincere cooperation has already played an important part in present-day international affairs Friendly cooperation of the Socialist states with countries that have won their national independence accords both their mutual national interests and the interests of world peace.

Both Government delegations note that in suppressing the national liberation movement and perpetrating aggression against the nations that have won their national independence, the aggressive imperialist alignments do not give up their attempts to conduct subversive activity against the Socialist states .

Of late, the aggressive imperialist alignments are intensifying the "cold war" and conducting subversive activities against the Soviet Union, against communism and the cause of peace

It is necessary to be vigilant in the face of these schemes. The Soviet Union

and China are united with all the Socialist states by their fraternal friendship and mutual assistance commitments.

Any provocative actions of the aggressive imperialist forces aimed at undermining the Socialist states will meet with the most resolute rebuff .

41 | Soviet Proposals for the Middle East: From a note handed to U.S. Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen

February 13, 1957

As a result of the efforts of the peace-loving peoples, supported by the United Nations, the aggressive actions against Egypt were liquidated, and favorable conditions arose and real possibilities emerged for insuring peace and also for the solution of international problems in the Near and Middle East

The liquidation of the hot-bed of war in this region provided prerequisites for the strengthening of national independence, sovereignty and economic development not only in Egypt but in all the countries of the Near and Middle East, and also opened the way for the broad cooperation of the countries of this region with all countries on the principles of equality in relations between states as formulated in the decisions of the Bandung conference [of Asian-African nations in 1955].

The peace-loving peoples justly expected that henceforth peace in the Near and Middle East could be preserved and strengthened, and that an end would be put to the policy of foreign interference in the internal affairs of this region, that the sovereignty and independence of the countries of the Near and Middle East would be sincerely respected, and that the countries of this region, and in particular the victim of aggression—Egypt—will be given selfless economic aid.

However, the period of amelioration of the tense situation in this region was regrettably short, and the hopes of the peoples were not justified. As a result of the unilateral steps taken by certain powers, the situation in the Near and Middle East has recently become very much more acute. This is mainly caused by the fact that it is still intended to use—without the consent of the United Nations and in a unilateral manner—the armed forces of one of the great powers in the Near and Middle East, at the discretion of that power, in order to interfere in the internal affairs of this region.

There is also the proposition for providing economic aid for the countries of the Near and Middle East, along with the imposition upon them of conditions by which these countries are to renounce any ties with certain countries which are members of the United Nations—that is, to accept political conditions for such aid that are incompatible with the dignity and sovereignty of these countries and with the high principles of the United Nations.

One cannot fail to be aware that the carrying out of such a policy, outside the framework of the United Nations, would lead to a new and dangerous worsening of the situation in the region, which has so recently been the theatre of military action resulting from the aggression against Egypt, and would represent a threat to the cause of peace throughout the world.

The aforementioned plan is nothing but a continuation of a policy of isolated, aggressive military blocs such as NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, and the setting up of artificial economic and political barriers between states.

At the basis of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union lies the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states, irrespective of differences in their social or state system. It is a known fact that, in establishing its friendly relations with the Arab countries, the Soviet Union not only did not seek any deterioration in the relations of those countries with other great powers, but on the contrary upheld the need for broad international cooperation, and the need to insure stable peace and the creation of an atmosphere of trust in the area of the Near and Middle East.

The Soviet Union does not possess, and does not wish to possess, military bases or any kind of concessions in countries of the Near and Middle East for the purpose of making profits, nor does it seek to obtain any kind of privileges in that area, because all that is incompatible with the principles of Soviet foreign policy

The Soviet Union is vitally interested that there should be peace in the area of the Near and Middle East, situated in direct proximity to its borders It is sincerely interested in the consolidation of the national independence of the countries of that area and in their economic prosperity.

In the opinion of the Soviet Government the preservation of peace in the Near and Middle East is a necessary condition not only for the development of the countries of the Near and Middle East, but, as recent events have shown for safeguarding the economic prosperity of many other countries. The need to strengthen peace and security in the Near and Middle East demands a broad development of political, economic and cultural ties between all countries, and joint action by the great powers primarily responsible for peace, this being particularly in accord with the United Nations Charter.

The Soviet Government considers that, by joint efforts on the part of the great powers, the U S S R , the U S.A , Britain and France, the permanent United Nations Security Council members, it would be possible to secure lasting and stable peace in that area if all the afore-mentioned great powers built their relations with countries of the Near and Middle East on the basis of the general principle of a policy of noninterference in their internal affairs and respect for their national independence and sovereignty

Proceeding from the above-mentioned, the Soviet Government addresses to the governments of the U S A , Britain and France the proposal to work out and to proclaim basic principles in matters of peace and security in the Near and Middle East and of noninterference into the internal affairs of the countries of this region.

These principles could be made the foundations of a joint declaration, the adoption of which would exclude the possibility of any dangerous, unilateral action by this or that great power in regard to the countries of Near and Middle East, and would help to strengthen peace and security in this most important region, to develop national economy and to consolidate the independence of these countries. It is self-evident it would be open to any state interested in peace and security, which desires to build its relations with the countries of the Near and Middle East on the basis of the mentioned principles, to subscribe to this declaration

Proposals regarding the obligations of the member-powers under the declaration could at once be conveyed to the governments and peoples of the Near and Middle East countries.

The Foreign Ministry appends the basic stipulations of the draft declaration by the four powers—the U.S.S.R, the U.S A, Britain and France—as proposed by the U.S S.R. Government, and would be grateful to the United States Embassy for information regarding the acceptability to the United States Government of the draft of the basic principles expounded in the declaration regarding peace and security in the Near and Middle East and non-interference into the internal affairs of the countries of this region.

The Soviet Government would have no objection to the Governments of the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union coming out with separate declarations (of similar context) regarding their relations with the countries of the Near and Middle East, based on the principles expounded in the attached draft.

Draft of the basic principles of declarations by the Governments of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., Britain and France regarding the question of peace and security in the Near and Middle East and non-interference in the internal affairs of the countries of this region

U.S.S.R., the U.S.A, the United Kingdom and the French Republic, guided by lofty peace-loving aims and the principles of the United Nations as expressed in its Charter, declare their agreement that at the basis of their policy in respect of the countries of the Near and Middle East lies the desire to establish peace and security in the Near and Middle East and throughout the world; acknowledge and respect the lofty principles of relations between states formulated at the Bandung conference of Asian and African countries; strive to create favorable conditions for the strengthening of the national independence and national sovereignty of the countries of the Near and Middle East; express a sincere desire to contribute disinterestedly, by common efforts, to the economic development of the countries of this area, and are in this proceeding from the fact that the natural wealth of the underdeveloped countries is the inalienable national property of the peoples of these countries, which have the full right to dispose of and use it in the interests of the development of their national economy and progress.

The Governments of the U.S.S.R., the U.S A., Britain and France, desire to contribute to the all-round development of economic, business and cultural relations of the countries of the Near and Middle East with all countries, on the basis of equality and mutual advantage; are of the opinion that wide economic and trade relations for the countries of this area accord not only with the interests of these countries but also with the securing of the economic prosperity for other countries of the world, and recognize the need for a peaceful settlement of all outstanding international problems and questions relating to the Near and Middle East by way of negotiations

Aware of the importance of the responsibility they bear for the maintenance of peace and security throughout the world, the Governments of the U.S S R, the U.S.A., Britain and France pledge themselves to follow, in their policy in respect of the Near and Middle East, the principles stated below

1. The presentation of peace in the Near and Middle East by settling questions at issue exclusively by peaceful means, on the basis of the method of negotiations.

2. Noninterference in the internal affairs of the countries of the Near and Middle East. Respect for the sovereignty and independence of these countries

3. Refusal to undertake any attempts to draw these countries into military alignments with the participation of the great powers.

4. The liquidation of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of countries of the Near and Middle East.

5. Joint refusal to supply arms to countries of the Near and Middle East.

6. Assistance in the economic development of countries of the Near and Middle East, without putting forward any political, military or other conditions incompatible with the dignity and sovereignty of these countries.

The Governments of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., the United Kingdom and the French Republic express the hope that other states as well will, in their relations with countries of the Near and Middle East, adhere to the same principles.

42 From Address to National Press Club: Guy Mollet

February 27, 1957

. . . Of course, the President [Eisenhower] and I have broached the subject of the Middle East. Without concealing our disagreements of the past months, we have recorded that our respective positions have always been clear-cut so that our mutual confidence has remained unchanged. We have one common purpose, which is the restoration of a lasting peace in the Middle East, a peace based on justice and international law.

The worst possible formula would be to return purely and simply to the situation as it existed prior to the so-called Israeli aggression. This would even constitute a crime against peace. All of us have had the weakness, for eight years, to allow disturbances to develop and to accept an undeclared war, as the United Nations' resolutions were repeatedly flaunted. Our peoples would not allow us to repeat the same tragic error.

We must strike at the very factors of this state of tension, at all the factors. A piecemeal or temporary solution in the Middle East will always be a bad solution. Some of the factors of the present situation are geographic, others are purely political.

The first of these "geographic" factors concerns the frontier of Israel and in fact the very existence of the State of Israel. Let us not forget that Israel, encircled as it is by ill-intentioned neighbors and subjected to repeated aggressions chiefly instigated by Egypt, was forced to resort to its elementary right of self-defense. I refuse to brand this State as an aggressor.

Israel was born under the auspices of the United Nations. It is entitled to have the question of its frontiers definitely settled and its territorial integrity guaranteed. At the same time as this problem is settled, the problem of the Arab refugees in Gaza, until yesterday a base for attacks against Israel, must also be settled.

The second of these factors is the Gulf of Aqaba. Bordered by four States, the Gulf of Aqaba is an international waterway. To guarantee free passage through

the Straits of Tiran, and thus to prevent the choking of Israel, is nothing but implementing international law.

The third factor is the Suez Canal The deliberate sabotage of the Canal by Egypt without any military justification, as well as the blackmail of the past two months with respect to the clearing up of a channel, are proof that we can place little trust in the signature of the Egyptian Government.

The Suez Canal, an international waterway, like the Gulf of Aqaba, must be kept free, in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council, from political interference on the part of any country and, first of all, on the part of Egypt.

The economic life of Europe and of many countries of Southeast Asia cannot possibly depend on the goodwill of an Egyptian dictator.

The elimination of these three factors of tension may be obtained through the customary international procedures. Some have already been started. We must not relax our efforts before a general settlement has been reached.

The problems which I have called "political" are even more serious. Among them, I shall rate first the Pan-Arab activities of Egypt and Soviet infiltration in the Middle East.

A year ago, when the French Government was denouncing the Pan-Arab ambitions of Colonel Nasser, the response it met with was at times rather skeptical A definite scheme had, however, been outlined in "The Philosophy of the Revolution." In this book, Nasser has proclaimed his will to unify the Arab world from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf around a "hero," himself, and to use for this aim against the West the instrument of blackmail which the geographic position of his country has put into his hands. the Suez Canal and the oil of the Middle East. Subsequent events have proved that these were not empty threats.

Denouncing Pan-Arabism does not mean attacking the Arab world and even less so the Moslem community. Isn't France, in any case, a Moslem power? Pan-Arabism is not the expression of the feelings of a people. Like Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism which other dictators have made famous, it is a myth, in the name of which the independence of peoples is being threatened.

It would be the worst possible mistake to answer this Arab propaganda spreading from Cairo and Damascus with concessions or counter-propaganda. The free nations must make a stand; they must show the rest of the world that provocations never pay and that one cannot compromise when the respect of international obligations is at stake. Such a task will require time, much firmness and a large dose of confidence.

Yet such effort is all the more necessary as Pan-Arabism is the best tool of Communist infiltration. Following Lenin's advice, the leaders of Soviet Russia bring aid to all movements of extreme nationalism. Cairo and Damascus, fountain-springs of Pan-Arabism, are also the strongest bridgeheads of the Soviet Union.

The French Government has acknowledged the extreme importance of President Eisenhower's message on the Middle East. The United States has acted with leadership. Is has served well the cause of peace and we know that Soviet Russia is not indifferent to warnings such as the one she has just received.

I do not want to abuse your patience in dealing in greater details with these problems, however much they deserve a more thorough analysis Their settlement requires that the free world engage in a joint and long-range policy. This, I indicated to the President of the United States. . . .

43 Statement by Four Arab Leaders: From Cairo Radio Broadcast

February 27, 1957

A meeting was held between the 25th of the month of Rajab, 1376, corresponding to the 25th of February, 1957, and 27th of the month of Rajab, 1376, corresponding to the 27th of February, 1957, between His majesty King Saud Ibn Ebdum Aziz al Saud, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, His Majesty King Hussein I, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; His Excellency Shukri al-Kuwatly, President of the Republic of Syria; His Excellency Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the Republic of Egypt, and their statesmen.

This was the fourth in a series of meetings that they hold from time to time in order to study the international situation and to discuss problems affecting the Arab nations, the course of their life, progress, and very existence

The participants [in the conference] were informed of the laudable efforts made by His Majesty King Saud Ibn Abdul Aziz in the course of his visit to the United States of America, the elucidations made by His Majesty to statesmen [in the United States] on the Arab points of view with regard to Middle East problems and the subjects of the discussions.

His Majesty also gave an account of explanations given by him to President Eisenhower with particular reference to Arab rights and problems, including the recent aggression against Egypt and its results, as well as Egypt's rights to sovereignty over the Suez Canal, and the seriousness of Israel's noncompliance with the United Nations resolutions that stipulate an unconditional withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba beyond the armistice lines without Israel's gaining any advantages as a result of the triple aggression.

The conferees affirm their anxiousness to play their part in the international sphere and to contribute to the creation of international relations on a basis conducive to peace, justice and well-being and respect for their sovereignty and interests.

Their strength having grown through the unity of their people, their faith in the safety of their aims having grown, the Arab countries meeting at the conference reaffirm their earlier declared determination to protect the Arab nation from the harm of the "cold war" and its dispute and to abide by the policy of positive neutrality thus preserving its real national interests.

They also affirm the fact that the defense of the Arab world should emanate from the Arab nation in the light of its real security and outside the scope of foreign pacts.

The participants note that, despite the United Nations Resolution and in defiance of unanimous world public opinion of the necessity of Israel's withdrawal beyond the armistice lines, the triple aggression against Egypt still exists in all its

effects and aspects since Israel has not complied with the United Nations resolutions on unconditional withdrawal.

The participants [in the conference] hold, moreover, that peace and security in the Middle East is in jeopardy while the population of Gaza continues to suffer acute oppression and maltreatment at the hand of Israel.

Therefore, the conferees have decided:

1. To work for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel beyond the armistice lines.

2. To uphold in full the rights of the Palestine Arabs and the Arabs' sovereignty over the territories and territorial waters

3. The necessity on the part of the aggressive states to compensate Egypt for all damages and losses caused through their aggression

4 To reject all attempts made with the view to reducing Egypt's sovereignty and rights over the Suez Canal as the Suez Canal is an integral part of Egypt, her sovereignty over the canal is absolute, and the freedom of navigation in the canal is regulated in accordance with the provisions of the 1888 Constantinople Convention.

5. To condemn British aggression against the territories of Yemen and to assume an attitude of solidarity with Yemen in stemming this aggression

6. To support absolutely the rights of the Arabs of Algeria to freedom and independence and the courageous struggle against imperialist force

The conferees hold that their liberal policy, emanating from their faith in the right of their nation to a free and independent life and rooted in their Arab patriotism which has proved to the world its real existence. increases their solidarity in order to attain the Arab nation's aspirations of freedom, unity and progress.

SECTION 4

The Continuing Struggle

44 | Proclamation of the United Arab Republic

February 1, 1958

On February 1, 1958, in a historic session held at Kubbah Palace in Cairo, His Excellency President Shukry El-Kuwatly of Syria, and President Gamal Abdel-Nasser of Egypt, met the representatives of the Republics of Syria and Egypt, El-Sayed, Sabry El-Assaly, El-Sayed Abdel-Latif El-Baghdady, El-Sayed Khaled El-Azm, El-Sayed Zakaria Mohieddin, El-Sayed Hamed El-Khoga, El-Sayed Anwar El-Sadat, El-Sayed Fakher El Kayyaly, El-Sayed Maamoun El-Kozbary, El-Sayed Hussein El-Shaffei, El-Sayed Assaad Haroun, General Abdel-Hakim Amer, El-Sayed Salaheddin El-Bittar, El-Sayed Kamaleddin Hussein, El-Sayed Khalil El-Kallas, El-Sayed Noureddine Tarraf, El-Sayed Saleh Akeel, El-Sayed Fathy Radwan, General Afif El-Bizry, El-Sayed Mahmoud Fawzy, El-Sayed Kamal Ramzi Stino, El-Sayed Aly Sabri, El-Sayed Abdel-Rahman El-Azm and El-Sayed Mahmound Riad.

The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the final measures to be taken for the realization of the Arab peoples' will, and the execution of what the constitutions of both republics stipulate, namely that the people of each of them form a part of the Arab Nation They, therefore, discussed the decisions unanimously approved by the National Assembly of Egypt and the Syrian House of Representatives that unity should be established between the two countries as a preliminary step towards the realisation of complete Arab unity. They also discussed the clear signs manifest in the past few years, that Arab nationalism was the inspiring spirit that dominated the history of Arabs in all their different countries, their common present and the hoped-for future of every Arab.

They came to the conclusion that this unity which is the fruit of Arab nationalism is the Arabs' path to sovereignty and freedom, that it is one of humanity's gateways to peace and co-operation, and that it is therefore their duty to take this unity with persistence and determination staunch and unwavering, out of the circle of wishes and aspirations to where it can be converted into a reality. They came out of this with the conviction that the elements conducive to the success of

the union of the two republics were abundant, particularly recently after their joint struggle—which had brought them even closer to one another—made the meaning of nationalism considerably clearer, stressed the fact that it was a movement for liberation and rehabilitation and that it was a faith in peace and co-operation

For all this, the participants declare their total agreement, complete faith and deeply rooted confidence in the necessity of uniting Egypt and Syria into one state to be named "The United Arab Republic."

They have likewise decided to declare their unanimous agreement on the adoption of a presidential democratic system of government for the Arab Republic The executive authority shall be vested in the head of the state assisted by the ministers appointed by him and responsible to him.

The legislative authority shall be vested in one legislative house The new republic shall have one flag, one army, one people who shall remain joined in a unity where all will share equal rights and duties, where all will call for the protection of their country with heart and soul, and compete in the consolidation of its integrity and the insurance of its unvulnerability.

His Excellency President Shukry El-Kuwatly and President Gamal Abdel-Nasser will each deliver a statement to the people in the Syrian and the Egyptian Parliaments respectively on Wednesday, February 5, 1958 in which they will announce the decisions reached in this meeting and explain the principles of the unity on which this rising young republic shall stand

The peoples of Egypt and Syria shall be called upon to participate in a general plebiscite on the principles of this unity and the choice of the head of the state within thirty days.

In proclaiming these decisions, the participants feel great pride and overwhelming joy in having assisted in taking this positive step on the road to Arab unity and solidarity—a unity which had been for many an epoch and many a generation the Arab's much cherished hope and greatly coveted objective In deciding on the unity of both nations, the participants declare that their unity aims at the unification of all the Arab peoples and affirm that the door is open for participation to any Arab state desirous of joining them in a union or federation for the purpose of protecting the Arab peoples from harm and evil, strengthening Arab sovereignty, and safeguarding its existence.

May God protect this step we have taken and those which are to follow with His ever vigilant care and benevolence so that the Arab people under the banner of unity may live in dignity and peace.

45 The Arab Federation: Joint Communique of Iraq and Jordan

February 14, 1958

WHEREAS the great Arab Revolt, led by His late Majesty Al-Hussein Ibn Ali, heralding the birth of a new dawn for the Arab Nation, and reflected by sacrifice for the liberation of the Greater Arab Motherland and the unification of its peoples and its lands with the aim of regaining the station of the Arabs among the nations of the world and contributing to the advancement of civilization; and

WHEREAS that blessed Revolt derived its inspiration from the will of the Arabs to achieve freedom and unity on the basis of their glorious history and their faith in themselves and the immortal message of their Nationalism, and

WHEREAS the message of the Arab Revolt—whose author gave his life in its cause—descended to sons and grandsons, inherited by generation after generation as the torch that guides the Nation of the Arabs in its march towards the achievement of its cherished aims of comprehensive unity and full freedom and sovereignty and for the recovery of its glory, the preservation of its sacred inheritance and the realization of its aspirations for an auspicious future under this blessed unity

NOW therefore, the two Hashemite States have resolved to form a Federation between them based on these high aims, and in fulfillment of this object and their National aims agreement has been reached on what follows:

1. An Arab Federation is formed between the Kingdom of Iraq and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to be known as the Arab Federation and to take effect as from Friday, 24 Rajab 1377 A H corresponding to 14th February 1958 A D This Federation shall be open to the other Arab States who may wish to adhere to it.

2. Each of the two States shall preserve its independent, international identity and its sovereignty over its territories and retain its present regime of government.

3 International treaties, pacts and agreements entered into by either of the two States before the formation of the Federation shall continue to be observed by the State that concluded them but shall not bind the other State As for international treaties, pacts and agreements that may be concluded after the establishment of the Federation and which shall come within the terms of the Federation, these shall come under the competence and authority of the Federal Government.

4 As from the date of the official proclamation of the establishment of the Federation, measures for the complete unification of the following matters shall be executed by the two States of the Federation.

(a) The unification of Foreign Policy and Diplomatic representation
(b) The unification of the Armies of Jordan and Iraq (the Arab Army)
(c) The removal of Customs barriers between the two States and unification of their Customs laws
(d) The unification of educational programmes

5. The two parties agree to take the necessary steps as quickly as possible to unify currency and co-ordinate economic and financial policies between the two States.

6 When necessity or the interests of the Federation require the unification of any matter not mentioned in Article 4, the necessary steps shall be taken in accordance with the Constitution of the Federation to bring such matters within the competence and authority of the Federal Govenment.

7. The flag of the Arab Revolt shall be the flag of the Federation and of the two States.

8. (a) Federal matters shall be dealt with by the Federal Government consisting of a Legislative Chamber and Executive Authority

(b) The members of the Legislative Chamber shall be elected by the Parliaments of Iraq and Jordan respectively, from among their own members, the two States to be equally represented in numbers

(c) The members of the Executive Authority shall be appointed in accordance with the Provisions of the Federal Constitution to assume responsibility for the matters which come within the competence of the Federal Government.

9. The King of Iraq shall be the Head of the Federal Government and in the event of his absence for any reason, the King of Jordan shall be head Each of the two Kings shall retain his Constitutional powers in his own Kingdom. In the event of any other State adhering to the Federation, the question of Head of the Federation shall be reconsidered as circumstances may require.

10 The seat of the Federal Government shall alternate between Baghdad and Amman and for a period of six months in each

11. (a) The Federal Government shall draw up a Constitution for the Federation in accordance with the bases set out in this Agreement and the Constitution of each of the two States shall be modified to the extent and limits required by the provisions of the Federal Constitution.

(b) The necessary steps and measures shall be taken to establish the Federal Government and draw up the Federal Constitution within a period not exceeding three months within the date of the signature of this Agreement.

This Agreement shall be ratified according to the Constitutional procedures observed in the two States. Done at Basman Palace, Amman, This Friday 24 Rajab 1377, A H. corresponding to 14th February 1958 A. D.

46 | Statement on Sending Troops to Lebanon: Dwight D. Eisenhower

July 15, 1958

Yesterday morning I received from President Chamoun of Lebanon an urgent plea that some United States forces be stationed in Lebanon to help maintain security and to evidence the concern of the United States for the integrity and

independence of Lebanon. President Chamoun's appeal was made with the concurrence of all of the members of the Lebanese Cabinet.

President Chamoun made clear that he considered an immediate United States response imperative if Lebanon's independence, already menaced from without, were to be preserved in the face of the grave developments which occurred yesterday in Baghdad whereby the lawful Government was violently overthrown and many of its members martyred.

In response to this appeal from the Government of Lebanon, the United States has dispatched a contingent of United States forces to Lebanon to protect American lives and by their presence there to encourage the Lebanese Government in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity. These forces have not been sent as any act of war. They will demonstrate the concern of the United States for the independence and integrity of Lebanon, which we deem vital to the national interest and world peace. Our concern will also be shown by economic assistance. We shall act in accordance with these legitimate concerns.

The United States, this morning, will report its action to an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. As the United Nations Charter recognizes, there is an inherent right of collective self-defense. In conformity with the spirit of the Charter, the United States is reporting the measures taken by it to the Security Council of the United Nations, making clear that these measures will be terminated as soon as the Security Council has itself taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

The United States believes that the United Nations can and should take measures which are adequate to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. It is apparent, however, that in the face of the tragic and shocking events that are occurring near by, more will be required than the team of United Nations observers now in Lebanon. Therefore, the United States will support in the United Nations measures which seem to be adequate to meet the new situation and which will enable the United States forces promptly to be withdrawn

Lebanon is a small peace-loving state with which the United States has traditionally had the most friendly relations. There are in Lebanon about 2,500 Americans and we cannot, consistently with our historic relations and with the principles of the United Nations, stand idly by when Lebanon appeals itself for evidence of our concern and when Lebanon may not be able to preserve internal order and to defend itself against indirect aggression.

47 Address to Congress: Dwight D. Eisenhower

July 15, 1958

On July 14, 1958, I received an urgent request from the President of the Republic of Lebanon that some United States forces be stationed in Lebanon President Chamoun stated that, without an immediate showing of United States support,

the Government of Lebanon would be unable to survive. This request by President Chamoun was made with the concurrence of all the members of the Lebanese Cabinet. I have replied that we would do this and a contingent of United States Marines has now arrived in Lebanon This initial dispatch of troops will be augmented as required. United States forces will be withdrawn as rapidly as circumstances permit.

Simultaneously, I requested that an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council be held on July 15, 1958. At that meeting, the permanent representative of the United States reported to the Council the action which this government has taken. He also expressed the hope that the United Nations could soon take further effective measures to meet more fully the situation in Lebanon. We will continue to support the United Nations to this end.

United States forces are being sent to Lebanon to protect American lives and by their presence to assist the Government of Lebanon in the preservation of Lebanon's territorial integrity and independence, which have been deemed vital to United States national interests and world peace

About two months ago a violent insurrection broke out in Lebanon, particularly along the border with Syria, which with Egypt forms the United Arab Republic This revolt was encouraged and strongly backed by the official Cairo, Damascus and Soviet radios, which broadcast to Lebanon in the Arabic language The insurrection was furthered by sizable amounts of arms, ammunition and money and by personnel infiltrated from Syria to fight against the lawful authorities The avowed purpose of these activities was to overthrow the legally constituted Government of Lebanon and to install by violence a Government which would subordinate the independence of Lebanon to the policies of the United Arab Republic.

Lebanon referred this situation to the United Nations Security Council. In view of the international implications of what was occurring in Lebanon, the Security Council on June 11, 1958, decided to send observers into Lebanon for the purpose of insuring that further outside assistance to the insurrection would cease. The Secretary General of the United Nations subsequently undertook a mission to the area to reinforce the work of the observer.

It was our belief that the efforts of the Secretary General and of the United Nations observers were helpful in reducing further aid in terms of personal and military equipment from across the frontiers of Lebanon. There was a basis for hope that the situation might be moving toward a peaceful solution, consonant with the continuing integrity of Lebanon, and that the aspect of indirect aggression from without was being brought under control.

The situation was radically changed, however, on July 14 when there was a violent outbreak in Baghdad, in nearby Iraq Elements in Iraq strongly sympathetic to the United Arab Republic seem to have murdered or driven from office individuals comprising the lawful government of that country. We do not yet know in detail to what extent they have succeeded We do have reliable information that important Iraqui leaders have been murdered.

We share with the Government of Lebanon the view that these events in Iraq demonstrate a ruthlessness of aggresive purpose which tiny Lebanon can not combat without further evidence of support from other friendly nations.

After the most detailed consideration, I have concluded that, given the developments in Iraq, the measures thus far taken by the United Nations Security Council

are not sufficient to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. I have considered, furthermore, the question of our responsibility to protect and safeguard American citizens in Lebanon, of whom there are about 2,500. Pending the taking of adequate measures by the United Nations, the United States will be acting pursuant to what the United Nations Charter recognizes is an inherent right—the right of all nations to work together and to seek help when necessary to preserve their independence. I repeat that we wish to withdraw our forces as soon as the United Nations has taken further effective steps designed to safeguard Lebanese independence.

It is clear that the events which have been occurring in Lebanon represent indirect aggression from without, and that such aggression endangers the independence and integrity of Lebanon.

It is recognized that the step now being taken may have serious consequences. I have, however, come to the considered and sober conclusion that despite the risk involved, this action is required to support the principles of justice and international law upon which peace and a stable international order depend.

Our Government has acted in response to an appeal for help from a small and peaceful nation which has long had ties of closet friendship with the United States. Readiness to help a friend in need is an admirable characteristic of the American people, and I am, in this message, informing the Congress of the reasons why I believe that the United States could not in honor stand idly by in this hour of Lebanon's grave peril As we act at the request of a friendly government to help it to preserve its independence and to preserve law and order which will protect American lives, we are acting to reaffirm and strengthen principles upon which the safety and security of the United States depend.

48 Arab Resolution: United Nations General Assembly

August 20, 1958

Compromise resolution drafted by delegates of ten Arab states.

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item "Question discussed at the 838th meeting of the Security Council" on 7 Aug., 1958,

Noting the Charter aim that states should "practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors,"

Noting that the Arab states have agreed in the pact of the League of Arab States to strengthen the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab states, and to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of these states, and to direct their efforts toward the common good of all the Arab countries, the improvement of their status, the security of their future and the realization of their aspirations and hopes;

Desiring to relieve international tension,

A

1. Welcomes the renewed assurances given by the Arab states to observe the provisions of Article 8 of the Pact of the League of Arab States that "each member shall respect the systems of government established in the other member states and regard them as exclusive concerns of those states," and that "each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government."

2. Calls upon all member states to act strictly in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, of non-aggression, of strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and of equal and mutual benefit, and to insure that their conduct by word and deed conforms to these principles;

B

Requests the Secretary General to make forthwith, in consultation with the governments concerned and in accordance with the United Nations Charter, and having in mind Section A of this resolution, such practical arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter in relation to Lebanon and Jordon in the present circumstances, and thereby facilitate the early withdrawal of the foreign troops from the two countries;

C

Invites the Secretary General to continue his studies now under way and in this context to consult as appropriate with the Arab countries of the Near East with a view to possible assistance regarding an Arab development institution designed to further economic growth in these countries;

D

1. Requests member states to cooperate fully in carrying out this resolution;

2. Invites the Secretary General to report hereunder, as appropriate, the first such report to be made not later than 30 September, 1958

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